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International Organizations (IOs) are vibrant actors of global social gov-
ernance. They provide forums for exchange, contention, and cooperation 
on social policies. IOs prepare, guide, and supervise international treaties 
about welfare issues which states sign and adhere to. They direct, finance, 
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and implement projects which affect people’s lives. The World Bank, for 
example, has been identified as having had a significant impact on social 
policy development in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in some 
countries in Latin America with regard to pension systems. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
considerably fueled the German debate on appropriate education systems, 
and the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is a 
very visible actor when it comes to development aid for children. The 
study of IOs in general has advanced tremendously in recent decades. 
Today, we have a much better understanding of different types of global 
actors and their mechanisms of influence. However, our knowledge about 
the involvement of IOs varies significantly by policy field. While scholar-
ship on IOs often focuses on issue areas like security, economics, or envi-
ronmental policies, we know comparatively little about the specific roles of 
IOs in social policies. Furthermore, within global social policy and gover-
nance studies, there have been very few systematic attempts to analyze 
different social policy fields in their dimension of global actor involvement.
With this book, we intend to enhance and systematize our understand-
ing of IOs in global social governance. It provides studies on a variety of 
social policy fields in which different, but also the same, IOs operate. 
Basically, the chapters in this book have two purposes: On the one hand, they 
shed light on IO involvement in a particular social policy field by describing 
the population of engaging IOs. They explore how a particular global social 
policy field is constituted as a whole, and which are the dominant IOs set-
ting the trends. On the other hand, the contributions examine the discourses 
within and between these IOs on the respective social policies. Thus, the 
chapters present the ideas IOs are promoting as well as their policies and 
leitmotifs which guide the discourses they produce. By examining the pop-
ulation of IOs and their discourses in different policy fields, the book both 
gathers insights from different projects on global social policy fields and 
opens the floor for comparing IO involvement in those fields. We generate 
new insights and future steps for describing and theorizing global social 
governance as an architecture of arguments. By this, we refer to the specific 
and varying constellations of IOs in different social policy fields and their 
patterns of discourse that characterize global social policies.
A. Kaasch 
Faculty of Sociology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
e-mail: alexandra.kaasch@uni-bielefeld.de
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In this introduction, we first briefly recap in broad strokes the knowl-
edge about the purposes, functions, and characteristics of IOs in general, 
and their involvement in social policy issues. Thus, we look at ‘public’ orga-
nizations, namely at IOs which are understood as intergovernmental orga-
nizations (IGOs), in which states are the prime members. We then set out 
some basic conceptualizations for studying IOs in global social governance 
before specifying our framework for exploring populations and discourses 
of IOs in global social policies. Complementing liberal and constructivist 
International Relations (IR) theories, we use organizational ecology and 
soft governance approaches as heuristic frames for our analyses of different 
architectures of IO global social governance. ‘Populations’ are identified as 
the dominant as well as regional IOs active in a specific social policy issue; 
they are analyzed in their current state but also from a historical perspec-
tive. In this volume, the concept of ‘discourse’ is understood as the strate-
gic way in which individuals or collective actors frame ideas, and not as a 
structural understanding of how certain meanings influence behavior.
Overall, despite intense scholarly work focusing on IOs, looking at spe-
cific policy fields and the roles, characteristics, or functions of single IOs 
and of IOs within their organizational contexts is surprisingly underdevel-
oped. Furthermore, the differences between such IO populations across 
different social policy fields are still rarely explored. Although IOs are one 
of the major components of global social policy and their prominence and 
influence in international life has steadily grown over the last decades, we 
need deeper research about how the population of IOs active in social 
policy is constituted and to better understand what discourses IOs actually 
spread in social policy, as they aim to influence national policies or the 
international community by means of soft governance with these dis-
courses. This volume seeks to complement research on IOs in social policy 
by addressing the following sets of research questions:
• Which IOs are active in different social policy fields? How is the 
population in social policy fields constituted by specific types and 
constellations of IOs? How (and why) do IOs cooperate with other 
IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or transnational 
actors, such as commercial enterprises, in social policy fields?
• What ideas about social policies are these IOs promoting? How can 
IO discourses over specific social policy issues be characterized? What 
were watersheds in the discursive framing of social policy ideas 
through IOs? Who are the addressees of IO discourses?
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We find that diverse IOs populate the different social policy fields—for 
a long time and with significant impact on the different discourses. While 
some have been around for a century or even longer, IO activity is fairly 
new in other fields. All social policy fields are populated by a variety of IOs 
which consist of universal IOs, but often also regional organizations occu-
pying particular niches. Some IOs, like the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) or World Bank, are present in multiple social policy 
fields and shape them by putting forward their ideas. With few exceptions, 
IOs active in global social policy mainly exert soft governance. They 
develop and broadcast ideas and norms about social policy issues which 
are transmitted into national systems. They are recognized normative 
players due to their reputation in the field. Overall, we find a highly sophis-
ticated architecture of arguments in global social policy which builds on a 
dense population of IOs and the discourses they spread. The different 
discourses in the studied social policy fields have idiosyncratic structures 
but also feature some commonalities. Often, the discourses of IOs are 
influenced by general global political and economic developments, like the 
rise of neoliberalism or globalization.
StudyIng IoS and SocIal PolIcy
Different types of actors can be identified in global social policies. These 
include civil society organizations, digital movements, formations of states, 
or even individuals (Kaasch and Martens 2015). In this book, however, we 
turn our focus exclusively to IOs in order to develop a more profound 
understanding of the variation of IO influence in different social policy 
fields. Nevertheless, despite the long existence of a continuous scholarship 
on IOs, there is no commonly accepted definition of the term ‘interna-
tional organization’. However, there is widespread agreement on the char-
acteristics of IOs. As a minimum, IOs are interpreted as international 
bodies that have been set up through a treaty between nations and thus 
have an international, legally binding character. Furthermore, IOs have 
structural bodies which are operating on a continual basis.
For the purposes of studying IOs in social policy, we employ the follow-
ing definition: An international organization is a formal institutional 
arrangement created by an international treaty between at least three sov-
ereign states or government agencies of states and has a permanent orga-
nizational body, including a secretariat, staff, headquarters, and a charter 
that addresses its mission and purpose. Such a definition follows common 
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practice in IO research (Hooghe et al. 2015) and excludes other interna-
tional bodies that are not founded by states, such as NGOs (e.g. Amnesty 
International) as well as those bodies that lack a permanent organizational 
underpinning, such as groupings or coalitions of states (e.g. the G8/20).1 
Among the tasks and functions of IOs are that they prepare, guide, and 
supervise international treaties. They also direct, finance, and implement 
projects, and exercise many more duties such as providing arenas for 
exchange, networking, and debate.
Scholarly research on IOs has dealt with them, for the most part, within 
the discipline of International Relations (see e.g. Keohane and Nye 1974; 
Hurd 2011; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Nielson and Tierney 2003). 
IOs have long been participants of international life and they play a signifi-
cant role in managing cooperation, providing forums for multilateral 
exchange, and in disseminating norms. Thus, research on IOs has focused 
on “why these phenomena exist, how they function and what effects they 
have on world politics” (Martin and Simmons 2013, 326). Recent research 
projects have also dealt with the performance of IOs and their policy out-
put (Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014), as well as the design of IOs in relation to 
their assigned authority (Hooghe and Marks 2014, Hooghe et al. 2015; 
Zürn 2018; Abbott et  al. 2014). Consequently, multiple theoretical 
approaches have been developed and applied to the study of IOs and their 
roles in the international community. As part of these diverse studies, the 
perception of IOs changes in accordance with developments in interna-
tional relations. Reflecting these different perspectives, scholars conceptu-
alize IOs as either ‘instruments’, ‘arenas’, ‘actors’, ‘bureaucracies’ or 
‘resources’ (e.g. Hurd 2011; Barkin 2006).
In the research on social policy, the attention to the role of IOs has 
emerged from studies on transition and developing countries. While in 
traditional welfare state research, the units of analysis used to be national 
contexts, actors, and institutions, most countries outside of a narrow 
‘OECD country’ view developed forms of social protection with different 
kinds of transnational involvement. IOs have, for example, been identified 
as important in designing schemes of social protection in Central and 
1 While the term IO has long been used for organizations founded by governments, the 
globalized turn in international relations also strengthened the interpretation of internation-
ally operating and non-governmental organizations as being IOs. In this context, the term 
IGOs was introduced to distinguish governmental from non-governmental actors. Either 
way, the significance of providing a definition of the type of organizations dealt with is 
immanent.
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Eastern European countries in the 1990s. In development contexts, the 
impact of conditionalities on loans, as well as the promotion of specific 
schemes of social protection (e.g. Conditional Cash Transfers) by IOs, has 
been subject to extensive research as well. Theoretical approaches combin-
ing different streams of theoretical literature for better capturing global 
social governance and the role of IOs within have been developed accord-
ingly (Kaasch et al. 2019).
Contributions focusing on the role of specific IOs in social policy 
include work on the World Bank (e.g. Ervik 2005; Vetterlein 2007) and 
the ILO (e.g. Deacon 2015), but also the OECD (e.g. Armingeon and 
Beyeler 2004; Deacon and Kaasch 2008; Mahon 2009) and the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 
the field of global education policy (Lerch and Buckner 2018). What we 
learn from such contributions is that while each IO does come with a spe-
cific, individual background, constitution, mandate, and working mode, 
they all coexist in contexts of mutual recognition, exchange, struggle, col-
laboration, and so on (e.g. Deacon 2007; Yeates 2008; Deacon 2013; 
Kaasch 2015; Kaasch and Martens 2015).
Moreover, it is hard to determine the value and quality of impact in a 
generalized way—even for one single IO—there are usually multiple mes-
sages and working mechanisms that play out differently. How do ideas and 
policies get diffused and how do norms get implemented? Considering 
different modes here, the World Bank for example can be the good guy 
(providing support for implementing social policies) or the bad guy (forc-
ing states to introduce certain reforms) depending on what policy field we 
look at. Similarly, looking ‘inside’ organizational structures, one OECD 
department can be identified as producing more social ideas than another 
one, and both messages may be communicated simultaneously to the pub-
lic. This also illustrates that IOs are not monolithic actors, but rather com-
plex bureaucracies with possibly competing departments.
In addition, assessing the power of specific working modes or means of 
communication is also difficult. To be sure, there is comparatively little 
‘hard law’ in global social policies, however, depending on the breadth of 
the concept, human rights law or international regulation may be part of 
the picture and there we may even find enforceable norms. Nevertheless, 
the only transnational context with something like a more comprehensive 
social policy is still the European Union (EU). The impact of the EU on 
social policy is mostly determined by its supranational legal framework in 
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the free movement of labor and, to some extent, health services, as various 
contributions have shown (e.g. Ferrera 2005; Anderson 2015).
An important task remaining for research is to get a clearer picture of 
what qualifies as ‘impact’ or ‘influence’. For instance, Armingeon and 
Beyeler (2004) argued for the OECD that it has at best little influence on 
national social policymaking. Orenstein (2003) and Müller (2003) instead 
found that the World Bank strongly influenced the set-up of national pen-
sion systems. While the aim of this book is not to analyze the impact that 
IOs have on specific national social policy reforms, the changing national 
discourses generated by global discourses, rankings by IOs, and hard law 
(e.g. as part of trade agreements) in some policy fields may have both 
direct and indirect implications and consequences for national social poli-
cymaking. Epistemic communities have been identified as playing a role in 
several cases. By taking into account how discursive practices shape the 
understanding of policy goals and appropriate means, we show how IO 
influence can be translated onto the state level.
global governance of SocIal PolIcy fIeldS
In understanding the meaning and impact of IOs from a horizontal per-
spective, the study of IOs is closely associated with concepts of global 
governance. For more than two decades, global governance has helped to 
frame the understanding of how political steering on the international 
level takes place and to what extent IOs can account for autonomous 
actions (Muldoon 2004; Mayntz 2008). As a system, global governance 
builds on normative principles and reflexive authorities (Zürn 2018). The 
notion of global governance is important because, “the purpose of global 
governance no longer reflects solely the interest of states but now also 
includes other actors” (Barnett and Sikkink 2008, 64). Following this 
aspect, territorial boundaries and national sovereignty cannot be taken for 
granted in contemporary policymaking (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 
2006). This also holds true for the involvement of IOs in social issues, 
despite the general assumption that social issues are dominantly governed 
by national constituencies.
Thus, an enhanced understanding of political steering processes allows 
for analyzing mechanisms of governance detached from the state-centric 
perspective and includes additional, more comprehensive forms of gover-
nance. Furthermore, it entails a shift from states to a multiplicity of regula-
tory actors: from hard to soft law, from formal to informal rules (Mingst 
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1999, 93). This understanding of governance presents IOs (and other 
inter- and transnational actors) as having the ability to create, diffuse, and 
implement rules, norms, and (behavioral) standards through means of soft 
governance rather than through binding legislation understood as hard 
law (Abbott and Snidal 2000). In other words, IOs can “use institutional 
and discursive resources to induce deference from others” (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004, 5).
In this regard, the discursive actions of IOs become pivotal in the realm 
of global governance, given that the ways in which issues and problems are 
framed and perceived play an important role in influencing policy out-
comes. In this vein, IOs can become “knowledge brokers” (Niemann and 
Martens 2018). They define social problems, provide answers to them, 
and distribute the solutions worldwide, often backed by academic research 
and empirical data. Thus, global social policy research is concerned with 
questions of who formulates and frames what kinds of ideas, goals, and 
rights on social protection (Deacon et al. 1997; Deacon 2007). Such kind 
of research also seeks to answer questions regarding how these processes 
take place and how they are ‘communicated’ to other levels of social poli-
cymaking (Béland and Orenstein 2013).
global governance aS Io Involvement In SocIal 
PolIcy fIeldS
For the purpose of this book, we study global social governance as the 
involvement of IOs in different fields of social policy. Concepts and theo-
ries vary though with regard to what forms part of social policy (or a ‘wel-
fare state’). Such concepts are often driven by the institutional arrangements 
of ideal types within welfare state regimes. Since the view has broadened 
so as to include low- and middle-income countries into welfare state analy-
ses, the concept of what may form part of a system of social protection has 
also widened. Pension and unemployment care schemes usually relate to 
concepts of social insurance, while food, housing, or water are more about 
the provision of public goods. Health and care extend to both the provi-
sion of services and forms of social insurance against connected risks. 
Identifying vulnerable groups, such as children or disabled people, is 
another way of defining and organizing social policy fields. Moreover, 
when we look at eco-social policies, we can consider both a connection 
between policy fields, as well as how they may stand for a new form of 
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welfare state conception. In the selection of contributions to this volume, 
we intend to exemplify several of such ‘fields’ without constraining our-
selves to one specific understanding of what forms a part of social policy, 
or one interpretation of how best to break social policy down into further 
policy fields.
With this approach, we are in line with the character and emergence of 
international law in relation to social issues and global development goals. 
The United Nation’s International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights refers to fundamental human rights connected to labor, 
social security, health and care, and education. Many ILO Conventions, 
especially and most recently the Social Protection Floors Recommendation 
(R202), specify these social rights as well. The Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) are a further reflection of the broad and multifold nature of 
social policy and social protection systems. At the same time, many of 
these instruments of global social policy also single out vulnerable groups 
for which they discuss and define the specific applications of social policies.
However, when studying the population of social policy IOs, theoreti-
cal streams of International Relations hold different factors accountable 
for IOs being engaged in the field of social policy. A realists’ interest in the 
activities of IOs is rather limited, as this perspective considers IOs to be 
institutions associated with reflecting the political power structures 
between states (e.g. Hoffmann 1970; Mearsheimer 1994). The existence 
and eventual influence of IOs would thus reflect state decision-making in 
terms of national interest in power perpetuation. Informed by functional-
ism and rational choice theory, neo-institutionalism views IOs as entities 
created to manage interdependencies and facilitate cooperation among 
states (Keohane 1984; Zürn 1998; Keohane and Nye 1977). In this vein, 
it is argued that IOs are suitable for pooling the interests of different actors 
and may achieve better outcomes than if states were to act on their own 
(Martin and Simmons 1998; Weingast 2002). Following this line of 
thought, IOs should form once a goal that requires international coopera-
tion is defined. They are sustained if the reason for cooperation persists or 
if the benefits for their involved members outweigh the costs. In any case, 
an IO’s existence depends on the goodwill and preferences of states.
Other approaches to international relations grant IOs more autono-
mous actorhood. Neoliberalists try to balance IO autonomy and their 
responsiveness to the demands of member governments (Hawkins et al. 
2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003). Thus, an IO’s existence is affected by 
their agent relationship to the state principal. Consequently, it becomes 
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costly for the principal to dissolve its agent once it is installed. According 
to assumptions of path dependency this cost increases the longer the IO 
exists and the more institutionalized it becomes. The work of constructiv-
ists and others have drawn attention to IOs’ nature and the characteristics 
of their actorhood as well as to the activities of IOs as norm entrepreneurs 
who are able to influence state behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Finnemore 1993; Abbott and Snidal 1998). 
From this view, IOs are not mere instruments of states. Rather, IOs and 
their bureaucracies can develop a life of their own, including the definition 
of new goals, structures, and modi  operandi, eventually being able to 
influence state behavior (Niemann 2012). Activities in social policy are 
therefore also within the hands of the IO itself and can even be dysfunc-
tional to the initial tasks.
Our volume builds up on liberalist and constructivist work, as scholars 
of these theories emphasize the actorhood of IOs, though to different 
degrees. Such approaches are a helpful starting point for exploring IOs as 
important actors in global social governance. However, these classic IR 
theories are not yet sufficient for exploring what shapes the populations of 
IOs in a field and the significance of the discourses they produce. Therefore, 
we complement our analytical framework with a theoretical heuristic, 
adapting Organizational Ecology and Soft Governance approaches for our 
purposes.
PoPulatIonS of IoS: organIzatIonal fIeld 
and InStItutIonal deSIgn
In conceptualizing global social governance as a number of social fields, 
we are interested in mapping each field according to the IOs active in it. 
How a field is constituted and which IOs populate it is determined by 
exogenous and endogenous elements. The analytical approach of 
Organizational Ecology within the study of IR is loosely applied in this 
volume as a heuristic frame for this aspect of the analyses. It offers a theo-
retical lens for assessing the developments in the population of social pol-
icy IOs. This theoretical account, which stems from biology sciences and 
was adapted to the social sciences most prominently by Hannan and 
Freeman (1977, 1986, 1989), was recently revived by Abbott, Green, and 
Keohane (2016) for studying IOs.
 D. NIEMANN ET AL.
13
Organizational Ecology is marked by two complementary approaches: 
organizational environment and intrinsic features (Abbott et  al. 2016). 
The intrinsic features approach emphasizes endogenous factors of IOs to 
explain how IOs are capable of acting within a given institutional environ-
ment and what accounts for change. The organizational environment 
approach addresses how this institutional field is composed and acknowl-
edges external factors and externalities of the IOs’ surroundings. Hence, 
combining both could be seen as a promising analytical tool for develop-
ing a framework for examining developments and changes in the realm of 
(social policy) IOs. Thus, from the perspective of organizational ecology, 
one focuses on both the constitutive features of the organizational field 
and the characteristics of IOs within this field. In addition, the theoretical 
view of organizational ecology with its focus on constraining and enabling 
environmental variables is seen as compatible with actor-centered 
approaches, which can offer more detailed explanations on how IOs 
respond to imposed external constraints and opportunities (Abbott et al. 
2016, 272–273).
Organizational Field: Topography of IOs
Organizational environment is related to the sociological concept of an 
‘organizational field’ and refers to what we call topography. Thus, the 
topography of an organizational field comprises underlying characteristics 
of the field itself, the density of relevant actors in that field and their rela-
tionship to each other. This concept, also widely used in political science 
and international relations, marks the aggregate of actors that constitute 
the institutional environment.
The characteristics of an organizational field further include the rules 
and belief systems, as well as the relational networks that arise in the 
broader societal context (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Meyer and Scott 1983). In this approach, the environment, 
which IOs cannot control, is seen as shaping the opportunities for their 
development and actions. In sum, IO behavior and interactions with oth-
ers is shaped by the field’s topography.
The organizational environment emphasizes that adaptation to the 
environment determines the opportunities and scope of action of an 
IO. Thus, a population is marked by its degree of diversity. This means 
that in a highly diverse field, organizations can populate different niches 
within a community. Also, the density of a population has to be taken into 
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account when analyzing an organizational field. For instance, the concept 
of isomorphism emphasizes how organizations act in a highly elaborated 
environment in which they become more alike in order to gain legitimacy 
and ultimately increase their impact (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 352).
This means that for an IO in social policy, the ability to shape discourse 
in a field is impacted by the number and power of competing, cooperat-
ing, and coexisting actors. If many actors hold the same beliefs and ideas, 
they can form coherent epistemic communities and put forward their 
claims and positions more easily in a partnership. Accordingly, a homog-
enous community could generate more leverage to influence other actors 
(e.g. domestic governments or other organizational fields). In contrast, if 
IOs face competition with other IOs (or other actors), they may lose out 
to those with stronger positions. IOs may also populate and cultivate a 
niche in some social policy issues and coexist without disturbing the vital 
interests of states or other IOs. When IOs populate a niche in a popula-
tion, an important issue in this context is often the question of expertise 
(Ness and Brechin 1988; Jonsson 1986), which could apply to regionally 
active IOs that address specificities.
Institutional Design: Intrinsic Features of IOs
While the organizational environment approach focuses on the interaction 
between IOs and their environment, the concept of intrinsic features 
emphasizes how the institutional design of IOs shapes their behavior and 
determines how autonomous IOs can act in an organizational field. On 
the one hand, it finds support in rational choice concepts, such as the 
principal-agent model (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003), 
which implies that the designers of IOs can actively influence the scope of 
possible actions of an IO. On the other hand, this approach is also congru-
ent with approaches based on path dependency theories of historical insti-
tutionalism, as they explain why initial choices may have long-term effects 
on the future of the organizational development (North 1990; 
Pierson 2004).2
2 This is in line with one early observation by Stinchcombe (1965), who argues that orga-
nizations incorporate and preserve institutional characteristics that are fashionable or legiti-
mate during the period in which they were founded. Intrinsic features also relate to theorists 
who have documented how public organizations reinvent their original missions and tailor 
their appearance to placate and please external stakeholders (Boin et al. 2010, 402).
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One important issue in this regard concerns the institutional design of 
membership rules (Koremenos et al. 2001, 763). Membership in IOs is 
usually distinguished as either universal or restricted (Rittberger et  al. 
2012, 7–9; Jacobson 1984, 12). Thus, it can be assumed that IOs that are 
potentially open to all states feature different discursive patterns than IOs 
with restricted membership. Moreover, if an IO has many different mem-
ber states with different interests and preferences, this heterogeneity makes 
it more difficult to find a commonly accepted framing of an issue at stake. 
On the other hand, once the frame is set, its moral authority is high.
Another important aspect regarding the institutional design of IOs is 
the scope of issues covered (Koremenos et al. 2001). In IO research, two 
notions are commonly distinguished, namely comprehensive and policy- 
specific concerns of IOs (Lenz et  al. 2015). IOs with comprehensive 
scopes deal with more issue areas than those with specific policy concerns. 
Hence, comprehensive IOs could link issues of social policy with other 
topics in their portfolio, for instance economics or the environment. IOs 
with more than one policy field usually have to find an overarching world 
view which is implicitly reflected in the IO’s discursive approach in all 
policy fields it is dealing with.
Understanding IOs (and particularly IO secretariats) as complex 
bureaucracies entails some important implications for the discourse char-
acteristics of IOs. As has been shown, the analysis of IOs as bureaucracies 
must also take into consideration the internal IO procedures, rules, and 
mechanisms (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). These influence how flexible 
an IO is in terms of dealing with changing external situations. In the con-
text of studying the discourses of IOs in social policy, this means that the 
organization of IO bureaucracies influences how the discursive culture of 
IOs is institutionally constituted. These factors provide a framework for 
deliberations within IOs and shape the scope of discussions.
dIScourSeS of IoS: cognItIve authorIty 
and Soft governance
As a second step, we are interested in the discourses which take place 
within and between IOs in different social policy fields. The organizational 
environment, characterized by the degree of density, diversity, and interac-
tion between IOs as well as the institutional design of an IO, which 
includes its scope of membership and the structure of its bureaucracy, 
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provide an analytical framework for analyzing how IOs are influenced by 
each other in terms of what they can do and how they can interact. 
However, the analysis of their discourses provides insights on what ideas, 
policies, and leitmotifs they promote both regionally and globally in their 
field about a particular social policy. This allows us to assess how their 
views on social policies have evolved and whether we can observe isomor-
phic tendencies regarding ideas.
The importance of discourses from an International Relations’ point of 
view is usually associated with social constructivism, as it offers explana-
tory strength in assessing IO governance capabilities. Discourses, in this 
sense, are understood in this volume as strategical discourse promoted by 
individual or collective actors, and not as structural components which 
constrain activity. Central to this perspective is the role of IOs and their 
ability to gain autonomy and authority as actors. Often equipped to set 
agendas, prepare and shape decisions, or foster implementation, IOs are 
thus more than the sum of their member states’ interests (Koremenos 
et al. 2001).
In particular, in a highly complex field where knowledge is considered 
a key resource, IOs make themselves irreplaceable in terms of providing 
information to their members that is otherwise not available (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004, Martens and Jakobi 2010b). In the absence of com-
mand and control, IOs can make use of their ability to produce informa-
tion and knowledge to generate influence (Conzelmann 2008, 44). Unlike 
hard or coercive mechanisms of governance, such soft governance cannot 
be equated with traditional hierarchical steering, but rather with epistemic 
knowledge (Haas 1992). What is important in this line of thought is that 
IOs need to be accepted as cognitive authorities on discursive governance 
and discursively provide a set of coherent ideas for policy solutions.
Cognitive Authority: Legitimacy and Reputation of IOs
IO soft governance implies that although IOs are set up by states and 
consist of state delegates, they are able to develop their own preferences 
and ideas because of intra-organizational networks and interactions that 
cannot be fully controlled by any principals (Hawkins et al. 2006). Despite 
the provision of a clear mandate on how to act, IOs can go beyond their 
previously defined roles and generate new aims that exceed their initial 
purpose and scope. With time, IOs may even embrace policy positions that 
are at odds with the interest of their founders, thereby exerting influence 
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back onto their member states and beyond, given the potential for agency 
slack (Koenig-Archibugi 2006). This may be accomplished when IOs, or 
more specifically their bodies (e.g. secretariats, departments, and working 
groups), develop idiosyncratic discourses and generate their own ways of 
framing an issue. Instead of simply carrying out what their member states 
urge them to do, IOs become policy entrepreneurs.
In this context, an IO needs to be accepted as a cognitive authority in 
the given policy field (Broome and Seabrooke 2012, 2015) in order to 
shape a given discourse. The authority of an actor lacking coercive powers 
is strongly linked to the aspect of legitimacy. An indicator of an IO’s legiti-
macy is its reputation. IOs with a ‘good’ reputation (i.e. a reputation for 
being rational and impartial) are accepted as legitimate sources of advice 
largely due to the fact that they exhibit apolitical and technocratic exper-
tise (Barnett 2002, 113; Sharman 2007; Meyer and Rowan 1977). The 
perceived legitimacy of an IO leads others to follow its 
recommendations.
The ability to shape how to think about something is central in under-
standing soft governance by discursive means. Since IOs utilizing soft gov-
ernance rely on their function as advisors and opinion leaders, one key 
element is the role and dissemination of ideas. The central argument in 
this respect is that the proliferation of ideas and ideational change in turn 
promote policy change. Ideas serve as a cognitive framework for interpret-
ing an issue, identifying something as a problem, and rendering suitable 
solution strategies (Martens and Jakobi 2010a). Thus, both the social cre-
ation of common knowledge as a standard in a policy field and the role of 
IOs in shaping international discourse are essential for soft governance 
(Abbott and Snidal 1998). In the case of social policies, this means that 
ideas IOs create and promote about social policies serve as “cognitive fil-
ters through which actors come to […] conceive of their own interests” 
(Hay 2011, 69).
This takes place in a discursive process. First, ideas shape the definition 
of an issue as a problem. In this regard, the reinterpretation of a policy in 
the light of a new idea reveals that something needs to be changed. This 
means that IOs first create common shared knowledge by providing infor-
mation which was otherwise not accessible. The collected data is then 
interpreted against the background of views and ideas within the IO. Pure 
information is transformed into substantial knowledge (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004).
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Second, by identifying something as problematic, ideas can also indi-
cate goals (i.e. a more desirable policy). The SDGs are a current and 
prominent example. They address global challenges in various social policy 
fields, interconnect them, and define targets to be achieved. It is deemed 
essential to back arguments with empirical evidence, as they must be 
proved to be conclusive and sound.
Third, suitable means for accomplishing the new goals are communi-
cated through ideas. This “meditative mode” of soft IO governance 
addresses direct contributions to the policy discourse (Mahon and McBride 
2008). IOs make recommendations to their members on the basis of pub-
licized information and findings about best practices in a certain policy 
field and consequently lobby for them (Martens and Jakobi 2010a). This 
lobbying can take different forms, such as recommendations which illus-
trate directly how to act in a policy field, for instance. More indirectly, 
recommendations can also emphasize the behavior of a peer actor in order 
to serve as a blueprint.
Soft Governance: IOs as Broadcasters of Ideas and Policies
Ideas are not just tools in the hands of strategic actors (Lieberman 2002, 
699), they need agents to be disseminated in a discursive process. IOs act 
as these disseminators or broadcasters of ideas (Djelic and Sahlin- 
Andersson 2006, 17) and aim to “nurture people’s identities, helping 
them to construct their fundamental values which, in turn, shapes their 
beliefs and interests” (Béland and Cox 2011, 9). IOs help to define what 
stakeholders want and provide them with the justification for why they 
want something.
By discursively constraining the frame of appropriate behavior, IOs are 
able to influence others, be it national governments or other actors in the 
international sphere, because they possess the authority to create social 
reality (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 2005). IOs aim to frame a common 
understanding of the issue at stake and define goals for policymaking by 
increasing or decreasing the legitimacy of a certain norm, policy, or action 
(Nay 2014).
Interesting questions in this regard are about whether the nature of the 
discourse is normatively constituted or whether it focus on strategic behav-
ior and technical aspects. Who is participating in these discourses? Can we 
observe different discursive frames competing within single IOs or 
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between IOs? Why does one prevail? Or do different IOs within a social 
policy field hold different discursive frames and compete with each other?
By virtue of the promoted leitmotifs or guiding principles, IOs can set 
how the discourse of a topic is defined, shaped, and promoted. IOs set 
standards against which national policies can be evaluated and create nor-
mative pressures for the national context of policymaking (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998). They form opinions which stimulate and inspire national 
discourses in politics, the public, and in the media. In other words, shap-
ing discourses is a form of soft governance.
Structure of the book
Taken together, this volume seeks to fill a major gap on IO social gover-
nance. The chapters in this book have two purposes. On the one hand, they 
shed light on IO involvement in a particular social policy field by describ-
ing the population of engaging IOs. They explore how a particular social 
policy field is constituted and which major or dominant IOs are setting the 
trends. On the other hand, the contributions examine the discourses these 
IOs promote in ‘their’ field by exploring and analyzing the ideas and leit-
motifs they produce. By exploring the trajectories IOs set and spread, the 
chapters in this book provide novel knowledge about the architecture of 
arguments in global social governance. In addition to the introduction 
and the conclusion, the volume contains three parts and each part con-
tains four chapters.
This introduction provides a systematic theoretical approach to exam-
ining IOs in global social policy. It lays out in broad strokes the knowledge 
about their purposes, functions, and characteristics in general, and their 
involvement in social policy issues in particular. Complementing liberal 
and constructivist IR theories, the introduction lays out organizational 
ecology and soft governance approaches as heuristic frames for the analy-
ses of different architectures of IO global social governance.
Part II deals with labor and migration issues. The following Chap. 2 by 
Fergusson addresses the ways IOs have responded to youth unemployment 
as an important and distinctive policy field by tracing the historical context 
of multiple IOs’ engagements. It also gives particular attention to the 
evolving relationship between the ILO and the World Bank as well as their 
construction of, and withdrawal from, partnerships that variously facili-
tated and limited the pursuit of their respective strategies and goals for 
alleviating youth unemployment. By analyzing the policy discourses of 
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both IOs, it finds externally facing partnerships were established as they 
better reflect distinctive ILO and World  Bank priorities. In Chap. 3, 
Römer, Henninger, and Dung compare how three international and two 
regional organizations, namely the ILO, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and the World Bank, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), 
approach the global governance of labor standards. They argue that two 
main discourses have been pursued in the global debate, a ‘social’ dis-
course, and a ‘neoliberal’ discourse, and they find that IOs whose intrinsic 
features allow for an institutionalized representation of workers’ interests 
pursue variations of the social discourse, whereas those that do not stay 
closer to a neoliberal position. Furthermore, they show that the coexis-
tence of these two conflicting discourses has led to contestation, but also 
to exchange and cooperation. In Chap. 4, Yeates and Pillinger offer a 
historical development of health care worker migration as a global social 
policy field in which distinct fields of care and migration overlap. They 
emphasize the pluralistic and dynamic nature of the field, and the role of 
contestation, cooperation, and coordination in the unfolding of global 
policy in order to better understand the origins of this field and its key 
characteristics. Chapter 5 on the global social governance of pensions by 
Heneghan analyzes the way in which IOs have competed to shape the pen-
sions discourse. It shows how the organizational field has been shaped by 
the dominant economic paradigm, which has created space for IOs to 
operate in the policy area. It also finds that the intrinsic features of each IO 
active in the pension reform arena determine its approach to influencing 
the pensions discourse and its response to rivals entering the field.
Part III deals with issues concerning family and education. Chapter 6 
by Holzscheiter traces the history of children’s rights as a distinct sphere in 
international law from the first recognition of the special status of chil-
dren, to adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC), to the growth of the contemporary complex IO land-
scape. Children’s rights enjoy growing visibility and relevance, and con-
tinue to be a cross-cutting issue in international organizations of all kinds, 
making them a central dimension of global social governance; nonetheless 
international norms and measures surrounding children’s rights continue 
to be challenged and questioned by scholars and practitioners alike. This 
contestation is also reflected in the discourse within the population of IOs. 
In Chap. 7, Niemann and Martens map the population of education IOs 
to describe what types of IOs deal with education and to identify different 
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clusters of IOs. Moreover, the ideas IOs hold regarding education are 
analyzed and show how the discourse on education has developed over 
time within the population of IOs. They show that IOs’ ideas about the 
purpose of education converged over time and that IOs became more 
holistic with regard to the leitmotifs they hold. In Chap. 8, Mahon identi-
fies that from the 1990s to 2008, the family policy field was bifurcated 
between the North and the South, whereby the former followed the shift 
from the male breadwinner to the adult earner family with its work-family 
tensions as promoted by the ILO and the OECD, and the latter focused 
on policies targeting children in poor families and had UNICEF and the 
World Bank clearly playing an important role on the ground. Since the 
2008 crisis, the field has come together through the Sustainable 
Development Goals which simultaneously address both North and South. 
Chapter 9 by Schuster and Kolleck deals with disability as a global social 
policy issue since the shift in conceptualization from a medical to a social 
perspective. It identifies influential actors, relates them to the main dis-
courses, and maps their relations by using network analysis.
Part IV deals with health and environment. In Chap. 10, Kaasch focuses 
on four key IOs involved in global social policy in the field of health care 
systems. She traces their roles and relationships over time and argues that 
the architecture has been increasingly characterized by collaboration 
around key concepts such as Universal Health Coverage (UHC). In the 
current COVID-19 response, however, preliminary findings suggest a 
shift back to original mandates. In Chap. 11, Lakeman deals with climate 
change as a global social challenge. The chapter highlights the temporal 
shift toward the current understanding of climate change as a pervasive 
threat to social policy writ large at the IO level across various issue areas. 
Climate change as a compounding issue has led to compelling develop-
ments regarding the roles of IOs as actors of soft governance, which this 
chapter illustrates via the example of climate insurance. In Chap. 12, 
Schmidt looks at water as a field of global social policy concern. The chap-
ter provides the historical context for understanding how international 
organizations developed a distinctly global orientation to water policy 
alongside the emergence of global hydrology. Water security is now cen-
tral to how international organizations frame and respond to risks affect-
ing interconnected environmental and economic systems. In Chap. 13, 
Wolkenhauer examines the policies of IOs in the Governance of Food. 
Despite having been on the global (social) policy agenda since the begin-
ning of the previous century, hunger and undernourishment have not 
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been resolved to this day. The chapter traces discursive and institutional 
shifts and shows how, after an initial focus on smallholder agriculture, IOs’ 
focus shifted from production to consumption. Coupled with an overly 
optimistic trust in the market, they have thus been as much part of the 
problem as they might still become part of the solution.
The concluding Chap. 14 by Martens, Niemann, and Kaasch resumes 
the arguments made in the introduction to this volume. It summarizes the 
empirical findings of the individual contributions and highlights prevailing 
cross-cutting issues and themes. Overall, it becomes evident that IOs have 
been part of the architecture of arguments in global social governance for 
a long time: They have been populating diverse social fields in which they 
more often cooperate or coexist in issue-related or individual regional 
niches than contest each other. IOs have also proven strong in exercising 
soft governance as the broadcasters of new ideas, having cognitive author-
ity over their specific field. The chapter closes by formulating avenues for 
further research.
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CHAPTER 2
International Organizations’ Involvement 
in Youth Unemployment as a Global Policy 
Field, and the Global Financial Crisis
Ross Fergusson
IntroductIon
Youth employment and unemployment are only recently becoming recog-
nized as a distinctive field of global and transnational policy. In the last two 
decades, several key texts have greatly deepened our understanding of 
International Organizations’ (IOs) centrality to the governance of global 
social policy (notably Deacon 1997, 2007; Deacon et al. 2003; O’Brien 
2014; Yeates 2000, 2014; Kaasch and Martens 2015). While all address 
labor or employment policy, in comparison there has been little or no 
analysis of global social policy actors’ engagement with unemployment in 
relation to young people— predominantly the most vulnerable unemploy-
ment demographic in recently transformed labor markets. General interest 
in this policy field burgeoned in the years following the Global Financial 
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Crisis (GFC), but it has lacked the analytical and scholarly attention to 
global policy afforded to other fields represented in this volume.1 As a 
result, understanding of how the global governance of youth (un)employ-
ment has evolved and functioned as a policy field remains comparatively 
limited.
This oversight could not be attributed to the short histories of IOs’ 
activities. By far the most prominent IO in the field, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) recently celebrated the centennial of its estab-
lishment under the Covenant of the League of Nations, set up by the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to address the aftermath of World War I. The 
ILO’s founding remit included labor relations and supply, the prevention 
of unemployment and other identified concerns including the protection 
of young people, children and women in labor markets. The only other IO 
of comparable historical standing, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now referred to as the World 
Bank (WB), was also part of an international response to catastrophic 
global social conflict—established as one of the Bretton Woods institu-
tions of 1944 to prevent the recurrence of major uneven development as 
a widely recognized cause of World War II.
Despite the longevity and global reach and scale of the ILO and the 
IBRD/WB, their work and that of the many other IOs and the interna-
tional partnerships they have initiated, it is only recently that youth unem-
ployment (YU) is becoming collectively interpreted and analyzed as a 
distinctive global policy field. Perhaps more than any other single factor, it 
was the rapid spread of mass YU in many countries at unprecedented levels 
during and after the GFC that prompted international recognition of the 
fact that YU is a global issue and a global policy field worthy of globalist 
modes of analysis—most notably because of its intergenerational signifi-
cance and its impacts on international labor migration and international 
tensions (Fergusson and Yeates 2014).
To set the contemporary context of these developments, some ‘head-
line’ data is necessary.2 Most recently, ‘headcounts’ of unemployed young 
people aged 15–24  years recorded by the ILO have been consistently 
1 Eichhorst and Rinne (2015), for example, estimate that by 2014, 730 youth employment 
projects were under way in 110 countries, initiated by IOs and the international develop-
ment programs of advanced economies.




between 11% and 12% (1999–2019) of the labor force, peaking at 77 mil-
lion worldwide in 2009, falling back to 70 million in 2015, and then rising 
slightly but steadily to a projected 71 million in 2018. These data are 
undoubtedly significant under-counts.3 Numerically, 71% of the young 
people who were unemployed at the peak level in 2009 were male, 29% 
were female. In addition, if the category ‘unemployed’ is expanded to 
include all young people aged 15–24 years who are Not in Education, 
Employment or Training (NEET), this more inclusive definition of non- 
participation in labor markets rises to 22%. Some data suggest that actual 
levels of ‘registered’ plus undeclared non-participation probably take the 
total of young people who are NEET to 130 million. If in-work poverty is 
included, 40% of under-25s worldwide are workless or poor 
(UN-ECOSOC 2016).
Rates of unemployment vary dramatically between countries and 
between regions. The weighted 27-year average YU rates to 2017 range 
between less than 5% (in ten African and Asian countries) and more than 
40% (five African and three European countries). In Northern Africa, YU 
rates have fluctuated in the 25–35% range since 1991; in Eastern Europe 
the range is 15–25%; in Central and Western Asia 13–20%; in Latin 
America and the Caribbean 10–20%. Almost all regions have seen signifi-
cant increases in these rates toward the upper range since the onset of the 
GFC.  In South-East Asia and the Pacific five young people are unem-
ployed for every unemployed adult.4
At these scales, for any age-range, persistently high unemployment at 
any spatial level cannot be construed as an economic policy problem alone: 
for young people, it is an acute problem for social policy. The dependency 
of many teenagers on their parents and other adults, the vulnerability of all 
young people to multiple forms of exploitation, and the harms and risks of 
extended periods of exclusion from labor markets and economic participa-
tion are all at high risk of becoming realized as problems of and for social 
policy that span multiple sectors (education, health, housing, social secu-
rity) and require ‘whole-society’ approaches for their resolution.
Wherever possible, this chapter focuses on statutory instruments using 
the governance capacities of IOs. In view of the multiplicity of actors, the 
3 See Bardhan (1978) and Beneria (1981) on the longstanding challenges of estimating 
unemployment levels.
4 Fergusson and Yeates (2021) provide a full analysis of the depth, extent and distribution 
of endemic YU.
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ILO’s longevity as an IO, and the many forms taken by other transna-
tional and global actors, it is necessary to concentrate analysis throughout 
the chapter on the ILO and WB as the two key IO actors and on the part-
nerships they established. Particular attention is given to the various for-
mations these IOs constitute, and the trajectories, configurations and 
processes which the evolution of their partnerships has entailed. This focus 
emphasizes the coexistence and contestation of the ILO and WB, and the 
modes of mutual engagement, cooperation and collaboration 
between them.
As Niemann et al. (see introduction to this volume) argue, individual 
IOs function in contexts of coexistence, mutual recognition, cooperation, 
exchange, collaboration, but also in contexts of competition, contestation, 
struggle and conflict. The overarching predominance of the ILO and the 
WB and their partnerships epitomize these forms of coexistence. These 
themes should not be construed either as typical or as defining the land-
scape of IO actor participation in framing and embedding social policy 
across this field. Rather, what follows is intended to extend and diversify 
understanding of the forms of global social governance analyzed in 
this volume.
MappIng the Io ‘populatIon’ and dIscourses
Six key IOs populate this policy field. They are significantly differentiated 
by the depth, extent and timeframes of their involvement. Perhaps pre-
dictably, the history of their engagement is a strong indicator of IOs’ 
respective significances as effective actors: Table 2.1 indicates their influ-
ence on YU policy globally, as well as their year of first intervention.
Dominant Actors: The Policy Discourses of the ILO 
and World Bank
The ILO and WB have jointly established themselves as transnational 
authorities setting principles and standards and diffusing rules, norms and 
key resources in the policy field of youth (un)employment. As norm- 
entrepreneurs, in very different ways, they have identified, defined and 
constituted YU as a policy field, a social problem (ILO) and an economic 
problem (WB), assuming leading roles in producing information. Their 
policy discourses establish the prevailing normative and ideational 
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foundations of the field, and the ILO’s and WB’s status as leading ‘soft 
governance’ actors.
As well as being by far the longest-standing IO, the ILO has had the 
most extensive engagement with youth employment and unemployment. 
Established in 1919 with a constitution committed to international social 
justice and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969, the ILO stands as an 
IO of unrivaled stature in the setting of international labor standards and 
promoting employment rights. Many of its Conventions and 
Recommendations bear directly on these issues with respect to YU. The 
ILO’s interventions across the range of conventions with statutory pow-
ers, recommendations, local projects and an extensive presence on the 
ground across several world regions make it the pre-eminent IO globally 
in the field of (un)employment. The ILO works closely and interactively 
with other UN bodies and civil society organizations, national govern-
ments and in partnerships.
Table 2.1 IOs in the youth unemployment policy field: earliest interventions
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support of global full 
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channel of international lending and 
to bring about a stable flow of 






Child labor and 
compulsory 
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1951 Requested the ILO to prepare a 
report for the international 





Jobs strategies for 
member states
1994 Extensive research and reporting at 















2010 Funding in response to extreme rise 
in YU in North Africa
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From its inception, the ILO’s discourse was focused on the need for 
concerted action to address the international causes of unemployment. 
Early work set out international norms governing young people’s rela-
tionship to work and education by means of Conventions and 
Recommendations. Between 1919 and 2002, 48 such instruments relat-
ing to children/young people and work were crucial to the construction 
of this transnational policy field. For example, key instruments concern-
ing YU during the interwar period ensured conditional financial support 
to the involuntarily unemployed, disputed economic theory that advo-
cated wage reductions as a means of remedying unemployment, and stip-
ulated compulsory general and vocational educational provision for all up 
to the age of 18. Many instruments have since been updated.
Since 2000, the ILO’s YU policy discourse has been shaped by its 
Decent Work and Global Employment agendas. It has emphasized secur-
ing increases in aggregate demand for young people’s labor, including by 
means of job creation and institutional labor market reforms, but has also 
advocated active labor market policies (ALMPs), selective employment 
incentives and supply-side labor market measures. The ILO’s commit-
ment to unemployment-related welfare benefits for young people is 
embedded in its discourse of ‘social protection floors’ that include basic 
income security across the life cycle. In the wake of the GFC, ILO dis-
course has urged member states to increase demand for young people’s 
labor in response to ‘jobless growth’ and inadequate unemployment pro-
tection, while also developing more business-friendly discourses, includ-
ing partnership-based entrepreneurial solutions. ILO discourses in this 
policy field have recently manifested increasing tensions, reconfiguring its 
labor market analyses and unemployment policies to concede to some 
neoliberal agendas, while continuing to reassert its historical commit-
ments to international social protection and labor standards.5
In parallel with the ILO’s post-WWII initiatives, the UN and IBRD 
were active in this field. A key UN report cites the UN’s 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ commitment to “the right to work, to free 
choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to 
protection against unemployment” (Article 23). The Charter of the UN 
pursued the threefold UN goal for “higher standards of living, full employ-
ment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development” 




(Article 55). The UN also called upon the IBRD to borrow from and lend 
to governments to facilitate full employment. While this remit drove a 
significant element of IBRD discourse throughout the following decades, 
its focus did not specifically include youth employment until the WB 
responded to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000. In 
collaboration with the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the ILO, the WB set up the Youth 
Employment Network (YEN) at the 2000 Millennium Summit. The WB’s 
first leading intervention on YU followed several years later, instigating 
the Global Partnership for Youth Employment (GPYE) in 2008.
During the pre-GFC period the WB’s interventions were largely con-
fined to published policy positions, the discourses of which emphasized 
young people’s insufficient or ill-matched labor market skills as a signifi-
cant cause of YU. These discourses provided the rationale for the WB’s 
criticism of regulated wages for young people, observing that YU rates are 
lowest in low-income countries, and implicitly associating this with mini-
mal or absent minimum wage rates for young people in such economies. 
WB discourse also tended to attribute endemic high rates of YU to demo-
graphic bulges such that young people who could not be accommodated 
in labor markets should be assigned to extended schooling or vocational 
training.6
Two related themes connect these discourses. They are grounded in 
human capital theory, and all focus on supply-side interpretations of high 
levels of YU. As a result, WB policy advocacy has leaned strongly toward 
more effective job-search training, internships and measures to ‘smooth’ 
transitions into youth labor markets. However, as evidence accumulated 
of the prolonged effects of the GFC on YU rates (especially in Northern 
Africa, and also in parts of Europe in 2012–15), WB discourse adjusted, 
beginning with growing recognition of the damage to human develop-
ment of mass YU, its costs and its effects on public perceptions of (in)
equality and social justice. The WB’s recognition of multiple shortcom-
ings of YU programs that focused on the supply-side ‘deficiencies’ of 
young labor market entrants followed. Further awareness of the high 
socio-economic risks of endemic mass YU (especially in politically volatile 
regions) intensified WB policy shifts. In parallel, the WB’s earlier anti- 
welfare discourses abated and prompted the need to reconsider the 
6 See World Bank (2006, 2011, 2012); Fergusson and Yeates (2013). For a definition of 
endemic YU see Fergusson and Yeates (2021).
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boundaries of welfare, causing recognition of the need for conditional 
support to gain ground.7
The WB’s shifts in its analyses and prognoses coincided with corre-
sponding obverse shifts in the ILO’s positions, as noted above, toward 
some degree of convergence—thereby apparently creating the conditions 
for more effective dialogue and collaboration between them (see below).
Other Significant Actors: UNESCO’s and OECD’s 
Policy Discourses
From the earliest years of the UN, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) maintained an impor-
tant role in shaping YU discourse as inseparable from issues of educational 
participation. UNESCO worked closely with the ILO and IBRD on child 
labor, statutory age of admission to employment and compulsory educa-
tion enforcement plans (UNESCO 1951, annex II: 17). A powerful, 
socially progressive, discursive dynamic between UNESCO and the ILO 
maintained strong pro-schooling advocacy, whereby the case for reducing 
YU became bound to the case for raising the school-leaving age. Before 
the GFC, UNESCO discourse stressed the particular exposure of young 
people to the risks of economic globalization, insecure jobs, involuntarily 
delayed labor market entry and prolonged unemployment/underemploy-
ment (UNESCO 2004, 5). Since the GFC it has led EU-funded programs 
in Mediterranean Northern Africa and Western Asia. Throughout, 
UNESCO discourse stressed unreliable and intermittent demand for 
young people’s labor and avoided discourses that allege poor skills and 
capabilities as causes of YU.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has been continuously active in this policy field. Its annual 
Employment Outlook Reports consistently address YU through in-depth 
multi-country strategic analyses of YU which provide extensive survey 
data and intensive analysis of policy effectiveness (OECD 2004–11). 
OECD discourses were consonant with those of the WB. They were 
informed by human capital theory and focused on labor market supply- 
side deficiencies and the reportedly ill-adapted skills of school-leavers and 
disincentivizing welfare programs. The GFC bore especially heavily on 
almost all OECD member states, triggering adjustments to OECD 
7 See World Bank (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015).
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discourse. Deficient demand for young workers became temporarily rec-
ognized as a key driver of escalating YU, and advocacy of welfare ‘safety 
nets’ for previously ineligible younger age-groups with little or no access 
to unemployment benefits strengthened (OECD 2010a, b, 2011a, b). 
Gradually, however, as continuing high YU rates were apparently becom-
ing normalized, OECD discourse returned to young people’s alleged skills 
deficits and the fiscally detrimental effects of subsistence-sufficient welfare 
benefits (OECD 2012–15). The OECD’s policy discourses on YU were 
unusually flexible over time, while also consistently defaulting to arche-
typal neoliberal positions, interspersed with sporadic more social demo-
cratic leanings.
Recent Entrants: UNICEF’s and IMF’s Policy Discourses
Two less prominent IOs warrant recognition here. The United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund’s (UNICEF) statutory focus 
remains on the welfare of children and young people up to age 18 under 
the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and on fighting 
child labor wherever appropriate. Over the long run its principal trajec-
tory of engagement with young people’s employment has been to pro-
mote and facilitate skills-related and employability programs in 
lower-income countries, typified by its current Generation Unlimited 
project supporting young people and extending its upper age-range to 
24 (UNICEF 2005, 2010).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was a late entrant to the field. 
Its interventions followed escalating YU rates during the 
GFC. Unprecedently, the IMF’s Managing Director shared public inter-
national platforms with the Director-General of the ILO, promoting dis-
courses of social protection and labor market intervention, identifying 
unemployment insurance for young people as cost-effective for sustaining 
consumer demand, and advocating job subsidies to avoid redundancies.8
Neither UNICEF nor the IMF claim significance as defining discur-
sive actors in this field. They are nonetheless shapers of discourses and 
norm- entrepreneurs in other fields, and their counter-stereotypical 
policy positions on YU are surprising. As a leading UN program, unac-
countably, UNICEF seems to overlook the well-being of young people 
8 These events took place at major international conferences in Oslo (2010) and 
Vienna (2011).
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aged 15+ and the threats to their economic and social security. 
Conversely, as a key Bretton Woods IO, the IMF has displayed unex-
pected concern for this age-group, advocating extension of social pro-
tection and job creation in the wake of the GFC and allocating major 
financial support to mitigate extremely high levels of YU in Northern 
Africa (although this appears not to be a continuous programmed 
intervention).
The policy discourses of these two least-influential IOs do not align 
well with the pro-social predispositions of UN bodies, or the pro-business 
predispositions of the WB and OECD. This provides a salutary reminder 
that the discourses and priorities of UNESCO and the OECD in this field 
cannot be ‘read off’ from their other more prominent discourses in other 
policy fields. It also demonstrates an ebb and flow of policy ideas and 
norms within IOs, which indicates ephemeral context-specific pragmatic 
adaptation at one extreme, or deep-rooted internal dissent at another. It is 
therefore salutary throughout to recall Niemann et  al.’s comment (see 
introduction to this volume) that IOs are not monolithic discursive actors, 
but complex bureaucracies that experience and contain ongoing multiple 
sources of contestation within their organizations.
partnershIps and Ios: dIsseMInatIng Knowledge, 
Ideas and dIscourses
The most immediate recipients of IOs’ knowledge, ideas and discourses in 
this policy field have been the partnerships they construct and shape as 
deliberate disseminators of norms and policies. It is in and through part-
nership that IOs have exchanged knowledge and ideas and achieved 
mutual recognition, sometimes leading to cooperation and collaboration 
in pooling resources and leveraging partners. Partnership between world- 
leading IOs with major resources of expertise and finance and extensive 
geographical and political reach offers great potential for effective inter-
vention, while also posing considerable risks of dissent and contestation. 
In practice the only IOs that make continuing direct interventions in the 
form of specific employment projects worldwide have been the ILO and 
WB. Each has its own extensive network of offices worldwide, some of 
which commission and fund projects in places of perceived significant 
need according to immediate contingencies.9 Many such projects are 
9 In the early 2000s, the ILO already had in place a uniquely extensive global network of 
up to 60 Country Offices, in Africa (14), Asia/Pacific (14), Europe and Central Asia (9), and 
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bespoke and not necessarily part of the strategic international programs 
that seek to spread the priorities, knowledge and ideas IOs generate and 
strive to embed in national economic, employment, social and other prac-
tices. Most programs take the form of partnerships, and all but one have 
at least nominally been established as partnerships between the ILO and 
WB—typically along with one or more additional partners.
It is important to be aware of the political-economic contexts in which 
such partnerships evolved. Unsurprisingly, given their historical purposes, 
remits and priorities, the ILO and WB have extensive and sometimes con-
tested histories regarding their political, social, and economic positions 
and contributions. These are captured in an academic literature too exten-
sive to recall here.10 Very briefly summarized, one key marker of their 
eventual divergence and contestation can be traced back to the 1980s–90s, 
when the dominance of the Post-WWII UN agencies came under chal-
lenge from the Washington Consensus in response to growing interna-
tional debt and the perceived need for ‘structural adjustment’ (particularly 
as a condition of WB/IMF loans), often taking the form of overt political- 
economic attacks on social democratic values in favor of free-market and 
neoliberal policies. The changing political economy of global policymak-
ing in this period challenged and partially marginalized the authority of 
the UN and its constituent organizations, including the ILO and its work 
in the field of global (un)employment. The ILO came under strong pres-
sure to accept more flexible employment contracts and relationships, for 
example. It subsequently responded with a Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, which pledged all ILO states to uphold 
four ‘core’ labor standards, including the abolition of child labor (reiter-
ated in 2002 through the World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization (ILO 2004)).11 These initiatives reasserted the ILO’s stand-
ing as a norm-generating institution—although they did not extend labor 
rights or strengthen the enforcement of existing labor standards, and they 
de-emphasized statutory instruments on rights and standards in favor of 
representatives in 20 more lead countries in Asia, Middle East, South America, Caribbean, 
Eastern Europe. The WB has in excess of 100 Country Offices that have much more diverse 
functions, of which tackling YU is a minor element compared to the ILO’s focused network 
at that time.
10 For example, Ghébali et al. (1989); Wallerstein (2000); Dale and Robertson (2007); 
Deacon (2007, 2013, 2015); Standing (2008).
11 https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. Accessed February 
25, 2020.
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weaker instruments such as recommendations and codes of practice. In 
return—and as ‘ascendant’ IOs in the political-economic reconfiguration 
of this period—the WB (and IMF) took steps to ‘regularize’ their relation-
ship with trade unions (without formalizing them), while continuing to 
support modes of economic development ‘free’ from labor regulation.12
These observations set the work of the most politically and financially 
engaged IOs in an altered context. The evolving development of ILO 
instruments alone graphically depicts its surging capacity as an agent of the 
global governance of social and labor policy. The great advances occurred 
in the decades following both World Wars, between 1919 and 1965. The 
countervailing watershed moment in the YU policy field was an active 
retreat from the values of the post-war settlement less than two decades 
later, making way for the period of unprecedented intensive neoliberaliza-
tion outlined above, heavily promoted by the WB and IMF. The language 
and values of the post-war settlement were substantially over-written by 
IOs that extolled competition, reward of enterprise and the claimed eco-
nomic and social benefits of deregulated markets in goods, services and 
labor. While these changes expressed themselves in complex, nuanced and 
sometimes contradictory ways throughout and beyond the 1980s–90s, 
they conditioned the practices and ambitions of many IOs and the rela-
tions between them—few more so than the ILO and WB, their work in 
the YU policy field and their respective mutual propensities to cooperate, 
coexist, diverge and later eventually to separate and create very different 
partnerships.
Collaboration, Cooperation, Separation: Endogenous Partnership
Inter-IO partnerships concerning YU have been a principal means by 
which IOs in this field have collaborated formally. The first of three 
ILO-WB partnerships in the cause of addressing extreme YU levels was 
the product of the 2000 Millennium Summit in New  York. The YEN 
which resulted was described as a global platform to prioritize youth 
employment and exchange policies and programs to improve employment 
opportunities for youth. YEN was an archetypal semi-endogenous 
12 For example, the WB integrated core labor standards into some of its health-related 
contracts (see Yeates and Pillinger 2019). More generally, for a fuller account of tensions and 




partnership of two UN IOs (ILO and UNDESA) plus a Bretton Woods 
institution (WB). It was managed from Geneva by the ILO, from its incep-
tion in 2004 onward. In practice, UNDESA’s role was principally con-
fined to monitoring and oversight.
The YEN network included development agencies, governments, the 
private sector, youth groups and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). It had a major presence in 22 lead countries including a special 
focus on Africa, and programs in Asia, the Middle East, South America, 
the Caribbean and Eastern Europe.13 The ILO’s Lead Country Network 
collected data and prepared and implemented National Action Plans, 
focusing on employability, entrepreneurship, employment creation and 
equal opportunities. Direct financial support was confined to impact eval-
uations and small-scale entrepreneurship projects in Africa.
YEN prioritized awareness-raising, advocacy and capacity-building for 
youth organizations. It laid the groundwork for increased inter- 
governmental recognition that youth employment would be essential for 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Its most significant distin-
guishing feature was its attempt to redefine youth employment as a social 
development issue, rather than a labor issue. It also allowed the two lead-
ing IOs to operate and negotiate on an altered terrain that minimized the 
prominence of the contested elements of their non-aligned political- 
economic positions, and to level-out their unequal strengths and powers. 
In practice, it was clear from the early years that YEN was shaped and 
defined in character with the ILO’s longstanding priorities, and largely 
faithful to its predominant discourses. WB influence on the framing and 
conduct of the local projects was palpably secondary: the ILO emerged as 
the appropriate leading player, given its employment-focused network and 
its ability to work on the ground in some of the most challenging eco-
nomic and political YU environments. Its pre-eminent ‘street-level’ reach 
in such contexts made it best-placed to identify the geographies of priority, 
based on trustworthy data and local networking with governments and 
pre-existing embedded programs and organizations.
An independent evaluation in the closing years of the YEN partnership 
reported that:
13 In the early stage of its establishment, YEN was financed by a desultory cluster of 
national government bodies (Denmark, Sweden, UK), the International Olympic Committee 
and ACCENTURE PLC as well as the ILO, WB and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO).
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YEN is said to have shifted course in a way that fits well with [World] Bank 
priorities, and as a grantee of its Global Partnership for Youth Employment 
(GPYE) [see below] it is seen as a good catalyst. ILO has perhaps the closest 
but most complex relationship with YEN, whilst UNDESA works less 
closely with the YEN Secretariat than the other partners, and describes its 
contribution as ‘minimal’. (International Labour Office Evaluation 
Unit 2012, 4)
It is a significant and telling feature of this analysis of the work of lead-
ing IOs in this policy field that the inter-institutional and intra- institutional 
politics between IOs are opaque to ‘remote’ researchers. The closest it is 
possible to get to this politics is to interpret the outputs of nominally inde-
pendent bodies like the ILO’s Evaluation Unit. Only original primary 
research could provide confident insights into the closed relations within 
partnerships of this kind. Only tenuous deduction is therefore possible. 
Nonetheless, the Evaluations Unit’s observation (triangulated with mul-
tiple other minor and contingent secondary indicators) strongly suggests 
an unequal division of labor in YEN, and some early ‘sharing out’ of con-
trol, as between a dominant and subordinate IO. The very conception of 
YEN was, self-evidently, not an untested ab initio venture, but an accre-
tion of a wider and more ambitious structure that built on a longstanding 
pre-existing organizational framework—namely the ILO Lead Country 
Network, which was part of the ILO’s employment-related work and 
other work in an extensive network (described above). It was this network 
that enabled YEN to begin new work in multiple localities barely three 
years after the MDGs were ratified.
The inherent dominance of the ILO in all practical aspects of managing 
YEN cannot reasonably be imagined as anything less than a superior 
degree of power, compared to that of the WB within the partnership. It is 
therefore less than remarkable that, in 2008, the WB instigated its GPYE, 
nominally incorporating YEN as one partner alongside the Arab Urban 
Development Institute (a not-for-profit NGO), the International Youth 
Foundation (IYF) (an international charitable organization) and 
Understanding Children’s Work (an inter-agency UN body).14 The part-
nership focused on providing applied research and learning to better 
14 See ILO 2012, International Labour Conference 101st session, Committee on Youth 





understand school-to-work transitions and increase the employability of 
youth, promoting policy dialogue and supporting technical assistance for 
local governments and capacity-building for stakeholders from the public 
sector and civil society, to enhance their engagement—priorities that are 
entirely consistent with many of the WB’s discourses as described above, 
and inconsistent with the ILO’s founding discourses.
YEN’s inclusion in GPYE maintained a de facto ILO presence in the 
partnership, for the duration of GPYE’s short life. Much as the WB’s early 
creation of GPYE gave the appearance of a successful ‘take-over’ bid when 
it ‘incorporated’ YEN, YEN’s focus nevertheless changed under (largely 
direct) ILO leadership from Geneva, taking on more strategic activities 
through its Lead Country Network, including running YEN Networks, 
the youth-to-youth toolkit and monitoring and evaluation activities (ILO 
Evaluation Office 2018). The YEN Secretariat ceased to function in 2014 
when GPYE also ceased to operate (although YEN continues as a ‘brand’ 
in ILO projects).15
YEN and GPYE constituted the decade of endogenous partnership 
between the pre-eminent IOs in this policy field. In all, YEN and GPYE 
had almost coterminous lifespans. The pressure for the ILO and WB to 
cooperate directly coincided with the 2001 Millennium Summit and 
ended in 2014. Initially, these previously often-counterposed IOs made 
common cause. Full cooperation in the YEN partnership nevertheless 
lasted little more than four years. As in all two-way partnerships (accepting 
that UNDESA/the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) were key actors only as sources of monitoring, oversight and 
funding), full and effective coordination depends on a single locus of gov-
ernance and administration. This was initially acceded to ILO and its 
Geneva Offices. Primary research would be needed to provide empirical 
clarity about the early separation of these two dominant actors. But what-
ever the measures taken to ensure the WB’s due influence, they were self- 
evidently insufficient to meet its preferences and priorities for addressing 
mass YU.  The ILO’s priorities at this time, shaped by its Global 
Employment Agenda, afforded strong emphasis to increasing aggregate 
demand for young people’s labor, including by means of job creation and 
institutional labor market reforms, while also acknowledging some need 
15 By 2014, GPYE had been devolved to the IYF, which produced just two outputs. GPYE 
has since ceased to function. https://www.iyfnet.org/initiatives/global-partnership-youth-
employment-gpye. Accessed February 25, 2020.
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for ALMPs. The WB’s corresponding priorities are best encapsulated in its 
Social Protection and Labor (SPL) strategy (itself committed to ALMPs) 
and building labor market resilience in young people (WB 2011). This 
approach epitomizes a supply-side emphasis in addressing the challenges 
of mass YU. These contrasting demand-side/supply-side emphases in YU 
policy also epitomize the tensions that came to underlie the strategic com-
mitments of the ILO and WB through YEN and GPYE.
YEN and GPYE had been established under the shared UN umbrella of 
the MDGs: MDG1 included a commitment to full employment and 
decent work for young people. Complete severance of relations between 
these two leading would-be IO partners would therefore have been politi-
cally untenable. YEN continued to exist, nominally embedded within 
GPYE. This shifted the locus of power and funding from Geneva to 
Washington. However successfully the shift was mitigated by the ILO’s 
continuing responsibility for YEN embedded within GPYE, the watershed 
from cooperation to coexistence en route to the separation of the ILO and 
WB had been crossed. Perhaps the most symbolic and informative aspects 
of this watershed lay in the ILO’s continuing commitments to working in 
and through its Lead Country Networks using ILO on-the-ground infra-
structure in lower-income countries, on one side of the dissolving partner-
ship; and in the WB’s enthusiasm for working with NGOs and Third 
Sector transnational organizations, on the other. Somewhat resonant of 
the distinctions between public/state versus Third Sector funding, this 
divergence set the stage for the next decade (and beyond) in this policy 
field. It was a divergence that would be based wholly on exogenous part-
nership and, eventually, effective separation between the lead IO partners.
Coexistence, Contestation, Division: Exogenous Partnership
GPYE was replaced by an infinitely more ambitious and very different 
partnership wholly led by the WB: Solutions for Youth Employment 
(S4YE). It is a multi-stakeholder partnership that was planned to begin in 
2012, launched in 2014 and became operational in 2015. Its high ambi-
tion to see 150 million more young people in employment is said to 
depend on its ability to “catalyse the promotion of public, private, and 
civil sector innovations”.16 To date, the largest of its dozen projects across 
16 World Bank (2015): http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/76591146819 




four continents has funding of just $250 million and aims to secure 
employment for 500,000 young people. Described as a coalition, S4YE 
cultivates multiple and dynamically evolving interlocking partnerships—
building directly on the WB’s affinity for Third Sector partnerships which 
it pioneered in GPYE, but moving far beyond it to embrace global corpo-
rates, and global financiers and banks. The nominal connection with the 
ILO continues in the form of the ILO’s membership of S4YE’s governing 
body—ostensibly largely confined to avoiding duplication and mutual 
conflicts of interest in work in the YU field. Alongside the IYF (itself car-
ried over from GPYE), S4YE’s original Third Sector partners include Plan 
International and Youth Business International (YBI), plus the RAND 
Corporation and Accenture. Original strategic partners include Hogan 
Lovells, Rockefeller Foundation, MasterCard and Ernst and Young.17
S4YE’s 2015 inaugural Baseline Report commits to increasing the 
demand for young people’s labor. From the outset, supply-side measures 
dominate three of the four ‘Frontier Areas’ of its strategic framework 
(S4YE 2015, 27).18 Only the ‘Quality Jobs’ frontier area is concerned with 
demand-side initiatives—generating jobs from private sector actors. No 
commitment is given to securing rights to social and labor protection.
In conception at least, S4YE anticipated the introduction of the UN’s 
2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG8 prescribes the 
achievement of “full and productive employment and decent work for all 
women and men, including for young people and persons with disabili-
ties” by 2030.19 SDG Partnerships are expected to include multi- 
stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, 
technology and financial resources.
The ILO’s involvement in S4YE appeared marginal from the outset, 
and this was eventually confirmed by its creation of the ‘Global Initiative 
on Decent Jobs for Youth’ (GIDJY)—now the ILO’s main contribution 
to addressing YU at program level. Launched in 2017, GIDJY also con-
tributes to SDG8. It too is a multi-stakeholder partnership, albeit with 
more modest aims to train five million young people across 26 projects 
focused on digital skills, apprenticeships, the rural economy, green jobs, 
17 S4YE has since included several more global corporates, transnational Third Sector 
agencies and government-funded International Development Agencies among its partners.
18 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23261. Accessed February 
25, 2020.
19 https://indicators.report/targets/8-5/. Accessed February 25, 2020.
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entrepreneurship and self-employment, transitions to the formal economy, 
and work in fragile settings and hazardous occupations (ILO, 2015a, 
2015b). Perhaps its most notable feature is that its ‘key partners’ include 
11 UN IOs/agencies and exclude the WB. More than any such partner-
ship, GIDJY epitomizes the concept of a constellation of IOs, as much 
founded in other IOs and other transnational UN agencies as in Third 
Sector and corporate partnerships.20 It places great stress on decent work, 
the quality of jobs for young people, promoting human rights, fostering 
gender equality and strengthening public-private cooperation and coher-
ence. These characteristics sharply mark off GIDJY from S4YE’s priorities 
and methods.
S4YE and GIDJY (now branded as Decent Jobs for Youth (DJY)) are 
at relatively early stages of development, with limited outcomes to date 
that could be viewed as commensurate with their ambitions. For the pur-
poses of this analysis at least, more important than their most immediate 
achievements are their significance as unprecedented innovative partner-
ships which envisage hugely ambitious  scope for transforming employ-
ment for young people where it is not self-generating under optimum 
market conditions. But in the present context of understanding the archi-
tecture of the arguments and discourses these new partnerships deploy, 
alongside their implications for the nature of global social governance 
among leading IOs, their greatest significance is already palpable. Both 
these new exogenous partnerships were products of endogenous partner-
ships that had aspired to collaboration, cooperation and modes of success-
ful engagement in this policy field that would be greater than the 
achievements of the two leading IOs working separately. However, the 
first attempt (YEN) lasted for less than four years under its original plans. 
A somewhat ambiguous, low-profile, half mutually embedded partnership 
between the ILO and WB (GPYE) endured for approximately six more 
years (although, as noted, vestiges of YEN remain). The absence of trans-
parency in the functioning of these two IOs prevents empirically sound 
20 GIDJY’s Key Partners are the ILO, the International Trade Centre (ITC), the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and UNIDO. Also included are multiple other UN agencies 
(FAO, ITU, UNHCR, UNDP, UNDESA, UNEP, UNFPA), international development 
agencies and charities (Citi Foundation, EYF, ITC, J-PAL, SCF, UNIAPAC, YBI), some 
global corporate entities (Microsoft, McDonald’s, Nestle, Inter-American Development 
Bank), international not-for-profit organizations (AISEC, Forge), and some national gov-
ernment aid and ministerial bodies (Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nigeria, Spain, OIJ).
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analyses of the outcomes of YEN and GPYE (notwithstanding the detailed 
ILO Evaluation Office reports of 2012 and 2018): both IOs have been 
almost completely opaque as to the causes of their short-lived attempts at 
endogenous partnership.
Overlaying this already complex field of policy actors, in 2018 the UN’s 
Agenda 2030 program and its Youth Strategy introduced Generation 
Unlimited (GenU), to ensure that every young person is in education, 
learning, training or employment by 2030 (in pursuit of SDG8).21 As a 
major global multi-sector partnership, GenU’s 53-member Board includes 
representatives from the ILO, OECD, the European Commission and a 
multiplicity of UN agencies, private-sector corporate bodies, national gov-
ernments, Third Sector organizations and other IOs. The World Bank and 
UNICEF are GenU’s key IO actors (already managing a $1 billion alloca-
tion from WB). Interestingly, UNICEF (an historically marginal contribu-
tor in this field) had displayed enthusiasm for supply-side measures, in 
common with the World Bank, at the start of the GFC.22 Their past shared 
positions (contrast ILO’s and UNESCO’s historical demand-side policy 
leanings) may well have influenced the UN’s decision-making when it 
constituted this UNICEF-WB alliance. Certainly, the prioritization of 
supply-side measures is clearly evident in GenU’s early on-line outputs.23 
The dominant political-economic character of GenU’s work ‘on the 
ground’ has yet to be revealed. However, the exclusion of the ILO from 
GenU’s Executive, and the preponderance of global private sector and 
Third Sector corporates on its Board are intrinsically note-worthy (again 
in contrast to ILO’s preference for multiple UN agencies as its key part-
ners in S4YE). Both these observations are consistent with the paths of 
‘separate development’ taken by the World Bank and ILO when they initi-
ated S4YE and DJY. This prompts the question as to why the UN elected 
to set up a third global partnership alongside them. GenU’s commitment 
to work across public, private and civil society sectors and governments 
ostensibly replicates a key premise of S4YE’s approach. GenU may com-
plement S4YE and DJY—at greatly increased scale if it achieves its ambi-
tions—or duplicate or supersede both partnerships.
21 https://www.unicef.org/young-people. Accessed June 21, 2020.
22 See Fergusson and Yeates (2014).
23 https://www.generationunlimited.org/news-and-stories/world-leaders-unite-educa-
tion-and-training-young-people. Accessed June 21, 2020.
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concludIng coMMents
As the key historical global actors in this field, both the ILO and WB have 
maintained dominant positions, in part by giving attention to opposing 
policy priorities, by finding some virtues in each other’s dominant and 
normative discourses and policy logics, and sometimes by cooperating 
despite discursive differences. Each has endeavored to allow the other’s 
position to stand alongside its own on some key policy dilemmas, without 
acceding to an opposing policy logic. Nevertheless, a highly condensed 
summary of their partnerships throws into stark relief the evolving trajec-
tory of ILO-WB relations, as follows. Before the GFC, the ILO and WB 
coexisted and acted largely in mutual disregard, each identifiable more by 
their differences than by their shared objectives. With the onset of the 
GFC in 2008, the ILO’s YEN was already weakened as a major YU plat-
form and risked being superseded by the WB’s GPYE. By 2012–13, GPYE 
was palpably unequal to making a significant impact on the successive 
waves of burgeoning YU, as the effects of the GFC unfolded internation-
ally. Yet the ILO was then still striving to accommodate the WB’s supply- 
side- dominated priorities, and in 2014 still accepted the role of minor IO 
partner in the WB’s ambitious, radically innovative cross-sector S4YE ‘alli-
ance’. Scarcely a year afterward, the ILO was distancing itself from S4YE 
while remaining on its Board, in order to initiate DJY, and was operating 
with unprecedented allocations of internal funding for implementation, 
without assistance from the WB, or by means of a WB presence on 
its Board.
Across nine years of the most intensive crisis of global YU in recorded 
history, the leading IOs moved full circle from largely mutually disregard-
ing coexistence, through high-profile collaboration and formal partner-
ship, to effective separation. At the point of separation, the ILO had 
exceptionally strong country networks and channels of local reach, and the 
WB retained access to extensive financial and other resources.
Understanding whether this cycle of rapid change is faithfully mirrored 
in both IOs’ dominant policy analyses and modes of intervention in labor 
market and associated welfare policies requires detailed research that can 
only be achieved effectively by means of ‘insider’ access. Although much 
remains to be seen about the functionality and effectiveness of S4YE and 
DJY, the shift to exogenous partnerships embracing unprecedentedly wide 
and highly differentiated constellations of Third Sector/corporate part-
ners constitutes a new mode of coexistence between the ILO and WB. This 
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speaks to degrees of historical and recent contestation between them that 
have resulted in division into two new entities, one of which marks com-
plete separation between the WB and ILO (DJY), the other of which 
retains only a nominal ‘place at the table’ for the ILO in a WB-defined 
universe (S4YE).
What also remains to be established by means of new empirical research 
is how far this extended history of partnership, division and separation can 
be attributed to the architecture of the arguments each IO deploys (along 
with their respective dissenting discourses); and how far it can be attrib-
uted to factors that have largely escaped the gaze of scholarship and 
research in this policy field. Both IOs are committed to self-evaluation, in 
terms of program outcomes. But their evaluations cast no light on the 
politics of cooperation, collaboration, coexistence and contestation 
between them.
To infer sources of conflict and separation from internally managed 
processes would be risky indeed, however strong the clues and correspon-
dences between sources. It is clear that the balance of power and advan-
tage between the WB and ILO has shifted significantly and more than 
once, in both directions, especially since the WB became fully active in the 
YU policy field alongside the ILO. Sometimes these shifts have matched 
overarching paradigm shifts, like those of the 1980s–90s. How the dynam-
ics of change occurred and were eventually resisted within and between 
them cannot be ‘read off’ from their work in any given policy field. Equally 
risky would be to attempt to interpret the primary geo-political and 
political- economic purposes of the work of the ILO and WB from single- 
field- specific contexts. The major attempts to stimulate engagement in the 
policy field of YU in the wake of the GFC also invite skeptical speculation 
that the principal purposes of the work of the ILO and WB were at that 
time to allay international concern that burgeoning YU rates posed risks 
well beyond their impacts on national economies—risks of civil disorder, 
precipitate youth labor migration, and political tensions and conflicts 
between semi-borderless nations. The need for the international commu-
nity that funds (and seeks to influence) the ILO and WB to be ‘seen to act’ 
was compelling. Both the MDGs and SDGs placed great emphasis on (and 
pressures toward) partnership for development. The SDG mandates in 
particular spurred the efforts of the ILO and WB to act in partnership. 
Through S4YE and DJY, the WB and ILO nominally meet these expecta-
tions while operating separately from one another. The recent advent of 
GenU, however, may be intended to re-calibrate partnerships and 
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relations between key players, as UNICEF is thrust into the limelight. 
How such separated and reconstituted partnerships operate is largely 
opaque to the processes of independent evaluation, especially with regard 
to the evolving relationships between three lead IO actors.
Arm’s-length scrutiny of complex partnerships involving multiple pow-
erful players rarely manages to deliver insights into internal intra-IO 
micro-politics. Even studies that gain direct access can be ‘called out’ on 
their interpretations. For example, Deacon’s ground-breaking work over 
the last two decades has been unique and pre-eminent in the study of the 
dynamics of IO relations in the global governance of social policy, espe-
cially of the ILO and WB. He found numerous examples of direct dissent 
and struggle between them in relation to employment, social protection 
and other policies (Deacon 2007, 2013, 2015). But despite his longstand-
ing, intensive and often first-hand studies, it would be rash to assume that 
Deacon’s work has definitively explained ILO-WB dynamics. His method-
ology has recently been respectfully and tentatively queried for drawing 
premature conclusions, and for being over-reliant on accounts that refer-
ence the personal dimensions of interaction (Cichon 2019). Other policy 
fields also query the more critical characterizations of the WB, and re-open 
questions about its political-economic predispositions and stances in the 
1980s–90s (see e.g. Barrientos et al. 2011; Alderman and Yemtsov 2012; 
Abramo et al. 2019).
The debate on the contested subject of inter-IO relations remains far 
from resolution. Understanding of the effects of IOs’ differences, tensions 
and conflicts on policy outcomes also remains limited—just as knowledge 
of the workings of IOs’ interior processes and interactions has remained 
commensurately limited regarding partnerships. The case for researchers 
to be afforded direct access to study the dynamics of key inter-IO relations 
is compelling. What is beyond doubt is that concerted attempts at the 
global governance of policies intended to alleviate continuous extremes of 
YU across many world regions have had ostensibly very limited impact to 
date. The spike in interest among most IOs in the face of the shocking 
scale of YU immediately after the onset of the GFC has long-since passed. 
Extreme youth unemployment in the Arab States, Northern Africa, Latin 
America/Caribbean, much of Europe and in Central and Western Asia are 
becoming normalized through their persistence. Among IOs, only the 




Whether the de facto separation of the work of the ILO and WB proves 
more productive than their past partnerships remains to be seen. The 
insertion of UNICEF into the field compounds the uncertainty. As other 
one-time IO actors in this field fell away ‘after the crisis’, perhaps the 
question of greatest importance is whether the re-distributional powers 
inherent in the global social governance of youth (un)employment policy 
can reasonably be deemed adequate—especially in a world in which the 
numbers of 15–24-year-olds who are not in employment or studying or 
training is still estimated to substantially exceed 100 million. One cer-
tainty, though, is that the work of all three leading IOs will be severely 
tested by the immanent transnational effects of the SARS-Cov-2 
(Covid-19) pandemic of 2020  and beyond with regard to collapsing 
labor markets in which young people are reliably the first victims.24
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and work-related diseases. Examples of perilous circumstances and deathly 
events are tragically abundant. Based on data collected by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), Hämäläinen, Takala and Boon Kiat (2017, 4) 
estimate that there are 2.78 million deaths due to work-related causes each 
year.1 This figure shows that the issue goes beyond widely publicized inci-
dents such as the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in 2013 which caused 
the death of at least 1134 workers. Improving working conditions for peo-
ple across the world is therefore an urgent and topical matter. But it is not 
limited to standards on occupational safety: In fact, achieving consensus on 
what should constitute a set of global (minimum) labor standards is crucial 
to prevent a potential ‘race to the bottom’ that places competitiveness and 
maximum profits over safe and humane working conditions.
In this chapter, we set out to investigate how international and regional 
organizations have positioned themselves toward global labor standards. 
Two questions guide our analyses. First, we want to outline why there is 
no agreement among International Organizations (IOs) on what consti-
tutes a set of desirable global labor standards. We argue that disagreement 
both between and within IOs persists for two reasons, namely conflicting 
ideological beliefs on the desirability of labor standards, but also because 
of strong regional differences. In effect, this has contributed to a decen-
tralized system of global governance which employs a variety of differen-
tially effective enforcement mechanisms (see Hurd 2003). Second, we will 
take a look at how labor standards are governed at the level of regional 
organizations, investigating whether regional organizations might in fact 
be better equipped to come to agreements given that they represent more 
homogeneous groups of countries than IOs.
The chapter starts by briefly exploring various conceptualizations of labor 
standards and by outlining the two contesting discourses, namely the ‘social’ 
and the ‘neoliberal’ discourses, and how labor standards, notably Freedom 
of Association and Collective Bargaining (FACB) rights, are perceived in 
each of these modes of thought. It proceeds to present the positions of 
three key international actors, the ILO, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the World Bank (WB). This selection does not constitute an 
exhaustive mapping of the field, where other organizations, notably the 
United Nations Human Rights Council and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), are also influential actors. 
1 Their estimates are based on data for the years 2014 and 2015 (Hämäläinen et  al. 
2017, 5).
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Restricting our analysis to the ILO, the WTO and the WB, however, allows 
us to juxtapose an organization strongly in favor of labor standards, an orga-
nization that claims to not be responsible for or even in opposition to labor 
standards, and an organization that has shifted its position to some extent.
Beyond the IOs, in this chapter we will assess how two regional organiza-
tions, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Southern 
Common Market (Mercosur), have approached the topic of labor standards. 
ASEAN and Mercosur are neither the only nor the most influential standard 
setters in the population of regional organizations—for example the European 
Union (EU) is much more active in defining standards and enforcement 
mechanisms (see e.g. Orbie and Babarinde 2008). ASEAN and Mercosur are, 
however, interesting cases to illustrate how social and neoliberal discourses 
shape regional approaches to labor standards in contexts where labor-inten-
sive industries are widespread among member states and introducing far-
reaching sets of labor standards might hamper competitiveness.
MappIng the populatIon and dIscourses of Ios 
actIve In the fIeld of global labor standards
There is no agreement on what the term ‘labor standards’ denotes. As 
work may take on a variety of forms and is happening in highly diverse 
contexts, defining and delimiting standards is highly contextual. When 
assessing organizations’ positions, however, it is helpful to rely on a defini-
tion that can be used as a benchmark. Based on a systematic literature 
review,2 we find that authors agree that labor standards are a multidimen-
sional concept that is made up of a number of different sub-components, 
but that there is no general consensus on the sub-concepts that should be 
included in a definition. Over 20 different components are mentioned at 
least once, among them are “hiring regulations” (Gwartney et al. 2012; 
Murillo 2005; Potrafke 2013; Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Nickell 1997; 
Botero et al. 2004), laws that prohibit forced labor (Anner 2012; Anner 
and Caraway 2010; Barrientos and Smith 2007; Cingranelli and Richards 
2014; OECD 2000; Portes 1994) and a right to unemployment benefits 
(Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Botero et al. 2004).
What explains the gaping differences between definitions? To some 
extent, the breadth (or narrowness) of definitions aligns with two 
2 We conducted a search on Web of Science using the search terms “labo* rights” and 
“labo* standards”. We restricted the review to the most influential articles, which we defined 
as those having >100 citations and being in relevant categories. This amounted to 15 studies.
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competing views on the desirability and reach of such standards: the ‘neo-
liberal’ and the ‘social’ perspectives. According to the neoliberal perspec-
tive, labor standards are problematic because they undermine the ‘free’ 
operation of the market, hampering the generation of profit. In this view, 
labor standards are only beneficial when they are geared toward productiv-
ity and compliance, not decommodification. Labor standards are thus seen 
critically, and a limited set of rights—if any—is favored. The social dis-
course on the other hand includes a strong commitment to a set of far- 
reaching rights and standards, even though there is often considerable 
disagreement in regard to insider/outsider divides within the social dis-
course (see also Ehmke et al. 2009, 17–20 for a detailed discussion of the 
positions of capital and labor).
Interestingly, authors included in the literature review agree in regard 
to one subcomponent of labor standards. All definitions include FACB 
rights. As FACB rights allow workers to organize and represent their own 
interests, they are a basis for many other rights and standards (see e.g. 
Langille 2005, 430; Berliner et  al. 2015). “The formation of a union, 
good faith collective bargaining, and withholding one’s labor to improve 
terms and conditions of employment are enabling rights. They do not 
dictate outcomes but guarantee procedures that mitigate the inherent 
power imbalance in the employment relationship” (Anner 2012, 610). 
The right to freedom of association and collective bargaining thus affects 
in how far markets are regulated and the way society is organized as a 
whole (Mosley 2010, 103–104). Because FACB rights touch upon funda-
mental class and power relations, they are likely to be contested and are in 
fact threatened in many countries (Visser 2019). In this chapter we will 
therefore use FACB rights as a benchmark to assess how IOs have 
approached Global Labor Standards.
We examine the stances of three major IOs toward labor standards: 
Firstly, the ILO, which remains the most influential standard-setting inter-
national organization in the field of labor standards. Other organizations 
continue to rely on the cognitive authority of the ILO to define bench-
marks in the field (Ehmke et al. 2009, 14; see also Baccaro 2014; Senghaas- 
Knobloch 2019). However, as was foreshadowed in the introduction, we 
also consider organizations that are not ‘responsible’ for labor standards in 
the narrower sense: On the one hand, we include the WTO, which could 
potentially provide effective enforcement instruments but has refrained 
from taking an active position on labor standards. On the other hand, we 
 F. RÖMER ET AL.
61
discuss the position of the World Bank which has moved from contesta-
tion to cooperation with the ILO.
It is important to note that a large literature attests that IOs are not the 
only influential actors in the field of global labor standards (Hendrickx 
et  al. 2016; Hassel 2008; Hassel et  al. 2008; Alston 2004). Multi- 
stakeholder initiatives, multinational corporations, international unions, 
NGOs and grassroots movements have become important actors, particu-
larly when it comes to implementation, control and enforcement (see e.g. 
O’Rourke 2003; Kolben 2011; Anner 2012). Of special relevance in this 
context is the UN Global Compact, which is something of a hybrid. 
Though initiated and overseen by the United Nations (UN), it is a volun-
tary association of businesses that aims to ensure adherence to a set of 
social and environmental standards (see Ruggie 2002; Hurd 2003).3 
Giving an account of all these different organizations and initiatives would 
be outside the scope of this chapter. However, we will touch upon them 
in those cases where they systematically influenced or were influ-
enced by IOs.
The International Labour Organization: The Promoter of Labor 
Standards as a Social Project
In 2019, the ILO celebrated its centenary anniversary. It is the oldest and 
the only global body responsible for the formulation and inspection of 
internationally recognized labor standards. The ILO is also the only tri-
partite UN agency, having succeeded in involving representatives of gov-
ernments, employers and workers in its decision-making process (ILO 
2002). To date, the ILO has established 190 Conventions (including 
eight Fundamental Conventions, four Governance Conventions and other 
Technical Conventions), 6 Protocols and 206 Recommendations. FACB 
rights are fundamental to the ILO, which is first and foremost mirrored in 
its institutional set-up—union members supply the worker representatives 
for its tripartite structure (ILO 2019b). Furthermore, promoting FACB 
rights has been one of the ILO’s aims from the start. The Declaration of 
Philadelphia mentions both “freedom of expression and of association” 
and “the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining” (ILO 
1944, 4–5). The two relevant conventions, C087 - Freedom of Association 
3 For a critical assessment of the “promise-performance gap” of the UN Global Compact, 
see Sethi and Schepers (2014).
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and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87) and C098 - 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), date 
from 1948 and 1949 respectively. Importantly, however, the social dis-
course pursued by the ILO has gone far beyond focusing on the enabling 
FACB rights. ILO conventions and regulations define labor standards in 
regard to a wide array of different aspects, covering not only protection for 
those at work, but also protection for those unable to work (unemploy-
ment, old age, sickness and disability insurance). This far-reaching defini-
tion of labor standards reflected by a large number of conventions has also 
been called the “maximalist approach” (Alston 2004, 465).
It has been argued that the social discourse pursued by the ILO was 
relatively strong in a world system characterized by two competing politi-
cal ideologies. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the threat of 
communism as a credible alternative to market capitalism and conse-
quently weakened the ILO (Kaufman 2004, 552). During the 1990s, the 
organization shifted from a maximalist approach to promoting a narrower 
set of standards. In 1998, the ‘Core Labour Standards’ (CLS) were intro-
duced. They are comprised of eight fundamental rights conventions which 
cover four dominant issues: freedom from forced labor, freedom from 
child labor, freedom from discrimination at work and the freedom to form 
and join a union and to bargain collectively.4 Importantly, the CLS apply 
to all ILO member states regardless of whether they have ratified them 
(ILO 1998). This constituted an important shift in the social discourse. 
CLS were framed as truly global, a set of rights which does not need 
national government approval.
The literature agrees on the fact that the introduction of the CLS in 
1998 marks a watershed (Alston 2004; Alston 2005; Langille 2005; 
Maupain 2005; Standing 2008). However, there is sharp disagreement 
about whether they represent an upgrading or downgrading of labor stan-
dards in the international regime. Numerous authors have argued that the 
CLS reflect a defeat of labor interests because they focus on a smaller 
4 Freedom of association and collective bargaining: C087 - Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), C098 - Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Forced labor: C029 - Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 
105); Discrimination: C100 - Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), C111 - 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); Child labor: 
C138 - Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, 1999 (No. 182).
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group of rights at the expense of the much broader body of labor stan-
dards covered by the conventions, thus marking a very significant depar-
ture from the approach that all human rights are equally important (see 
e.g. Alston 2004, 2005). There are, however, also a number of voices 
arguing that the CLS were an adequate response to the increasing domi-
nance of trade liberalization and neoliberalism in national and interna-
tional institutions. Maupain stresses that since the introduction of the 
CLS, ratification of the respective conventions has increased considerably 
(Maupain 2005, 439). Despite criticism of the loose wording in the 
Conventions and Recommendations, the CLS nevertheless stand as the 
most influential source of defining minimum standards, with the right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining remaining at the heart of 
the ILO’s goals (Standing 2008; Langille 2005).
Furthermore, the CLS do not stand alone but are accompanied by the 
Decent Work Agenda (DWA), which includes a more encompassing con-
ceptualization of labor standards. The DWA encompasses the CLS as one 
of four pillars next to employment creation, expansion of social protection 
and promotion of tripartite agreements as well as social dialogue (Bakvis 
and McCoy 2008, 2). Through the CLS and the DWA, the ILO thus 
continues to define benchmarks for global labor standards that include 
and go beyond FACB rights.
In recent years, however, the ILO’s significance has been challenged in 
two ways. First, the ILO has had to consider its relations to other actors 
that have newly emerged or gained importance. The role of international 
unions has continued to expand in scope in recent years, with unions 
developing into effective actors in international labor relations (Fairbrother 
and Hammer 2005; Croucher and Cotton 2009; Ford and Gillan 2015). 
Unions directly negotiate with multinational companies and sign 
International Framework Agreements that ensure the company-wide 
respect of labor standards across multiple countries (Dehnen 2013; 
McCallum 2013). Similarly, grassroots and civil society organizations are 
channeling consumers’ awareness of working conditions in the global pro-
duction chain. This has resulted in influential public campaigns that have 
led to responses from multinational corporations (Barrientos and Smith 
2007, 715). Among those responses are increases in the use of corporate 
codes of conduct since the 1990s (Bartley 2005). The ILO’s role has been 
one of support through capacity building, technical assistance and provi-
sion of legitimacy (Baccaro 2014, 265), but actual control over these cor-
poratist actors is limited. This has led some authors to the conclusion that 
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the ILO has not been able to defend workers’ interests and that the social 
discourse has failed (see e.g. Farnsworth 2005; Hilgert 2009). In a more 
recent study, however, Thomas and Turnbull (2017) find that policy 
entrepreneurs within the ILO are successfully promoting the idea that a 
new form of governance is needed that can target transnational actors, 
notably multinational corporations.
A second challenge arises from the fact that the ILO has traditionally 
tended to represent formal workers and to neglect the situation of margin-
alized workers such as informal workers or migrant workers (Cox 1980; 
Prügl 1999; Vosko 2002; Whitworth 1997). Yet these make up a large 
part of the global workforce. The ILO’s legitimacy as the organization 
most knowledgeable about any issue related to labor thus hinges on incor-
porating and supporting these groups that have not traditionally been its 
main clientele. Furthermore, interest groups representing informal work-
ers are emerging across the globe. The response of the ILO has been to 
suggest unionizing the informal workforce. The report “Organizing 
Informal Workers into Trade Unions” is a guide that is supposed to help 
unions identify and organize relevant populations (ILO 2019a). One 
could conclude that Vosko’s (2002) claim that the ILO seems to be less 
market-oriented than in previous years still holds today, and that a labor- 
oriented discourse on labor standards prevails, with FACB rights as the 
fundamental principle. The ILO thus appears to continue to normatively 
define labor standards within the global discourse in a comparatively 
encompassing way.
The World Trade Organization: The Persistent Trade Promoter
The WTO is the largest international economic organization in the world. 
In contrast to the ILO’s tripartite structure, the WTO gathers only gov-
ernmental and business representatives at the negotiating table of trade 
treaties and is operated by consensus. The bargaining power of workers or 
domestic politics in labor standards promotion is often limited through-
out the process. The WTO has persistently pursued a neoliberal discourse, 
which challenges labor-related laws and regulations as factors of market 
distortion. According to this point of view, there is no obligation for the 
WTO to contribute to ensuring adherence to these standards.
From the 1980s onward, the debate on ‘social clauses’ raised the ques-
tion as to whether there should be a formal link established between global 
trade and global labor standards. Interestingly, it was not primarily the 
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ILO that initiated this discussion. In fact, among ILO officials there was 
some reluctance to adopt strong sanctioning mechanisms in order to 
achieve compliance to labor standards (Haworth et al. 2005, 1946) and 
international unions, notably the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions/International Trade Union Confederation (ICFTU/
ITUC), took the initiative instead (van Roozendaal 2002). The main 
argument of the international unions was that there was a risk of a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in the global trade and production network. The argument 
claims that in a globalized economy, weak labor standards are a competi-
tive advantage (Chan 2003; Davies and Vadlamannati 2013; Drezner 
2001). Low labor standards in one country may therefore trigger a dete-
rioration in labor standards in other countries which face competitive pres-
sures to weaken or refrain from strengthening their own labor standards. 
A social clause would have allowed importing countries to make use of 
trade sanctions against exporting countries that did not respect a previ-
ously defined set of labor standards (Van Liemt 1989).
The proposition to include a social clause was met with fierce opposi-
tion by developing countries in the Global South who believed this clause 
would be used for protectionist purposes. Workers’ representatives were 
also divided on the issue: Those from countries with stronger labor stan-
dards supported the clause, whereas workers from countries with lower 
standards faced a dilemma, as raising labor standards posed a threat to 
competitiveness and the creation of new jobs (Stallings 2010, 128). The 
last major effort to link labor standards into global trade through con-
certed efforts of the ILO and the WTO took place at the World Trade 
Organization Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996. At the confer-
ence, all WTO member governments agreed to committing to core labor 
standards, but emphasized that the WTO should not be the body respon-
sible for enforcing them. Instead, the WTO pointed to the ILO as the 
competent body responsible for setting and monitoring labor standards.
The WTO talks held in Seattle in 1999 ultimately resulted in a failure 
to make any progress on the contents of the next round of global trade 
negotiations. One of the main causes of dissent among the participants 
was again the issue of including labor standards in international trade 
agreements (Bhagwati 2001). Given the shortcomings of multilateral 
trade negotiations, the number of bilateral trade agreements outside the 
ambit of the WTO has since exploded. A number of these include social 
clauses. In the global discourse, however, the WTO ultimately retained 
the position that labor standards are neither its competency nor 
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responsibility. Even though the secretariats of the ILO and WTO work 
together on technical issues under the banner of ‘coherence’ in global 
economic policy making, there is evidence that labor standards are not 
only not promoted by the WTO, but that they are framed as impeding 
WTO objectives. Analyzing World Trade Reports from 2003–2017, 
Delgado (2019) finds that the WTO Secretariat continues to frame dereg-
ulatory reforms as desirable.
The World Bank: The Advocate for Neoliberalism in Labor 
Standards as a Development Project
The International Financial Institutions (IFIs), that is the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the regional development banks, 
have often put labor standards into question and, for the sake of a develop-
ment project, demand more labor flexibility over labor protection (see e.g. 
Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Anner and Caraway 2010). Empirical 
studies have shown that IFIs have actually undermined labor rights in the 
countries in which they were active. For instance, Blanton, Blanton and 
Peksen (2015) find that policy reforms recommended by IFIs undermined 
collective labor organization and the adoption of protective laws (see also 
Martin and Brady 2007).
The World Bank is an informative example of how ideas and discourse 
may evolve within IOs (Béland and Orenstein 2013). Having followed a 
neoliberal agenda from the 1980s, demanding structural adjustments in 
return for much of its lending, the World Bank refused to promote labor 
standards for a long time (Murphy 2014). From the late 1990s onward, 
however, the institution entered into dialogue with the ILO and with 
unions as well as civil society organizations (Hagen 2003; Murphy 2014). 
It is important to note, however, that FACB rights were only promoted 
once it had been proven that they would not threaten the main objective 
of the neoliberal discourse, that is economic growth. In response to a 
study that failed to find negative impacts of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights on economic growth, its executive board 
agreed on a statement in support of “the promotion of good practice 
related to all four Core Labour Standards” (Fryer 2003, 8).
The World Bank also changed the methodology of its influential Doing 
Business report to no longer penalize countries with strong labor regula-
tions in its “ease of doing business” index (Murphy 2014, 414). Labor 
standards also figure in the World Bank’s Environmental and Social 
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Framework, in the second set of standards. The Environmental and Social 
Standards (ESS) 2 “Labor and Working Conditions” has the following 
objectives with regard to World Bank projects: health and safety at work, 
fair treatment, non-discrimination and equal opportunity, protection of 
vulnerable workers including migrants, prevention of forced and child 
labor, the support of “principles of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining of project workers in a manner consistent with national law” 
and the creation of complaints mechanisms (World Bank 2018, 1). The 
guidelines reference the eight ILO Conventions that constitute the CLS 
(World Bank 2018, 1–2). Thus, the World Bank has moved from a posi-
tion of contestation of ideas brought forward by the ILO to a more coop-
erative stance.
regIonal organIzatIons In the regIMe of global 
labor governance
In this section we examine regional organizations’ stances toward labor 
standards and specifically FACB rights. As outlined in the introduction, 
labor standards are highly contextual, and the sets of standards and rights 
which are considered both desirable and feasible are likely to differ between 
countries and regions. As we have shown, regional differences have in 
some instances led to deadlock at the international level, notably within 
the WTO. Regional organizations as intermediary levels of agency between 
the nation-state and global institutions (Börzel and Risse 2009) may be 
better equipped to avoid such deadlocks. The groups of countries coming 
together in regional organizations tend to be more similar to each other 
than those involved in global multilateral negotiations, and therefore 
decision- making processes are less protracted (Yeates and Deacon 
2009, 470).
Both ASEAN and Mercosur have member states that were opposed to 
the social clause within the WTO. The two organizations differ, however, 
in regard to how much their member states rely on labor intensive produc-
tion, and the share of exports as a percentage of GDP is higher among 
ASEAN member states, making them more dependent on cheap labor 
(Fink and Rempe 2017). Another difference stems from the fact that while 
FACB rights remain limited in most ASEAN member states, Mercosur’s 
approach to FACB rights is shaped by the strong involvement of trade 
unions at the national level. This is mirrored in the ratification of the 
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relevant ILO treaties. Whereas only four and six of the ten ASEAN mem-
ber states have ratified ILO conventions No. 87 and No. 98 on FACB 
rights respectively, all Mercosur member states have done so. ASEAN has 
in recent years started promoting FACB rights, but this has been piece-
meal and with limited impact on member states. Mercosur’s approach to 
FACB rights on the other hand is more participatory, as evidenced both 
by the strong involvement of trade unions in the elaboration of labor 
rights declarations, but also in the emphasis put on these rights in the 
declarations themselves.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
ASEAN member states have a mixed track record when it comes to 
engagement with global labor governance.5 Before the early 2000s, 
ASEAN did not explicitly include human rights in its agenda (Davies 
2013, 385–386) and did not adopt a social approach to labor standards 
either. Questions of labor standards were peripheral (O’Brien 2008, 146), 
even though sectoral issues like work environment (ASEAN 2012b), the 
reduction of child labor (ASEAN 1993), and occupational health and 
safety (ASEAN-OSHNET 2015) were discussed. ASEAN was even hostile 
toward the promotion of labor rights in international forums. In fact, the 
organization’s Economic Ministers’ Meeting in April 1996 announced 
their refusal to accept social clauses in the WTO (Mah 1998, 297).
From the early 2000s, ASEAN adopted a discourse more amenable to 
workers’ rights and the concept of “people-centered ASEAN” became a 
leitmotif in many of the organization’s documents (Morada 2008). This 
shift resulted, among other things, in the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration (AHRD). While it should be stressed that it is non-binding, 
the Declaration includes many workers’ rights, including the right to 
social security and freedom from forced labor (ASEAN 2013, 5–8). In 
regard to FACB rights, however, the declaration contains the limitation 
that these rights must be “in accordance with national laws and regula-
tions” (ASEAN 2013, 8). In 2012, ASEAN also issued an “ASEAN 
Guideline on Good Industrial Relations Practices” calling for “[f]reedom 
of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bar-
gaining” (ASEAN 2012a, 3). Furthermore, there is some evidence that 
5 Out of the ten ASEAN member states, only Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines 
have ratified all Core ILO Conventions (Brown 2016, 35–36).
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ASEAN is responding to the ILO’s cognitive authority with regard to its 
“Decent Work” discourse, the concept appearing in documents such as 
the “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025” (ASEAN 
2016a) and the “Vientiane Declaration on Transition from Informal 
Employment to Formal Employment towards Decent Work Promotion in 
ASEAN” (ASEAN 2016b). The objectives set out for labor standards in 
the Blueprint are detailed in ASEAN Labor Ministers’ Work Programs and 
the Work Plans of subsidiary bodies (ASEAN 2017) with at least the 
implicit goal of harmonizing labor laws, including industrial relations (Sale 
2020, 38).
Regional free trade agreements also tend to not include labor provi-
sions: For instance, the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership between ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, 
Australia and New Zealand, is unlikely to do so (Brown 2016, 47). Truly 
regional frameworks on labor standards are also rare: An exception is the 
ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons signed in 2015, which 
builds on global initiatives and requires ASEAN member states to trans-
pose it into their national legislations. ASEAN has thus taken up global 
discourses seeking to harmonize labor standards across member states, but 
these attempts have been met with little success (Brown 2016; Sale 2020).
Both the concept of “organizational field” and the intrinsic features 
(Niemann et al. in this volume) of ASEAN may explain some of these dif-
ficulties. Firstly, with regard to the former, Sale (2020) argues that differ-
ing belief systems underlying national labor laws mar harmonization. For 
instance, labor market regulation in Malaysia focuses on employers’ inter-
ests in providing an inexpensive workforce, whereas worker protections 
take center stage to a larger extent in the Philippines, indicating that har-
monization of their labor standards will be difficult (Sale 2020). But lack 
of progress in regional harmonization of labor standards can also be traced 
back to intrinsic features of the organization: ASEAN has in fact long 
prided itself on its soft approach as well as prevailing norms of non- 
interference and consensus decision-making, so much so as to call this the 
“ASEAN way” to approach regionalism (Acharya 1997, 320). 
Consequently, many of the above-mentioned regulations, such as the 
AHRD, remain non-binding and thus with questionable impact.
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Southern Common Market (Mercosur)
Mercosur has created a relatively coherent legal framework for the protec-
tion of labor standards, including freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, as will be shown in this section. The organization promotes 
the participation of social partners in tripartite processes. In doing so, the 
organization references and thereby broadcasts global labor standards. 
This does not necessarily translate into promotion of these standards 
beyond the confines of the region, however.
When Mercosur was created it focused on free trade without any provi-
sion on labor (or other) rights (Ermida Uriarte 1999, 105). However, 
early treaties on Mercosur’s institutional set-up created a Working Sub- 
Group No. 10 on labor issues, employment and social security and the 
Economic and Social Advisory Forum (Olmos Giupponi 2014, 74). It is 
worth noting that a regional association of trade unions that predates 
Mercosur, the Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur founded 
in 1986, has a seat in both of these groups and has played a vital role in 
promoting the issue of workers’ rights in Mercosur in the 1990s (Ermida 
Uriarte 1999, 117). Mercosur member states signed the Multilateral 
Social Security Agreement in 1997 and the Mercosur Socio-Labor 
Declaration in the following year (Olmos Giupponi 2014, 75). The 
Declaration referenced a number of human rights treaties, but importantly 
also the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
which had just been adopted that same year (Mercosur 1998, 1). It con-
tained a number of individual worker rights, but also the right to freedom 
of association and collective bargaining. This included, explicitly, a right to 
strike (Mercosur 1998, 6–7). The parties to the declaration furthermore 
committed to fostering social dialogue (Mercosur 1998, 7). The 
Declaration was non-binding, however, and Mercosur treaties generally 
need to be incorporated into the domestic laws of most member states 
(Malamud 2020; Olmos Giupponi 2014).
In terms of enforcement bodies, the Declaration created a Regional 
Socio-Labor Commission, though with purely promotional tasks and 
without any means of sanctioning member states (Mercosur 1998, 10–11). 
It should be noted that as the Socio-Labor Declaration was not directly 
linked to the founding documents of Mercosur, violations of the norm 
could also not be dealt with within the Mercosur dispute settlement mech-
anisms (Castello 2016, 79). There has been quite some debate on whether 
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it might be directly applicable, and this depended on the legal systems of 
the member states: Only the Argentinian constitution follows the principle 
of monism, that is direct applicability of international norms (Olmos 
Giupponi 2014). In any case, the declaration contained many rights that 
are granted with reference to national legislation, but regardless of national 
differences in transposition, Castello (2016, 79) contends that labor tribu-
nals in all member states have made reference to the Declaration in rulings.
The Declaration was updated in 2015 after a tripartite process and aims 
to reaffirm and deepen labor rights (Castello 2016). The 2015 declaration 
reiterates its support for the ILO Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, but also takes up more recent international discourse on labor stan-
dards, putting the ILO “Decent Work” agenda at center stage (Mercosur 
2015). This entails the inclusion of a number of standards for individual 
workers like maximum work hours (Castello 2016, 84), though collective 
rights are also slightly expanded in the new document: Signatory states 
commit to efforts to actively strengthen employees’ (and employers’) rep-
resentation and collective bargaining mechanisms, the latter now also 
explicitly open to public sector employees (Castello 2016, 84). The revised 
declaration also substantiates the competencies of the Socio-Labor 
Commission which can now make recommendations to member states 
and meets twice as often as before (Mercosur 2015, 14–16).
The previous sections have shown that agreements on labor standards 
within Mercosur are developing. There is also a certain degree of technical 
cooperation through the Mercosur Labor Market Observatory established 
in 1998 to monitor labor market developments (Munck 2001, 18). In 
how far Mercosur advocates labor standards in its relations with other 
countries is less clear. Franca-Filho, Lixinski and Olmos Giupponi (2014, 
821–822) point out that Mercosur has concluded trade agreements with 
various countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America and 
South Asia without including human rights provisions. In conclusion, 
Mercosur can be seen as a broadcaster of ideas (Niemann et  al. in this 
volume) regarding global labor standards such as Decent Work or the CLS 
at the regional level. The development of these norms was aided by the 
strong presence of labor actors such as trade unions in the process of 
regional integration.
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labor standards for everyone? an outlook
In this chapter we compared how three International and two Regional 
Organizations, namely the ILO, the WTO and the World Bank, as well as 
ASEAN and Mercosur, approach the global governance of labor stan-
dards. We argue that two main discourses have been pursued in the global 
debate, a ‘social’ discourse and a ‘neoliberal’ discourse. We find that orga-
nizations whose intrinsic features allow for an institutionalized representa-
tion of worker’s interests pursue variations of the social discourse, whereas 
those that do not stay closer to a neoliberal position. This is true both at 
the international and regional level. We furthermore show that the coexis-
tence of these two conflicting discourses has led to contestation, but also 
exchange and cooperation, and that the ILO remains the cognitive author-
ity in the field.
Two sets of challenges seem especially relevant for the future of global 
governance on labor standards. First, there is still a gap between promises 
and enforcement due to capacity constraints, market pressures and ‘cheap 
ratification’. In how far this gap will be closed depends on the ability of the 
ILO and powerful trading partners, such as the US and the EU, to incen-
tivize pro-labor reforms. Second, the rapid technological transformation 
across industries and manufacturing sites results in a wide range of changes, 
in terms of the nature of formal work contracts, industrial relations at the 
workplace and how the global production network will be organized 
across nations. This new wave of technology will alter the traditional 
understanding of actual bargaining power of low-skilled workers at firms 
and factories in both developed or developing countries. The coming leap 
forward in technology challenges the existing global labor governance 
regime to catch up with industry practices and market forces as well as to 
come up with new governance strategies in order to limit the effect of 
negative externalities or social disruption on the poor, low-skilled working 
class. In how far these developments will weaken or strengthen the relative 
power of the social discourse remains to be seen.
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This chapter focuses on international health care worker migration to 
illustrate shifting constellations of architectures of ideas, actors and institu-
tions in global social governance and policy. The phenomenon of health 
worker migration and how the international community should respond 
to it is one that has long preoccupied International Organizations (IOs) 
(Yeates and Pillinger 2019a, b). It is the earliest case of care as an overtly 
institutionalized field of global social policy, long predating IOs’ initiatives 
on childcare, domestic care and care of migrants. It has been an active area 
of global social policymaking throughout the post-WWII period. Thus, a 
discernible global social policy field of health care worker migration was 
instituted from the outset of the United Nations (UN), developing and 
N. Yeates (*) • J. Pillinger 




expanding over the ensuing decades. As the chapter shows, this global 
policy field is complex, contested and dynamic. It is populated by numer-
ous IOs and other transnational actors promulgating myriad discourses, 
forging international agreements and entering into partnership—some are 
complementary, others are competing.
One chapter cannot do justice to the field’s complexity and dynamics, 
and therefore it focuses on mapping key contours of this global social 
policy field in the form of IOs operating on the most extensive multilateral 
scale. The chapter’s core emphasis is therefore on global organizational 
sources of public authority; private sources of authority within global gov-
ernance are outside the scope of the chapter. The discussion draws on our 
on-going work on this topic—most recently in a co-authored research 
monograph (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a) where we examine the origins of 
IOs’ involvement in shaping the field and demonstrate the substantial 
long-standing history of global governance and policy in this field. There 
we amply showed how the institutional architectures and discourses of 
contemporary global health workforce migration governance and policy 
are best understood as being produced through intersections of multiple 
policy fields (notably, health, migration, social protection, labor, trade, 
equality and human rights). The full implications of this are discussed 
further in Yeates and Pillinger (2019a), but it is worth highlighting at this 
point that expanding the analytical vista beyond intersections of global 
health policy and global migration policy opens our gaze onto a far broader 
institutional terrain, a much wider range of IOs and transnational policy 
actors active in this field, and far more complex global social policy dynam-
ics than has hitherto been appreciated. This chapter does not rehearse 
these arguments, but picks up key ideas from them. It incorporates addi-
tional analysis prepared purposefully for this chapter.
The remainder of the chapter is organized around four principal sec-
tions. Section “Mapping the Population of International Organizations” 
identifies the principal IOs active in the global policy field since the foun-
dation of the UN system, showing how they have changed over time. It 
relates this changing IO population to the expanding ‘universe’ of state 
and non-state policy actors active in this field and discerns principal char-
acteristics of this population over the period examined. Section “Key 
Discourses Promulgated by IOs” considers the IOs’ policy discourses in 
this field. Emphasizing the multiplicity of policy concepts, approaches and 
discourses circulating in this field, we discuss the extent to which they are 
attributable to any single IO and how they might relate to IOs’ 
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organizational ecology. Here, IOs’ organizational mandate and gover-
nance are accorded significance because they structure which actors par-
ticipate in IOs’ policy-formation processes and how they do so. In other 
words, mandates and governance structures determine who has proposal 
(and veto) rights within global policy. Section “Inter-actor Relationships 
of Cooperation, Coordination and Contestation” picks up on the multi-
farious nature of global social policy discourse(s) in this field, to discuss 
how they are shaped by cooperation, contestation and competition among 
IOs. We emphasize that such relations are integral to this field, albeit with 
an apparent trend in increased inter-IO cooperation, particularly over the 
last decade. This does not signal an erosion of competing policy approaches, 
which continue to be manifested in the context of the trend toward inter-
 IO global policy partnerships; contestation remains a central feature of the 
global policy field. Section “Conclusion” draws the chapter to a conclu-
sion, where we synthesize key points from the discussion and reflect on 




Historical Constellations of International Organizations
The numerous IOs constitute a significant share of the total population of 
transnational policy actors active in the global policy field of health worker 
migration. This section discusses the expansion of IOs involved in this field. 
It signals the extent to which the field has been marked by policy contesta-
tion, competition and coordination—a theme which is taken up in more 
detail in Sections “Key Discourses Promulgated by IOs” and “Inter-actor 
Relationships of Cooperation, Coordination and Contestation”.
To begin with, it is worth noting that the organizational features of this 
global policy field share many of the characteristics of migration gover-
nance more generally. While the World Trade Organization (WTO) over-
sees trade negotiations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
along with the Financial Stability Board, manages capital mobility, there is 
no single IO regulating migration. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) approaches issues of migration from a health needs and a ‘human 
resources for health’ perspective, while the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) focuses on labor and social protection issues affecting 
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all categories of labor, migrant or otherwise. The United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has an interest in health worker migration 
from the perspective of children’s rights to health, although it does not 
participate in shaping this policy field. United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) interest is from the 
perspective of education and training, and in international educational 
exchanges and mobility of highly educated labor. United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) interest is in the 
labor content (migratory and otherwise) of the international trade/devel-
opment nexus. The World Bank (WB) has an interest in migration as a 
factor in wider economic development. Only the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) has a sole focus on migration issues, 
but for most of its history it has sat outside the UN system. It has no regu-
latory or standard-setting role, and in keeping with its main emphasis on 
lower-skilled migration, displacement and returns it does not cover skilled 
health worker migration other than through more general diasporic 
approaches (Yeates and Pillinger 2018, 2019a, 15). Various other consul-
tative global fora operate within and outside of the UN to promote mul-
tilateral dialogue, such as the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development, the Global Migration Group and the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development (GFMD), though they have no role in the 
development of multilateral policies or standards and their involvement in 
health worker migration and recruitment has not been evident. The 
International Platform on Health Worker Mobility, which is part of the 
ILO, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), WHO Working for Health program (HEEG 2016) (Section 
“Inter-actor Relationships of Cooperation, Coordination and 
Contestation”), builds upon the High-Level Dialogue on International 
Health Worker Migration that took place in Dublin in 2017.
Table 4.1 below provides an overarching summary of the period exam-
ined. It plots the active IO population over time, along with key policy 
concepts and principal landmark agreements in the global policy field.
Against a backdrop of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) international trade regime underpinning the post-WWII global-
izing liberal order, the dominant IOs in this global policy field are member 
organizations of the UN system. The global policy field on international 
health worker migration originated within the UN system from its earliest 
days. WHO first reported on the consequences of the global dynamics of 
international health worker migration in the 1950s in the context of its 
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Fellowships scheme, but it did not initiate the global field as an arena of 
policy as political practice, nor was it a frontrunner in it for much of the 
field’s early history. Indeed, for much of the post-war period, this space 
was dominated by UNESCO, UNCTAD and the ILO. WHO started to 
participate more actively in an already extant policy field at the end of the 
1960s, within the terms of the debate set by these other UN agencies. 
These agencies were decisive in the early definition of the global policy 
field and had played a crucial role in identifying the global policy issues at 
stake since the early 1960s. UNESCO was the first UN (or any) global 
agency to explicitly identify international health worker migration as a 
global social policy issue, raising questions about the transfers of national 
(educational and training) resources involved in emigration. UNCTAD’s 
focus on the ‘brain drain’ and ‘reverse transfers of technology’ framed 
health worker migration as a factor of economic and industrial develop-
ment. Of note here are its attempts to negotiate an international agree-
ment to regulate and help reverse highly skilled health care worker 
migration. The ILO’s mandate meant its involvement was through the 
prism of international labor migration, instantiated through its tripartite 
elaboration of international labor standards. These standards were appli-
cable to all workers and were not sector-specific, but nevertheless related 
to the recruitment and working conditions of migrant health workers in 
tangible ways. Organizations of employers and workers were the only 
non-state policy actors involved in shaping the field at the time, and this 
remained the case until the 2000s (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a).
The first global institutional landmark agreement was concluded in 
1977 (ILO Nursing Personnel Recommendation). This was spurred by 
the ILO’s activism in the mid-1970s on international labor migration and 
gender equality more generally, which unfolded in the context of the 
UN’s New International Economic Order (NIEO) initiative and gave 
concrete expression to two international human rights covenants con-
cluded in 1966. WHO had by this time initiated a major global study of 
medical and nurse migration, but although it had provided substantial 
ideational input it was unable to translate its conclusions and recommen-
dations into a WHO Resolution or a general program of work or similar. 
This stalling did not seem to be due to a lack of demand by governments 
for international action. Indeed, this translational work was passed on to 
the ILO, which adopted a draft Recommendation in the space of a year. 
The rapid passage of a proposal into an agreement reflected the mounting 
‘anxiety’ expressed by many source country governments throughout the 
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1960s and 1970s of increasing emigration of their health workers and 
adverse impacts on their health systems. Correspondingly, it gave further 
impetus to the urgent need for internationally agreed-upon principles for 
the recruitment and employment of overseas health workers (Yeates and 
Pillinger 2019a).
The changed political and economic priorities of the late 1970s and 
1980s marked a significant shift in the international political economy of 
global social policy, stalling momentum that could otherwise have built on 
the ILO Recommendation. IMF, WB and OECD policies on structural 
adjustment and health sector reforms strongly conditioned the working 
and living conditions of health workforces across many countries, which, 
combined with the liberalization of labor migration, contributed substan-
tially to a growing global public health crisis in many countries. It was not 
that these IOs directly shaped global policy debate about health worker 
migration, but their activism in the wider realm of health and trade gover-
nance, notably through their promulgation of neoliberal and deregulatory 
social and economic reforms, impacted on the material conditions of 
health workforces that the UN (and its social agencies) had long been try-
ing to address through labor, education and trade sectors. The effects of 
global neoliberalism on this global policy field were felt most keenly by the 
ILO, WHO, UNESCO and UNCTAD whose policy space to consolidate 
and extend prior agreements in the interests of migrant workers and devel-
oping countries’ health services shrunk considerably. The growing empha-
sis on economic liberalization, market integration and voluntary 
self-regulation combined to stall the momentum gained by the UN agen-
cies which had worked in formal and informal partnership with the labor 
movement and developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s. Such 
was the severity of that stalling that the 1980s and 1990s were, in effect, 
lost decades as far as progress in this policy field is concerned (Yeates and 
Pillinger 2019a, b).
The opening years of the twenty-first century marked somewhat of a 
turning point in this global policy field. In health, international develop-
ment ministries, the labor movement and the increasing number of 
(International) Non-governmental Organizations ((I)NGOs) dedicated 
to global health workforce issues and international health worker migra-
tion were pressing forcefully for better regulation of international recruit-
ment as a means of stemming the growing global public health crisis and 
wider development impacts that were disproportionately borne by those 
countries (especially in Africa and Asia) least able to bear the effects of 
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health worker emigration. From the early 2000s, ‘ethical recruitment’ ini-
tiatives started to proliferate and, although these favored voluntary self- 
regulation, they influenced the discursive environment and empowered 
those (including WHO) calling for limits on the extent of recruitment of 
health workers from poor countries by rich ones (Yeates and Pillinger 
2019a, b).
Elsewhere, growing activism to strengthen global migration gover-
nance and policy more generally forged new institutional spaces and pro-
cesses outside of the UN system, notably in the GFMD and IOM1 which 
to some extent addressed health workforce issues and their intersections 
with migration. The GFMD proved to be a conduit for policy renewal in 
global health worker migration governance especially in relation to tem-
porary and circular migration, a significant policy idea that also features 
prominently in World Bank and IOM discourses (Section “Key Discourses 
Promulgated by IOs”). During the 2000s, ethical recruitment initiatives 
not only proliferated but multilateralized, culminating in the second dedi-
cated multilateral agreement in this global policy field—the Global Code 
of Practice on the Ethical Recruitment of Health Personnel (hereafter, 
Global Code) (WHO 2010). The alliance formed to advocate for and 
negotiate the Global Code reflected the expansion of the IO ‘universe’ 
since the 1970s. The ILO, WHO and IOM were especially active, along-
side Ministers of Health, Labor and International Development from 
source and destination countries, and a highly active civil society initiative 
(Health Worker Migration Initiative (HWMI).2 The Global Code is a sig-
nificant milestone in the history of the global policy field, though it is 
more permissive of continuing large-scale international migration and 
recruitment of health workers than the 1977 ILO Nursing Personnel 
Recommendation (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a, b).
The years after the 2010 Global Code were ones during which WHO 
consolidated its position as a principal IO in this global policy field. Its 
focus on the implementation of the Global Code paralleled efforts to 
mainstream issues of health worker recruitment and migration into global 
health and development policy, a feat achieved by its assertive stance on 
universal health coverage as a central global health policy objective (SDG 
5). Yet WHO is by no means the sole IO in this global policy field. The 
1 IOM was incorporated into the UN in 2016.
2 HWMI was a partnership between the NGO ‘Realizing Rights: the Ethical Global 
Initiative’ and the ‘Global Health Workforce Alliance’ (GHWA).
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leitmotifs of sustainability and international partnership facilitate a plural-
istic and expansive universe of policy actors. The ILO continues to be 
highly active in this global policy field, focusing on labor rights, as does 
WHO, advocating a focus on health services within strengthened health 
systems. IOM’s engagement with this field is sporadic and limited, but 
ultimately supportive of circular migration. The OECD continues to be a 
significant presence, bringing expertise in data production and analysis of 
OECD migration trends and support for continued international recruit-
ment by OECD countries. The World Bank is also becoming a more cen-
tral actor. It has been a major proponent of the argument that greater 
international economic integration within the framework of the WTO 
General Agreement on Trade in Services can facilitate greater mobility of 
health workers in ways that limit developing countries’ losses (World Bank 
2009, 2012). Other interventions have revolved around health work force 
composition and ‘task shifting’, health worker-to-population ratios and 
health workforce labor markets. World Bank officials have argued that 
WHO staff-to-patient ratio norms are too high (Yeates and Pillinger 
2013), challenging the international consensus that the ratios should be 
revised upwards.
The ILO, WHO and the World Bank—and prospectively, the WTO—
seem set to play a greater role in remaking the global policy field over the 
coming years. One driver of this is the Global Commission on Health 
Employment and Growth (HEEG 2016) which recommended an inter-
 IO global health workforce initiative led by the ILO, WHO and the World 
Bank, and involving the OECD. It remains to be seen how this inter-IO 
dynamic will unfold, what new policy actors will be brought into the 
arena, what discursive shifts it will produce and how these will be mani-
fested in the dynamics and outcomes of global policy itself. However, 
there are already signs that WHO is taking on board the need for stronger 
lateral connections between health, trade and labor, even if inscribing 
these connections within a revised Global Code seems a step too far for it 
at the moment. It has extended consultative status to labor actors (nota-
bly, PSI), is adopting ILO’s occupational classification for future use and 
seems to accept the need for greater emphasis on labor economics (associ-
ated most with the World Bank). It will be of interest to see what other 
policy actors are brought into WHO work in this evolving field and what 
role the WTO might play in the future. The WTO has self-consciously 
abstained from participating in this field on the grounds that GATS is 
about mobility and not migration. However, the WHO’s discursive (and 
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apparent institutional) shift from migration to mobility3 plus its prospec-
tively greater attention to health labor economics may open opportunities 
for the WTO and the World Bank to become more prominent influences 
on the field.
The SDGs are a further driver creating spaces for additional IOs to join 
this policy field. Health worker migration and recruitment cuts across four 
SDGs (Health and Well-Being, Decent Work and Economic Growth, 
Reduced Inequalities, Partnership). SDG 17 identifies regional integra-
tion and regional entities in implementing the SDGs, opening up the 
prospect of a far larger role for IOs on a regional scale to influence global 
policy in this and other fields (Yeates 2017). Indeed, WHO is already 
highlighting a greater role for regional formations in managing health 
worker migration (WHO 2016; Chanda 2019). In many ways, though, 
this regional emphasis builds on extant trends in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the East African Community (EAC), 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the EU 
whose institutional regimes already play a significant role in governing 
health worker recruitment and migration within their regional communi-
ties and their relations with ‘third countries’ (Yeates 2014, Yeates and 
Pillinger 2013, 2018). Also, the 2010 WHO Global Code has been imple-
mented, in part, by being integrated into the European Commission 
Action Plan for the EU Health Workforce. Further measures or plans to 
integrate the principles into regional actions are reported from member 
states in the WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean 
(EMRO) network (Arab League), the Andean network, the Ibero-
American General Secretariat (SEGIB) and the Council of Health 
Ministers of Central America (COMISCA) (WHO 2016). The SDGs’ 
emphasis on partnership working is embedded in the idea of ‘multistake-
holderism’, which structures diverse stakeholders (including INGOs, civil 
society organizations, employers, corporations) into policy formation for 
delivering the SDGs. In health, multistakeholder partnerships have so far 
been most obviously manifested in the increasing role of the private (for 
profit, corporate) sector in delivering universal health coverage and global 
health initiatives (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a, b).
Clearly there are different and competing currents running through the 
development of global policy in this field. In terms of the broad 
3 Echoes of this discursive shift are apparent in the inter-IO International Health Worker 
Mobility Platform.
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development of the field, this review of its long history across its post-war 
era, the following points regarding the ‘universe’ of IOs populating this 
field may be highlighted.
First, WHO may currently be the IO that is most associated with this 
global policy field (by virtue of the 2010 Global Code), but from a longer 
historical perspective it has played a far less formative role. The ILO, 
UNESCO and UNCTAD, were at the foreground of shaping the defini-
tion of the global policy issues at stake and elaborating on concrete global 
policy proposals in the 1960s, prior to WHO’s joining this field. 
Furthermore, WHO’s contributions to the field have been uneven: 
decades have passed without it making any contribution at all. Despite 
this, WHO undoubtedly has the second longest presence among IOs in 
the field and presently functions as a principal convener of international 
initiatives in this field. The changing constellations of IOs over the period 
are also evident in how UNESCO and UNCTAD are no longer the prin-
cipal protagonists that they once were (indeed, they have withdrawn from 
the field), and how the World Bank has been gaining greater prominence 
within the last decade.
Second, if the IOs involved in propelling the major initiatives and 
agreements can be taken as a proxy for the most powerful (influential) 
actor in the global policy field, then the ILO is the most consistently pow-
erful UN social policy agency over time (see point above). In practice, 
though, the ILO and WHO have worked in informal partnership. This is 
most obviously seen in the 1970s when WHO handed over the task of 
translating the policy conclusions of its initiative to the ILO, which nego-
tiated the Nursing Personnel Recommendation within the space of just 
one year. The dynamics of this historic partnership may well change over 
the coming years as the World Bank and others become more prominent.
Third, the changing constellation of IOs is seen in the expanding uni-
verse of IOs more generally. Prior to the 2000s, international non-state 
actors were comprised principally of international workers’ and employers’ 
organizations working through the ILO to form international labor stan-
dards. At the turn of the twenty-first century, this universe of non-statist 
IOs had pluralized: a far greater number and range are now involved, 
organizing the ethical recruitment movement. This movement originated 
with non-state actors (health professionals etc.) which have worked with 
state actors (some source and destination country governments) and IOs 
through the HWMI to campaign for the Global Code and its implementa-
tion. This multi-actor alliance has succeeded in renewing attention to 
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connections between health, development, labor migration and labor 
conditions.
Fourth, the most significant advances in the institutionalization of 
global policy (indicated by concrete multilateral agreements) have tended 
to follow major global initiatives in two fields: international development 
(UN Development Decades, NIEO, MDGs, SDGs) and international 
migration (ILO labor migration initiatives of the 1970s preceding the 
ILO Nursing Personnel Recommendation; UN initiatives in the late 
1990s/mid 2000s to ‘thicken’ global migration governance; most recently 
the migration-related aspects of SDGs, Global Compact). We must not 
discount the formative influence of global initiatives launching and sus-
taining neoliberalism and structural adjustment through finance, develop-
ment, trade and health. This points to the conclusion that the broader 
canvas of IOs and the institutional regimes in which they are embedded 
are essential to understanding the dynamics of the global policy field of 
health worker migration governance. It is as important to attend to the 
broad canvas of global governance and policy when considering the popu-
lation of relevant IOs (and discourses) and the dynamics of the global 
policy field as it is to those IOs more explicitly operating within the policy 
domain. This conclusion speaks to the idea of ‘exogenous organizational 
ecology’ (Niemann et al., in this volume).
Key dIscourses proMulgated by Ios
The organizational features of this global policy field discussed in Section 
“Key Discourses Promulgated by IOs” indicate that just as there is no 
overarching global institutional migration governance framework on 
health worker migration, so there is no single predominant IO coordinat-
ing the policy field. This global policy landscape points to dispersed man-
dates, authority, responsibility and power among the population of IOs. 
Most of the principal IOs engage with health worker migration as part of 
their broader remit, but they address health worker migration and recruit-
ment in quite different ways.
Indeed, looking more closely at the concepts, approaches and dis-
courses in this field, we see multiplicity. IOs’ policy discourses are multi-
farious. Policy issues identified differ from one IO to another, each of 
which institute initiatives reflecting their organizational mandate and pri-
orities. Table 4.2 identifies in summary form the policy approaches and 
their underpinning key concepts, characteristic discourse(s) and exemplar 
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initiatives and/or publications for eight IOs discussed in Section “Mapping 
the Population of International Organizations”, namely: ILO, IOM, 
OECD, UNESCO, UNCTAD, World Bank, WHO and WTO. The table 
covers a long historical period; where applicable, it indicates any shift in 
approach and discourse of the IOs included in it. The WTO is bracketed 
here because although it has self-consciously abstained from this global 
policy field on the grounds that it addresses mobility of labor, not migra-
tion, the applicability of GATS, although uncertain, cannot be excluded 
entirely (WHO/The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)/
WTO 2012). In any case, international services trade agreements in global 
policymaking in this field (as in others) have been enduringly attractive to 
some global actors so it is important that the WTO be included even if it 
is presently a ‘passive’ actor.
Table 4.2 shows the breadth of policy concepts, approaches and dis-
courses evident in this field. These more or less clearly distinguish the IOs 
(columns 2 and 3) from one another, even though underpinning ideas 
such as the right to migrate, universal health coverage, ethical/fair recruit-
ment and development benefits of migration are shared by them. However, 
these ideas are taken up and blended in quite different ways by different 
IOs. Among the UN agencies, the ILO, WHO, UNESCO and UNCTAD 
all subscribe to UN normative principles on human rights and equality, 
but each bring different perspectives that are, in turn, reflected in their 
discourses. The ILO’s approach is grounded in promoting the highest 
international labor standards possible and social protection systems consis-
tent with them, and accordingly discusses health worker migration and 
recruitment in terms of working conditions in countries of origin and 
employment and as a matter of social (labor) injustice. WHO’s approach 
is rooted in meeting essential health needs in line with realizing strength-
ened health systems and universal health coverage. Its discourse is rooted 
in health workforce planning and health professional workforces as part of 
the planning, policy and administration of health services more generally 
in order to meet population health needs and global health goals. 
UNESCO’s approach has been to highlight the loss of national invest-
ment in education and human development that results from permanent 
emigration of highly skilled health workers especially to richer countries in 
the Global North. During the 1960s, it was the most vociferous of all the 
active IOs at the time in emphasizing the need for a robust global policy 
capable of addressing and stemming the ‘brain drain’.
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Table 4.2 Policy approaches and discourses of IOs in regard to health worker 
migration/recruitment
IO Approach Discourse Exemplar initiative(s)





Brain drain, brain gain, brain 
circulation. Fair recruitment and 
employment; pre-eminence of 
ILO normative standards on 
labor migration and social 
protection for migrants






1982 Maintenance of 






Brain gain, brain circulation; 
harnessing social remittances for 
‘development’, supporting 
transfer of knowledge, skills and 
technology, and diaspora 




IOM-funded study by 
Tjadens, Weilandt and 
Eckert (2012)
OECD Health labor 
markets, circular 
migration
Mutual benefit, brain circulation 
(health sector efficiency/costs), 
sustainable financing.




Brain drain as a factor of 
depletion of investment in human 
development. Redistribution, 









Brain drain. Outflows of health 
workforce as: denial of a 
country’s access to development 
resources; one-sided transfer of 
productive resources embodying 





WHO Essential health 
needs
Human resources for health; 
health professionals; health 
workforce planning and 
sustainability; ethical recruitment; 
universal health coverage. Brain 
drain, brain gain, latterly, brain 
circulation.
WHO (2006)
2010 WHO Global 
Code of Practice on 
the Ethical 




4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, CARE AND MIGRATION: THE CASE… 
98
Beyond these IOs, the policy issues are framed in quite different ways. 
UNCTAD’s policy discourse stands out for framing international health 
worker migration as an issue of ‘reverse’ transfers of resources from devel-
oping to developed countries which, it has argued, is a reflection of source 
countries’ unequal positioning within the international trade and develop-
ment system. Its interventions were significant at the time (during the 
1960s–1980s) because they differed substantially from—and challenged—
the policy discourses of WHO, the ILO and UNESCO in  locating the 
‘brain drain’ in the context of uneven trade and development within the 
world system. UNCTAD was also significant for its pioneering (but ulti-
mately doomed) global policy proposals to regulate and stem such resource 
flows through global financial restitution mechanisms. The trade/labor/
development nexus perspective has more recently been taken up by the 
World Bank, which frames the issue as a matter of harnessing international 
migration dynamics for national and international development, albeit 
only recently beginning to engage with health worker migration dynamics 
through the lens of services trade and, latterly, universal health coverage. 
Its keenest interest has been in diasporic aspects of socio-economic devel-
opment, particularly migrant remittances as a source of development 
finance, and in harnessing international services trade frameworks on a 
regional scale as a means of mobilizing labor and financial resources for 
Table 4.2  (continued)




Brain gain, brain circulation.
Labor market, fiscal and 
development impacts of 
migration
Temporary migration, knowledge 
transfers from migration.
Has invoked the potential value 
of international services trade 
agreements to manage health 
worker migration.
Universal health coverage
Ratha and Mohapatra 
(2011)




(WTO) (Trade in 
services)




Source: compiled using data from Yeates and Pillinger (2013, 2018, 2019a), with additional analysis by 
the authors for this chapter
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regional (and national) economic development. With the very recent 
exception of WHO (WHO 2016), it has been the only IO which has an 
appreciable world-regional dimension to its policy discourse, which it has 
pursued largely through wider regional development initiatives. Indeed, 
world-regional social policy in the Caribbean, Africa and East/South-East 
Asia bear the imprint of World Bank encouragement of international trade 
in services approaches to health worker migration and recruitment policy 
which emphasize the value of temporary and circular migration of health 
(and other) workers to meeting the economic needs of countries (Yeates 
2014; Yeates and Pillinger 2013, 2018).
Policy approaches and discourses, such as ethical recruitment, universal 
health coverage and so on, crosscut with those of ‘brain drain’, ‘brain gain’ 
and ‘brain circulation’ that transcend any one IO. These latter three con-
cepts can be broadly demarcated over time. Thus, global policy discourses 
have shifted from emphasizing the loss of investment of public resources 
in human and wider development capacity of countries (‘brain drain’), to 
emphasizing the benefits to source countries of their highly skilled labor 
emigrating to richer countries (‘brain gain’), to emphasizing the ‘win-win’ 
outcomes for source and recruiting countries alike as a result of temporary 
migration implied by more ‘free-flowing’, ‘circular’ migration patterns 
(‘brain circulation’). Even so, each of the IOs (and many INGOs) partici-
pate in these debates on quite different terms. These differences relate in 
turn to debates about the migration-development nexus that have become 
prominent in the global migration governance and policy field over the 
last two decades. Such debates tend, however, to be conducted in rather 
abstract terms, rarely connecting to the actual labor and living conditions 
of migrants themselves. One concern is that the concept of ‘brain circula-
tion’ (and of circular migration more generally) feeds into political move-
ments challenging the right to migrants’ permanent settlement overseas. 
Otherwise, the concept of ‘brain circulation’ is particularly associated with 
the GFMD, IOM and the World Bank diasporic approaches and circular 
migration discourses. There are signs it is being adopted by WHO as well. 
The ILO remains skeptical of circular migration because its precepts are 
very similar to temporary migration; encouraging such migration risks 
undermining permanent migration rights and labor rights and standards.
The delineations among the IO population identified here have a mate-
rial basis, connected as they are to the organizations’ institutional man-
dates and governance structures. For example, the ILO’s focus on labor 
migration and labor standards founded on non-discrimination (including 
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on the basis of national origin) and human rights reflects its institutional 
mandate to protect ‘the interests of workers when employed in countries 
other than their own’ (Preamble, ILO Constitution 1944). Its tripartite 
governance structure (governments, employers, workers) coupled with its 
institutional provisions for monitoring the implementation of its instru-
ments have been important for propelling its mission to codify interna-
tional standards and embed them institutionally at country level. WHO, 
on the other hand, has no institutional mandate on migration per se. 
Nevertheless, it has routinely encountered the phenomenon of health 
worker migration and recruitment since it earliest day by virtue of being 
tasked ‘to promote improved standards of teaching and training in the 
health, medical and related professions’ (Article 2) as part of its ‘responsi-
bility for the health of their peoples and the provision of adequate health 
and social measures’ and overarching objective for ‘all peoples [to attain] 
the highest possible level of health’ (Article 1). This objective and respon-
sibility is guided by the principle that ‘[u]nequal development in different 
countries in the promotion of health and control of disease…is a common 
danger’ (WHO 1946), and opens the way to WHO’s concern with how 
(in)adequately staffed health services combine with emigration in some 
country contexts. Unlike the ILO though, WHO is governed by member 
states (health ministries) via the World Health Assembly. Only member 
governments have ‘proposal rights’, and there is no constitutional duty, 
mandate or mechanism for formally incorporating non-state actors in its 
policy-formation process. Nor is there any means of monitoring the imple-
mentation of its instruments, save for what can be negotiated with govern-
ments and written into specific agreements on a case-by-case basis (Yeates 
and Pillinger 2019a, 29–30, 2019b).
The contrasting mandates and governance mechanisms differentially 
structure the participation and proposal rights of different actors (state, 
business and labor in the ILO, states in WHO), and produce varied insti-
tutional and political dynamics of IO policy formation (Yeates and Pillinger 
2019a, 29–30). The ILO’s tripartite governance structure has proved 
more conducive in framing and propelling global policy than WHO’s 
structure which limits participation rights to member state governments. 
Internal organizational features of IOs are also important in structuring 
other IOs’ policy discourse (and by extension the pace and timing of pol-
icy and international agreements). For example, ideas and discourses 
revolving around ‘reverse transfers of technology’ at UNCTAD brought 
labor migration into capital mobility debates. This had the effect of 
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highlighting how the international migration of highly skilled (health) 
personnel constitutes a one-sided transfer of productive resources embody-
ing technology in human skills, as well as the economic development con-
sequences of outflows of such resources from poorer to richer countries 
(Yeates and Pillinger 2019a). These creative opportunities to connect 
labor, trade and development in global policy during the 1970s in particu-
lar were enabled by UNCTAD’s thirdworldist mandate to enhance the 
participation of developing countries into global trade and development 
policy. UNCTAD’s policy-making structures, which involved grouping 
countries into distinct negotiating blocs (advanced economies, commu-
nist countries, developing countries), strengthened the voices of those 
highlighting the economic development impacts of (human) capital 
mobility. They also helped compensatory approaches to global policy on 
health worker migration and recruitment to be articulated in ways that, 
although controversial and despite not being instituted in practice, have 
remained an enduring idea within the field since the 1960s (Yeates and 
Pillinger 2019a).
The range of policy concepts and discourses in this global policy field is 
at least as diverse as that of the population of IOs and the networks and 
constituencies in which they are embedded—if not more so. The delinea-
tions set out in Table 4.2 are heuristic devices that help distinguish princi-
pal policy characteristics of the organizations concerned. These policy 
characteristics tend to be stable over time, even if the emphasis (e.g., 
through work programs) is refreshed periodically. There is strong continu-
ity of the ILO policy in this field, which has remained rooted in interna-
tional labor standards and an appreciation of the multiple, intersecting 
social and economic policy sectors involved. There has also been continu-
ity of WHO policy, which has remained grounded in essential health 
needs, universal health coverage and strengthened health systems. Yet 
these characteristics are not immutable; they change over time. New ideas 
are folded into organizational work programs, which may become institu-
tionalized in policy. For example, WHO took up the idea of ethical recruit-
ment in the mid-2000s and featured it in the 2010 Global Code. A similar 
process may be occurred in relation to gender equality, with WHO recently 
recognizing the need for gendered health workforce strategies (WHO/
GHWN/Women in Global Health (WGH) 2018), and in relation to tem-
porary and circular migration (see footnote 3, above). The fundamental 
discursive characteristics remain stable but they evolve over time. Thus, 
what we see in current WHO discourse is continuity with older ideas of 
4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, CARE AND MIGRATION: THE CASE… 
102
ethical recruitment, voluntary self-regulation and universal health cover-
age blending in its present-day focus on the benefits of temporary and 
circular migration. This is leading to a discursive shift in WHO (as with 
other IOs) away from ‘brain drain’ toward embracing ‘brain circulation’, 
with attendant consequences for global policy on migration more generally.
Nor are the policy characteristics of any one IO necessarily uniform at 
any one point in time. They may be articulated only in some parts of the 
world, as in the case of the World Bank’s support for an international ser-
vices trade policy approach in the Caribbean context but not, it seems, in 
other regional contexts. Is this simply a reflection of creative opportunities 
available in the region to advance this agenda, such as resources and stra-
tegic priorities of the WB regional office for Latin America, or of certain 
features of the region’s history? IOs are large, complex, multi-faceted 
organizations spanning multiple country and regional contexts, each of 
which has its own histories, constellations of policy actors and ‘stakehold-
ers’, and institutional landscapes. Moreover, multiple IOs are co-present 
in any different regional or country context, and so the constellations of 
global actors, drivers and politics of policy vary considerably at any one 
point in time. This raises an analytical (and methodological) question: 
What can be taken as IOs’ definitive policy position at any moment in 
time? Where do we ‘look’ to ‘read’ IO policy discourses? A reading of, say, 
ILO policy, with its codified international labor standards, seems straight-
forward enough. But how and why is it that some regional offices of IOs 
seem to promote particular aspects of the organization’s policy? In WHO’s 
case, for example, its Europe and South-East Asia offices have been the 
most visibly active in implementing the WHO Global Code. Might we 
understand this apparent anomaly as qualifying the idea of a singular, over-
arching policy, as a reflection of context-dependent resources, or as differ-
ences in leadership—or a combination of these? Finally, we should note 
that additional multilateral frameworks (and IOs) governing international 
health worker migration/recruitment also come into play. For example, in 
Asia Pacific, ASEAN’s approach allies most closely with that of the WTO 
(health migration and recruitment as a trade in services issue) (Yeates and 
Pillinger 2018). Regional-level IOs ‘overlay’ global-level ones, offering 
competing or complementary normative and policy frameworks condi-
tioning the work of governments (and others). In Asia Pacific, the ILO, 
WHO, the WB and so on sit alongside regional IOs, such as ASEAN, 
regional development banks and regional dialogic mechanisms for migra-
tion governance (Yeates and Pillinger 2018).
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Inter-actor relatIonshIps of cooperatIon, 
coordInatIon and contestatIon
A relational approach to global policy development (Yeates and Pillinger 
2019a) emphasizes that IOs do not work in isolation from each other or 
the wider global and national institutional and political fields in which they 
are embedded. As discussed in Section “Key Discourses Promulgated by 
IOs”, there is much crossover among IOs’ policy discourses, even if dis-
tinct policy approaches and IOs can be identified. Indeed, global policy 
discourses are blended from multiple sources and, in turn, circulate among 
IOs and their constituencies. Considering these interactions, this section 
turns to consider further inter-IO relations of cooperation and contesta-
tion through the lens of the formal and informal partnerships they forge 
with one another. Indeed, partnerships are a key feature of how IOs relate 
to each other and other actors.
Inter-IO relations have been a feature of this global policy field when it 
was substantially initiated and progressed within the UN system during 
the 1960s. These relationships, between the ILO, UNESCO, UNCTAD 
and WHO, seem to be ones of coexistence within the wider UN system. 
As separate (and relatively young) UN agencies, they were developing 
their programs in accordance with their organizational mandates and pri-
orities in the context of a rapidly developing realm of action being carved 
out by the UN as a whole on a range of issues of interest—from interna-
tional human rights instruments to the first UN development decade pro-
gram—to give tangible meaning to the UN overall mandate. A range of 
UN bodies besides the four major UN agencies were involved (e.g., 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), United Nations Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), office of the United Nations Secretary- 
General (UNSG), UN Advisory Committee on the Application of Science 
and Technology for Development, UN Conference on Science and 
Technology for Development, UN Institute for Training and Research, 
Commission for Social Development). Although these were essential in 
developing and approving UN agencies’ policy initiatives within the wider 
UN system, by themselves they do not testify to specific partnership rela-
tions among the agencies beyond the generality of common membership 
of the UN.
Partnership relations became more apparent in the 1970s, in the guise 
of informal cooperation between the ILO and WHO. WHO’s major 
international study of international physician and nurse migration was 
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curtailed early, and, with the prospects of the policy conclusions being 
incorporated into a WHO policy program rapidly diminishing, there was 
an opportunity to pass the ‘baton’ to the ILO, whose own employment 
program, which included a labor migration and gender equality strand, 
was being elaborated at the time. The ILO negotiated and concluded the 
Nursing Personnel Recommendation in record time. A representative of 
WHO was present at part of the passage of the Recommendation (Yeates 
and Pillinger 2019a, 64–74). This is a good example of inter-IO coopera-
tion, one that is all-the-more significant because the Recommendation 
was the first multilateral agreement setting international standards on 
international health worker migration and recruitment.
Later decades provide more instances of inter-IO partnership working. 
These instances have increased in frequency since the 2000s as global 
social policy and development agendas have come together, first around 
the MDGs (2000–2015) and later around the SDGs (2016–2030). Over 
the last two decades, engagement by multiple IOs in partnerships (or, at 
least, alliances) has been a defining discursive and institutional feature of 
this field. This has been important given the multi-sectoral nature of the 
phenomenon. Indeed, such partnerships were key to the Global Code 
(WHO 2010), the international campaign for which involved an alliance 
between WHO, IOM and the ILO working within the multi-stakeholder 
Health Worker Migration Initiative (HWMI)4 and the high-level Global 
Policy Advisory Council (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a, b). Another example 
is the global Commission on Health Employment and Economic Growth 
(HEEG 2016), whose recommendations to increase investment in high-
quality health jobs—rich economic growth strategies to underpin the 
SDGs (including health and health-related goals) were premised on coop-
erative and coordinated joint ILO-OECD-WHO work to address health 
worker shortages. This has been taken forward through the International 
Platform on Health Worker Mobility set up under the joint ILO-OECD-
WHO Working for Health program and proposals to set up an interna-
tional fund, the Working for Health Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), 
to support countries in expanding and transforming their health work-
force (Dublin Declaration 2017). Questions here are whether these 
4 HWMI was established as a partnership between the NGO Realizing Rights: The Ethical 
Global Initiative and the Global Health Workforce Alliance (GHWA) in 2006 in response to 
the heightened concerns about the need for global responses to health worker migration and 
recruitment and was a crucial actor during the negotiations (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a, b).
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initiatives are more than an umbrella for a division of specialist labor 
among the IOs, and whether they are leading not just to collaborative 
activities but to coordinated ones—and if so, how are concepts, discourses 
and structural authority and power being reconfigured?
Inter-IO partnership working has become integral to the present-day 
global policy field, bringing much-needed multiple perspectives on the 
complex, multi-sectoral issues at hand, but such cooperation is not with-
out tensions. We are not suggesting that IOs are pursuing parallel agendas 
within this joint global program of work, but competing policy approaches 
and discourses seem to be resilient—in no way subordinated or diluted 
under the banner of unity; still relatively fluid and in no way fixed or 
unchanging. One illustration of this is the Global Skills Partnerships 
initiative,5 which has gained some traction in recent years. Favored by the 
OECD (2018), for example, such partnerships are seen as a means to 
derive mutual benefit—a ‘win-win’ solution to reconciling the continuing 
need for highly skilled immigrant health workers with source countries’ 
capacity to keep ‘producing’ health workers willing to emigrate. Global 
Skills Partnerships are also flagged in the Global Compact (UNGA 2018) 
(Art.33(e)) as a way to link migration and skills development for the 
mutual benefit of migrants, and source and destination countries.
These partnerships are mired in controversy though because there are 
concerns that they open paths to greater reliance on private financing for 
education and training and international trade in health services. There is 
also a great deal of uncertainty as to how they will fulfill their promise of 
simultaneously contribute to a net creation of health workers in the source 
country, mitigate the effects of health worker migration and prove an 
effective way of addressing health workforce availability and promoting 
health system sustainability. There are also unanswered questions about 
how they will ensure ethical recruitment and rights-based approaches to 
5 Global Skills Partnerships (GSPs) are essentially bilateral agreements that mobilize 
resources for the training of skilled health workers in source countries, equipping health 
workers with the relevant skills and visas to migrate to work for an agreed duration in the 
country of destination that funded their training. Such an agreement allows mutual gains by 
taking advantage of large international differences in both professional earnings and training 
costs (Clemens 2017, 1). Clemens’ idea is that GSPs would be formed on the basis of bilat-
eral agreements where destination country governments directly fund training and skills 
development programs prior to migration. He argues they avoid the loss of resources from 
source countries when a trained health worker migrates to work abroad on time-limited 
contracts, returning ‘home’ afterward.
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migration (i.e., uphold the principles of the WHO Global Code). There 
are specific concerns that they may further embed temporary and circular 
health worker migration schemes (and related quotas) rather than pro-
mote permanent migration and other rights-based approaches to migra-
tion established by the UN and the ILO (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a, 
190–193). In terms of the present discussion about sources of tension and 
potential fracture in inter-IO relations, it is worth highlighting that the 
dominant discourse in relation to Global Skills Partnerships revolves 
around financial incentives, employability, skills transfer and mobility 
rather than around health systems strengthening, health systems sustain-
ability, health equity, decent work and social protection. These discursive 
shifts signal a potential turn away from UN normative principles, insofar 
as the OECD and the WB are associated with the dominant discourse in 
relation to Global Skills Partnerships, and the ILO and WHO associated 
with the labor and health rights-based one. In these partnerships, alterna-
tive narratives among the IOs could signal fracture lines in the new politics 
of IO cooperation around the health workforce aspects of the global 
health goals (Yeates and Pillinger 2019a).
conclusIon
This chapter has examined constellations of global policy actors (princi-
pally IOs), as well as ideas and discourses in the global policy field of 
health worker migration. Among the oldest post-WWII global social pol-
icy fields, the organizational center of gravity of this field has lain within 
the UN system. From the outset, we see multiplicity in terms of the popu-
lation of IOs and policy concepts, approaches and discourses. Non- 
governmental IOs were limited to international workers’ and employers’ 
organizations. Ensuing decades have seen the continual participation of 
(especially) the ILO and WHO, the exit of UNESCO and UNCTAD 
from the field, and the entry of the OECD, IOM and the World Bank and, 
prospectively, the WTO. UNICEF has never had a presence in the field. 
Regional-level IOs have not been a central feature of this chapter, but 
there is evidence that they are an already-important part of the IO topog-
raphy in this field and that they may increase in significance in the future.
The ILO stands head and shoulders above other IOs for being the 
single most continuously present and active IO in the field. Given the 
mandate and governance structure of the ILO, this also means that IOs of 
workers and employers are the most long-standing and active of all IOs in 
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the policy field. Since the 2000s, however, the population of non- 
governmental IOs has expanded significantly, to the point that such actors 
extend well beyond workers’ and employers’ organizations. Their partici-
pation has added further perspectives and complexity, not least because 
these IOs are drawn from development, migration and health (and health- 
related) NGOs. A notable feature of this non-governmental population of 
IOs is the Global Health Workers Alliance (now Global Health Workers 
Network) which is unique in the field. Inter-IO cooperation has long been 
evident in the field and has intensified in recent decades, notably since 
2000 (corresponding with the MDGs), during which time those relation-
ships have moved from informal partnerships to more formal ones.
Over this time, IOs’ policy approaches have been stable, with competing 
(and sometimes complementary) emphases on labor standards, health ser-
vices, diaspora engagement, economic development and trade. However, 
policy discourses have shifted considerably along many axes. Perhaps the 
most significant of these shifts revolves around the labor- migration- 
development nexus, as captured in the concepts of brain drain, brain gain 
and brain circulation. Ethical recruitment, mutual benefit and mobility (as 
distinct from migration) have become key policy concepts. The notion of 
depletion may be an emerging concept, paralleling ongoing preoccupa-
tions with, and anxieties about, ‘shortages’ and resource extractivism that 
international recruitment signifies. In some quarters, brain/care drain still 
has considerable purchase, even if it is seen as problematic by many.
The growth of inter-IO partnering in global policy development seems 
to correspond with accommodations of various kinds among IOs in the 
field. Contemporary forms of inter-IO relationships oriented toward col-
laboration and cooperation have attenuated—but not eliminated—some 
historic tensions. In this respect, this chapter has pointed to emergent 
fracture lines in relation to Global Skills Partnerships, where predominant 
essential health needs and social protection approaches are being chal-
lenged by discourses of mobility (notably temporary and circular migra-
tion), financial incentives, employability and skills transfers.
This discussion ends on two points of critical reflection. The first con-
cerns organizational ecology (cf Niemann et al, this volume). We high-
lighted the significance of both endogenous and exogenous organizational 
ecology in materialist understandings of global social policy formation in 
relation to any one IO.  Internal governance structures determine global 
policy approaches as much as specific initiatives, where the former tend to be 
enduring and structurally formative and the latter are battlegrounds over 
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which competing policy approaches and discourses are fought out. We also 
highlighted the temporally and geographically contingent nature of this 
organizational ecology, which is fluid and varied rather than fixed and uni-
form. This points to the value of taking a broad view on what counts as an 
IO’s exogenous organizational ecology rather than delimiting the view only 
to IOs directly and explicitly participating in the field. The second point of 
reflection relates to the levels metaphor used so often in global social policy 
and governance studies. The concept of scale, rather than level, may be a 
more pertinent one, because it brings us closer to a form of global social 
policy analysis cognizant of how IOs of many different kinds work across 
multiple spaces of transnational governance that, in turn, are dynamically 
interacting. An appreciation of organizational ecology and the interactions 
at once constituting and deriving from it should therefore encompass rela-
tions among populations of IOs across multiple scales. Constellations of 
actors, ideas and policies in the architecture of global social governance and 
policy will be context-specific, that is formed from concrete situations 
circumstances, times and places.
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CHAPTER 5




This chapter analyzes the role of International Organizations (IOs) in the 
global governance of pension policy. The primary purpose of a pension 
system is to provide income security in old age. A public pension system 
may seek to offer poverty relief by offering a pension benefit above the 
poverty line, with additional income in retirement coming from private 
savings. Public pension systems can also offer more comprehensive 
benefits, replacing a proportion of a person’s income in retirement. The 
latter is obviously more expensive. In the developed world, most countries 
have close to universal pension coverage with expenditure across the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
currently averaging 8.6 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(OECD 2017). The precise balance between the state and the market var-
ies from country to country. Within the average expenditure on pensions 
in the OECD there is a range of different expenditures. In contrast to the 
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developed world, pension coverage in the developing world is patchier. 
For example, less than 30 percent of the population in Africa have some 
form of formal pension coverage (ILO 2017).
In addition to income security in old age, pension policies also have 
secondary objectives such as developing capital markets to enhance eco-
nomic growth (Holzmann 1997) or as a way to manage unemployment 
during economic restructuring (Vanhuysse 2006). As the largest compo-
nent of government expenditure, they are often a feature of any program 
aimed at reducing budget deficits or national debt (Güleç 2014). It is 
therefore no surprise that a number of IOs, beyond those primarily con-
cerned with income protection in old age, have an interest in shaping the 
pension policies of national governments. The main debates have centered 
around whether pensions should be offered on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
or a funded basis. PAYG pensions are where the current generation of 
workers finances the current generation of pensioners through the tax sys-
tem. A funded system involves individuals setting aside resources for 
retirement through savings in a private pension plan. A related debate is 
whether pensions should operate on a defined benefit (DB) or defined 
contribution (DC) basis. The former involves pensioners receiving a guar-
anteed proportion of their income in retirement. The latter entails the 
pension benefit being determined by the performance of the investment 
from the individual contribution. This transfers the risk to the individual 
(Barr 2001).
The analysis of the IO population here largely focuses on the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Bank (WB), as each 
of these organizations has dominated the global discourse on pension 
reform at one time or another (Heneghan and Orenstein 2019). The role 
of the OECD and the European Union (EU) in shaping the pensions 
agenda through benchmarking is also highlighted. Their role has been 
more limited due to their smaller membership, but they have still made 
important contributions to global debates (Orenstein 2008). In addition, 
various United Nations (UN) agencies have been involved in the recent 
move toward national social protection floors, which includes pensions, 
adding more diversity and complexity to the field of IOs involved in pen-
sions (Deacon 2013). This chapter traces the entry of each organization 
into the field of pensions by outlining the development of three distinct 
periods in the field. It provides an overview of the IOs involved and the 
dominant discourses during each period.
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the organIzatIonal envIronment and the IntrInsIc 
Features oF Ios Involved In the socIal governance 
oF PensIons
There are three distinct periods in the global social governance of pensions: 
the golden age of welfare (1945–1970s), the neoliberal era (1979–2008) 
and the post-global economic crisis era (2009 onward). Each period is 
characterized by the dominant economic paradigm which has shaped the 
discourse on pension provision. This paradigm forms the nature of the 
organizational environment, and in part, determines which actors become 
involved in the field (Heneghan and Orenstein 2019). This chapter 
demonstrates that shifts in the dominant global economic paradigm create 
the space for new IOs to enter the field by providing expertise in line with 
the new zeitgeist.
In addition to the organizational environment, the unique features of 
each IO that populate the pension governance environment have shaped 
the nature of their involvement and the discourses they promote. Their 
intrinsic features have also determined their ability to respond to a chang-
ing environment. For instance, it will be shown that the tripartite nature 
of the ILO constrained its ability to react to the entry of the WB into the 
pension reform arena. Intrinsic features also determine the type of involve-
ment an IO has and the nature of its discourse. For example, the WB and 
ILO have departments with the autonomy to promote specific pension 
models. In addition, alongside the promotion of pension models they also 
offer technical assistance to reforming countries. The OECD and EU have 
a select membership and are therefore reluctant to promote a specific 
pension model. Instead, they use benchmarking and promote general 
principles through their cognitive authority (Ervik 2009).
Intrinsic features can determine which source of authority an IO will 
rely on as a form of social governance in the pensions field. For example, 
as a bank, the World Bank is able to use its lending capacity to steer the 
policy agenda of national governments. During the 1980s, the reputation 
of the World Bank was damaged when—alongside the IMF—it used 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as a form of conditionality in 
lending to developing countries. SAPs often involved ordering govern-
ments to reduce social expenditure as a way to reduce budget deficits and 
national debt. These policies proved to be widely unpopular and were 
abandoned by the World Bank in the 1990s (Stiglitz 2002). The World 
Bank now prefers to use persuasion rather than coercion as a tool of 
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influence (Béland and Orenstein 2013). In addition, IOs are cognizant of 
the effectiveness of countries owning their development agendas, rather 
than them being portrayed as protectionist measures of the global north 
(Deacon 2013). However, the Bank can still use its lending as an addi-
tional form of influence. As will be argued, the World Bank was able to 
induce a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe to adopt its 
pension model with the use of loans and technical assistance (Orenstein 
2008; Appel and Orenstein 2013). Indeed, the level of indebtedness of a 
country was argued to be a key source of influence for the World Bank in 
shaping pension reforms in the region (Müller 1999).
IOs also have power through their moral and cognitive or expert 
authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The ILO relies largely on moral 
authority as a form of influence through the soft law of conventions and 
recommendations. Using a language of universalism, national govern-
ments are compelled to sign up to ILO conventions and follow its recom-
mendations to be a ‘good global citizen.’ The ILO has used a number of 
these legal instruments to steer pension policies. The moral authority of 
the ILO is enhanced by its policies which emerge as a consensus between 
each organ of its tripartite structure—national government representa-
tives, employers’ representatives and employees’ representatives. In addi-
tion, all the IOs involved in global pension governance use their cognitive 
authority as a source of influence (Orenstein 2008). They each lay claim 
to pensions expertise, which can compel states to follow their guidance. 
For example, the OECD produces in-depth reports on the national pen-
sion systems of its members in order to compare and contrast the pension 
systems in each country with the aim of influencing reform through peer 
learning and emulation (Ebbinghaus 2015).
the Ilo and the global socIal governance 
oF PensIons durIng the golden era
The ILO has a long history of contributing to the development of pension 
policies and promoting the expansion of social insurance across the globe. 
It was an early adopter of the Atlantic Charter (1941) and a proponent of 
the Beveridge Report (1942), it initiated the Declaration of Philadelphia 
in 1944 and adopted the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, cul-
minating in the formation of its own Convention 102 on Social Security 
in 1952. The ILO’s pension policies historically consisted of three compli-
mentary strands: the promotion of social security norms across the globe, 
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a provider of technical assistance to countries designing a social security 
system and through the production of social security knowledge in the 
form of the Costs of Social Security, a key reference point in the field.
Although founded in the aftermath of the First World War, it was while 
planning for peace at the end of the Second World War that the ILO 
cemented its position as a global actor in pension policies (Heneghan 
2019). On May 10, 1944, while the war was still ongoing, the ILO’s 26th 
International Labour Conference (ILC) in Philadelphia formally estab-
lished the rights of every human being to social security. The Declaration 
of Philadelphia requires the ILO to promote the achievement of social 
security among the nations of the world. The conference was part of an 
emerging international consensus on the nature and principles of the 
political, economic and social reconstruction after the war, with the ILO 
part of a growing movement to foster peace and stability through the use 
of social policy (Esping-Andersen 1996).
The publication of the Beveridge Report in the United Kingdom in 
1942 recast the understanding of income security in old age, popularizing 
the expression “social security” (Parrott 1992). The ILO had been actively 
involved in the discussion and articulation of the report. Its core message 
of “freedom from fear and want” resounded with the desire of the ILO to 
create a new social settlement that would prevent the conditions for inter-
national conflict. From a global perspective, the most important docu-
ment in pension policy was the Declaration. It was incorporated into the 
ILO’s constitution and formed the cornerstone of its activities in the 
decades that followed. It recognizes the:
solemn obligation of the International Labour Organisation to further 
among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve”, among 
others, “the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income 
to all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care. (ILO 
1944a, Article III (f))
In order to achieve this aim, the Conference adopted two Recommendations, 
one on income security (Recommendation 67) (ILO 1944b) and one on 
medical care (Recommendation 69). Recommendations 67 and 69 paved 
the way for Convention 102 on Social Security (Minimum Standards) that 
followed shortly after in 1952. The Convention marked a step change in 
global social security policy, since it introduced the idea of a minimum 
level of social security that could be attained anywhere in the world 
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(Cichon and Hagemejer 2007). It incorporated all the branches of social 
security, including old age security that had previously been dealt with in 
separate conventions and recommendations. Convention 102 moved on 
from defining the classes of people that ought to be protected and instead 
argued that a specific percentage of the population be covered.
In the years that followed, the ILO set about promoting social security 
through conferences, the creation of reform templates and the dispatching 
of consultants. The activities of the ILO were instrumental in the spread-
ing of pension ideas across the globe. In the immediate years after the 
Declaration most Latin American countries had adopted a pension system 
by the end of the 1940s. Caribbean countries followed suit in the 1950s 
and 1960s, with the majority of African countries following later in the 
1960s and 1970s (Orenstein 2003).
The Declaration of Philadelphia was the first in a number of interna-
tional legal instruments that have sought to install social security as a right 
to every human being. In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly 
included social security among the rights proclaimed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948). This text was 
drafted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights also recognized the rights of everyone to social security (ICESCR 
1966). This right to social security formed a central component of the 
post-war consensus to foster peace and stability. The golden age entailed a 
considerable expansion of public pension provision across the globe. The 
consensus on the role of the state in providing income protection in old 
age would last until the crisis of the Keynesian economic model led to a 
sustained global challenge to the role of the state in the economy and in 
society (Table 5.1).
the neolIberal economIc order
The elections of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in 1979 and 
Ronald Reagan in the United States in 1980 helped usher in a new eco-
nomic paradigm. Inspired by Friedrich Hayek (1976) and Milton Friedman 
(1977), a challenge was mounted against the principles that had under-
pinned the global economy. These new principles would transform the 
global discourse on pensions by having an impact on the approach of the 
World Bank, the OECD and the EU in their pension advocacy.
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The privatization of Chile’s pension system in 1981, under the authori-
tarian leadership of Augustus Pinochet, was held up as a beacon for all 
pension systems by neoliberal policy entrepreneurs. It had been designed 
by a group of radical reformers nicknamed the ‘Chicago Boys’. These had 
studied under the tutelage of Milton Friedman at the University of 
Chicago and upon their return to Chile, based themselves at the Pontifical 
Catholic University of Chile. This institution was the laboratory for a 
number of neoliberal experiments, of which the most radical was the com-
plete privatization of the public pension system (Borzutzky 2005). The 
privatization involved diverting pension contributions from taxpayers into 
individual fully funded pension accounts (IFAs). This represented a sig-
nificant redrawing of the social contract: from the state to the market and 
from a collective to individual responsibility. From the mid-1980s up until 
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Chilean economy grew at an aver-
age annual rate of 7.2 percent (Büchi 2006). The impressive performance 
of the economy was argued in part to be a result of the development of the 
capital market the pension privatization had stimulated (Holzmann 1997; 
World Bank 1994). The Chilean experience would be a constant reference 
point for organizations that wanted to privatize pension provision.
Table 5.1 A mapping of IO involvement and the discourses on pension provi-
sion 1945–1979
Year Summary of the 
Dominant Discourse




1945–1979 Peace and international 
economic prosperity 
require a strong welfare 
state. This must include 
a pension system 
offering universal 
coverage with adequate 
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The OECD and Pensions
It was during this period that the OECD began to focus on pension issues 
(Walker 1990). Its impact was not as far-reaching as the ILO’s and did not 
have the capabilities to be as active as the World Bank in promoting pen-
sion privatization. Where the ILO and later the World Bank promoted a 
message across the globe, the OECD’s message was targeted at its mem-
bers, which consist of the world’s most developed nations. Nevertheless, 
the OECD used its ability to produce authoritative statistical information 
on pension systems to advocate a shift toward privately funded pensions. 
In the late 1980s, the OECD began to produce reports on demographic 
aging and reforms to public pensions (OECD 1988, 2000). These reports 
built upon earlier critiques of the welfare state from the OECD with an 
explicit focus on population aging and its implications for the welfare 
state. By 2000, the OECD was calling for more pension diversification as 
a way to make public pension systems more sustainable (OECD 2000).
The entry of the OECD into the traditional domain of the ILO wrong-
footed the Geneva-based institution during a period of global upheaval. 
The intrinsic features of the ILO prohibited a robust response to the 
OECD’s critique of the welfare state. The parallel goals of defending and 
expanding the welfare state in the developed world while building new 
systems in the developing world stretched the resources of the ILO. The 
OECD only had to focus on the former. In addition, the ILO was caught 
up in Cold War tensions between the developed and developing world. It 
would lead to the United States leaving the organization, cutting its bud-
get by a quarter. The ILO was dealing with considerable internal upheaval 
just as a rival IO was moving into its traditional field of expertise and 
influence.
The main contribution of the OECD into the global social governance 
of pensions has been discursive. It was the first IO to forcefully promote a 
message that the welfare state was in crisis. It used its expert authority to 
shift the focus from purely public provision and add to a growing global 
concern over the sustainability of pension systems and the desirability of 
diversification. The OECD laid the groundwork for the World Bank to 
enter the pension reform arena for a message that went beyond the ‘rich 
countries club’ of the OECD to the Eastern bloc and the Global South.
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The World Bank Enters the Field
The collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe 
drew the World Bank into the global pensions field. The twin transforma-
tion from socialism to market-based capitalism and from authoritarianism 
to democracy had never been undertaken before. The region was heavily 
dependent on the expertise of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
(Roaf et al. 2014). It was also starved of capital, which gave the IFIs sig-
nificant leverage over the reform agenda in the new market economies 
(Müller 1999). Central and Eastern Europe was uniquely susceptible to 
neoliberal policy prescriptions given its recent experience with commu-
nism. The region was also keen to signal its neoliberal fervor to interna-
tional investors.
In addition to the susceptibility to neoliberalism and IFI advice, the 
transformation also had significant consequences for its pension systems. 
As large sectors of the economy became redundant in the shift away from 
a planned economy, the pension system was used as a de facto unemploy-
ment benefit (Vanhuysse 2006). This led to a sharp increase in the number 
of pensioners and a subsequent increase in pension expenditure. For 
example, pension expenditure in Poland reached 15.9 percent of GDP in 
1995 (Góra and Rutkowski 2000). This brought pension reform onto the 
agenda in Central and Eastern Europe (Müller 2003).
Advising middle-income countries with such large pension expenditure 
was a new experience for the Bank. The publication of Averting the Old 
Age Crisis in 1994 (Averting hereafter) represented its formal response to 
t1he pension systems of the new post-socialist landscape it was now actively 
involved in. Its core message was that—due to population aging—public 
pension systems in the developed world were unsustainable and that every 
country needed to diversify pension provision through mandatory private 
savings pillars. Figure  5.1 shows the proposed pension model which 
entailed three pillars. A public pillar concerned solely with poverty relief, a 
mandatory private pillar to smooth consumption over the life course and 
a voluntary pillar for additional savings for those who want a larger income 
in retirement.
Averting built upon the message on population aging propagated by 
the OECD and targeted it at developing countries by arguing that most of 
the growth in the world’s old age population would be in developing 
countries (World Bank 1994, 28). On page one it issues a stern warning 
to developing countries not to follow the lead of developed countries:






Regulated fully funded Fully funded
Voluntary pillar
Savings plus coinsurance Savings plus coinsurance
Means-tested, minimum pension
guarantee, or flat pension
Personal savings plan or
occupatonal pension






Fig. 5.1 The pillars of old age income security. (Source: World Bank 1994, 15)
At the same time, many developing countries are on the verge of adopting 
the same programs that have spun out of control in middle-income and 
high-income countries. (World Bank 1994, 1)
The message on public pension provision was that it required high taxes, 
which distort labor markets, that in developing countries it was regressive 
as it redistributed from the poor to the rich, and that it was vulnerable to 
political manipulation. Meanwhile, private provision was argued to not 
distort labor markets as it entailed private saving, could produce a more 
generous pension as returns on investments were greater than economic 
growth, it was free from political manipulation and could enable develop-
ing countries to develop their capital markets.
It was a message that proved to be controversial both inside and outside 
of the Bank. However, its intrinsic features allowed this particular message 
to prevail over rival ideas. The World Bank Group consists of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which 
lends to middle-income and developing countries at preferential rates and 
the International Development Association (IDA) which offers grants to 
the world’s poorest countries. In addition, the World Bank Group is also 
made up of the International Financial Corporation (IFC) which is con-
cerned with private sector development. The latter arm of the Bank has 
significant leverage over policy development.
The Averting team came into conflict with consultants in the Eastern 
European Division who favored parametric reforms to the pension sys-
tems of Central and Eastern Europe, such as raising the retirement age 
and contributions to make the system more sustainable (Barr 1994). 
 M. HENEGHAN
123
However, the team behind Averting had powerful support in the form of 
the financial market sector at the IFC which favored Averting’s proposal 
as it offered the chance to develop capital markets in the new market 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. With the internal dispute won 
by the Averting team it was able to take a coherent message to the rest of 
the world (Heneghan and Orenstein 2019). Despite its origins in the 
transitions taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, the message of 
Averting was aimed at developing countries warning them not to make 
the mistakes of the developed economies and to only promise modest 
pension benefits in old age. Its message was therefore far more influential 
than the message of the OECD which focused its critique on the mature 
welfare states of its members. The World Bank, in contrast, was seeking 
to limit the size of developing countries’ welfare states before they even 
existed. Its campaign was highly successful. It led a coalition including 
the Cato Institute, United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the pensions industry, persuading 30 countries to adopt its 
model (Orenstein 2011).
The Response of the ILO
The entry of a new powerful IO—with considerable resources—into the 
pensions field spooked the ILO. However, its intrinsic features precluded 
a formal response (Table 5.2).
The Social Security Department was vehemently opposed to the propo-
sitions and policy prescriptions of Averting. Its initial response was low- 
key in the form of a journal article in conjunction with the International 
Social Security Association (ISSA) (Beattie and McGillivray 1995). Yet it 
was unable to mount a serious challenge to the Bank because other con-
stituents within the ILO’s tripartite governing structure were sympathetic 
to the message of Averting, like the employers’ representatives, particu-
larly after lobbying from representatives of the FIAP—International 
Federation of Pension Funds Administrators. In addition, other constitu-
ents were fully supportive of the message in Averting as their countries 
were adopting the same reforms, such as the Latin American bloc of coun-
tries. It would not be until 2000 that the ILO would produce a formal 
response and by this point it seemed to have largely accepted the message 
from Averting (Gillion et al. 2000).
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The ILO Changes Direction
The dominance of the World Bank in the pensions arena forced the ILO 
to retreat from defending the public pension systems it had promoted. As 
a reaction to losing its primary role in their promotion, it shifted focus to 
the developing world where the prevalence of informal labor markets 
meant that many of the world’s poorest had no pensions coverage at all 
(Reynaud 2005). The ILO launched a campaign to extend coverage to 
everyone. The theme of its 2001 International Labour Conference was 
“Extending Social Security to all.” The main conclusion from the session 
was “highest priority should go to policies and initiatives to extend social 
security to those who have none” (ILO 2001, v). After a protracted inter-
nal debate, the ILO settled on the idea of a national social protection 
floor as its flagship policy (Deacon 2013). A social protection floor entails 
a minimum level of income security (including pensions) and access to 
healthcare.
Table 5.2 A mapping of IO involvement and the discourses on pension 
provision 1979–2000




Method/s of Influence Source of 
Authority
1979–2000 Public pension systems 
are unsustainable. It is 
necessary and 
economically desirable 
to increase the role of 






World Bank: Material 
influence from the 
World Bank through 
technical assistance 
and loans provided to 
implement reforms. 
Persuasion in the form 
of flagship reports such 
as Averting the Old 
Age Crisis
OECD and EU: 




1994–2000 A defense of PAYG 
pension systems on the 
grounds that 
marketization places 











The campaign for social protection floors was both an internal one, 
within the ILO, and a wider global campaign. The external campaign 
began before the social floor was official ILO policy. In 2007, the Director 
of Social Security at the ILO, Michael Cichon, convened a meeting with 
representatives from United Nations Department of Social and Economic 
Affairs (UNDESA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 
HelpAge International (HAI). The meeting formalized the Coalition for a 
Global Social Floor. It sought to be a steering committee to bring together 
a movement for social protection floors under the UN umbrella. It was 
established in the context of debates around a fairer globalization and 
global inequalities. In addition, these debates were taking place in parallel 
with the positive experiences of modern forms of universal social policy in 
the Global South, such as the conditional cash transfer programs being 
rolled out in Latin America (Huyse 2017).
Internal Disputes at the Bank
By the mid-2000s the World Bank was shifting to a more nuanced posi-
tion on multi-pillar pension reforms. Its intrinsic features allow for internal 
policy evaluations which can alter policy. Béland and Orenstein (2013) 
argue that the World Bank is an open system which allows for the contes-
tation of ideas. The challenge to its model first came in the form of a 
provocative presentation paper titled Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten 
Myths About Social Security Systems and co-authored by its Chief Economist, 
Joseph Stiglitz. Here they highlighted a number of micro, macro and 
political economy assumptions in Averting, which they claimed to be false. 
Further criticism from within the Bank came from a volume titled Keeping 
the Promise of Latin America (Gill et al. 2005). This brought attention to 
the poor coverage in Latin America and exorbitant fees for private pension 
pillars. The following year, more criticism of the World Bank’s pension 
policy came from a formal internal evaluation, echoing other critiques. In 
addition, it claimed the benefits of the policy had been oversold and not 
enough attention had been given to initial conditions before advising 
reform (Independent Evaluation Group 2006). However, a defense of 
Averting was published in the form of an updated volume by the Director 
of Social Protection and Labor in the Bank (Holzmann and Hinz 2005). 
This volume defended the principle of pension diversification through a 
multi-pillar system. Yet, developments in the approach of the Bank pointed 
to a greater role for the state in providing poverty relief to the lifetime 
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poor. In that sense it began the process of the World Bank beginning to 
focus on coverage through the public system, rather than diversification 
through privatization (Table 5.3).
the global economIc crIsIs and Its ImPact 
on the global PensIon envIronment
At the onset of the global economic crisis, most countries that had adopted 
the World Bank’s multi-pillar pension reforms either halted them, drasti-
cally reduced the private element or completely abandoned them. This 
was largely a result of the fiscal implications of implementing a multi-pillar 
reform (Orenstein 2011; Sokhey 2017). As a result, the crisis significantly 
altered the IO global social governance environment of pensions. It had 
the twin impact of damaging the expert authority of the World Bank and 
allowed the ILO to reassert itself into the pensions debate.
Beginning with the ILO, the immediate post-crisis era of coopera-
tion between the nation states that comprise the G20 had implications 
for the Geneva-based organization. Internally, the crisis helped to create 
a consensus for the ILO’s flagship policy of national protection floors. 
It was formalized with the passing of Recommendation 202 by the ILC 
in 2012. On old age income security, the social protection floor policy 
states that:
Table 5.3 A mapping of IO involvement and the discourses on pension provi-
sion 2000–2009
Year Summary of the 
Dominant Discourse




2000–2009 Open internal debate on 
the merits and drawbacks 
of multi-pillar pension 
reform.






Extending coverage of 
pensions to the 
developing world is a 
policy priority. 
Embryonic discussions 













all residents in old age and all residents with a disability to the extent that it 
excludes them from gainful activity enjoy income security at least at a nation-
ally defined minimum level, through benefits in cash or in kind for old age 
and disability. (ILO 2011, 21)
Externally, as governments around the world intervened in their econo-
mies to stimulate aggregate demand in the economy and rescue insolvent 
banks, the role of social security as an automatic stabilizer in the macro 
economy was highlighted (IILS 2011). As a result of this, the ILO was 
invited to the top table of governance at the G20 to report on how its role 
could be broadened across the globe to embed its stabilizing function in 
the global economy (Deacon 2013).
In light of the crisis, the UN developed a series of coordinated responses 
to secure economic recovery and better protect the world’s population 
against a future downturn (Deacon 2013). The Social Protection Floor 
Initiative (SPF-I) was developed by the Chief Executives Board of the UN 
(UNCEB). Its aim was to explore methods for IOs to support countries 
that wanted to expand social protection in their societies. It was to be 
chaired by the ILO and World Health Organization (WHO) with respon-
sibilities divided between the ILO focusing on income security (including 
old age security) and the WHO focusing on basic healthcare provision. 
The SPF-I invited the former president of Chile (Michelle Bachelet) to 
write a report on social protection floors. Its publication in 2011 coin-
cided with the French Presidency of the G20. Nicholas Sarkozy was sym-
pathetic to the idea of a social protection floor which helped to keep it on 
the G20 policy agenda. The Bachelet Report called for a formal inter-
agency development board to coordinate the disparate activities on social 
protection. This was heeded by the G20 as the Development Working 
Group set up the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board 
(SPIAC-B). This board is chaired by the ILO and World Bank and meets 
biannually to coordinate strategies to expand social protection coverage to 
the developing world.
The crisis also created the conditions for the World Bank to abandon its 
campaign for pension privatization and work much more closely with the 
ILO to focus more exclusively on social pensions in the developing world. 
The impact of the crisis on pension funds was almost immediate, with 
US$5 trillion dollars wiped off pension assets in the early crisis period 
(Keeley and Love 2010). This damaged the performance of the fledgling 
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pension systems of Central and Eastern Europe just as the first beneficia-
ries from the World Bank-led reforms were due to draw a pension. This 
gave domestic opponents of the pension system ammunition to attack the 
desirability of the reforms.
The fiscal impact of the crisis was an even greater blow to the World 
Bank’s pension model. The early Keynesian activism of national govern-
ments gave way to fiscal conservatism as the crisis rolled on. Balancing 
budget deficits became the central target of policy makers as an era of 
austerity took hold and markets turned on the countries of Southern 
Europe for their debt levels. This had important implications for the pen-
sion systems of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The partial 
privatization of the pension system involved diverting contributions that 
previously went to the PAYG public pillar into individually funded 
accounts. This left a funding deficit in the public pillar—a transition cost—
to pay the current generation of retirees’ pensions. The transition costs 
were significant and primarily financed by borrowing. For example, the 
transition costs in the pension system in Poland were as high as 1.8 percent 
of GDP (Bielawska et al. 2016).
A further complication was the role of the EU in the governance of the 
Central and Eastern European pension systems. Like the OECD, the EU 
does not promote a global pension model, its membership is limited by 
geography and its members have a broad range of pension systems. Similar 
to the OECD, its governance of pensions has implications beyond its 
members. In the late 1990s, the EU became increasingly involved in pen-
sion policy for a similar reason to the OECD—its impact on the wider 
macro economy. This was given further impetus in the Lisbon process 
which had explicit goals for raising the employment of older workers 
(Ebbinghaus 2015). The main form of governance is ‘soft governance’ 
whereby the EU produces common indicators and benchmarks—through 
its open method of coordination—with the aim of countries learning from 
each other, with emulation driving a process of convergence. However, it 
is within the financial constraints placed on members of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) where the EU had an indirect but significant 
impact on global pension policy.
The accession of Central and Eastern European countries into the EU 
meant they were bound by the Maastricht Criteria on government bor-
rowing. This stipulates that EU member states cannot run budget deficits 
larger than 3 percent of GDP and national debt must be below 60 percent 
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of GDP. This made reversing the World Bank’s pension model politically 
attractive. The poor performance of the pension funds had generated dis-
sent. Renationalizing the pension system had the benefit of immediately 
reducing the deficit by diverting the private contributions back into the 
public pillar. Moreover, renationalizing the system meant the government 
was able to seize the accumulated pension assets. For example, in the case 
of Hungary, this entailed the national debt reducing by 10 percent of 
GDP overnight (Simonovits 2011).
As country after country reversed the World Bank’s pension model it 
significantly dented the reputation of the World Bank as an expert author-
ity on pensions. In addition, the Bank had also lost its leverage in Central 
and Eastern Europe as the region was no longer dependent on its finance. 
The region’s integration into the global economy meant that it had access 
to other sources of finance, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). As a 
result of waning influence in the region and across other middle-income 
countries, demand for World Bank pension assistance now primarily comes 
from developing countries. These countries have very different needs and 
are more likely to require assistance with designing a public pension sys-
tem to provide poverty relief.
The failure of the World Bank’s multi-pillar model—particularly in the 
post-communist countries where it was heavily involved—alongside a 
demand for the World Bank to assist in extending pension coverage has 
meant the alignment of the ILO and World Bank agendas.1 The World 
Bank has adopted the language promoted by the ILO on social protection 
floors and its primary purpose in the field now is to expand the coverage 
of social protection in the developing world. The ILO was successful in its 
efforts to influence the UN Sustainable Development Agenda (Huyse 
2017). This agenda will largely determine the orientation of development- 
related resources both globally and nationally. After lobbying by the ILO, 
social protection was integrated into 5 of the 17 sustainable development 
goals (Huyse 2017). This means that social protection is now a key focus 
of the development agenda for many years to come. Notably, goal 1.3 
1 Despite this alignment, the ILO published a scathing critique of the World Bank’s pen-
sion model in late 2018 in its evaluation of the pension privatization campaign, labeling it a 
failure (Ortiz et al. 2018).
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explicitly mentions social protection floors. It culminated in the Global 
Partnership for Universal Social Protection announced at the UN General 
Assembly in 2016, which is to be jointly developed by the ILO and 
World Bank.
The current global social governance of pensions is characterized by 
cooperation between the two major IOs in the field. They jointly chair the 
SPIAC-B which has coordinated social protection policy including pen-
sions. One of the major outcomes of the board to date has been the pro-
duction of a set of practical tools that help countries improve their social 
protection system by analyzing its strengths and weaknesses and offering 
policy options for further action. This toolkit was jointly developed by the 
World Bank, ILO, OECD, EU, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW), UNICEF and 
a number of bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). This type of tool characterizes the nature of global social gover-
nance in pensions. Although the World Bank and ILO will still assist indi-
vidual countries with their pension reforms, the global debate takes place 
largely within the broader social protection agenda. This means a number 
of additional IOs, such as the ones listed above, have been loosely drawn 
into the field of pensions.
The analysis for this chapter has largely focused on activity at the 
headquarters of the IOs involved. Further research is needed in field 
offices where there is considerable discretion and autonomy. This may 
be consequential because though both the World Bank and ILO use a 
similar discourse on social protection, key differences in interpretation 
remain. In particular, the interpretation of the term universal is con-
tested. For the World Bank it simply means everyone having some form 
of coverage, for the ILO it means everyone having the same coverage. 
This means that previous debates on the role of means-testing may 
resurface. In a recent report, the World Bank (2018, 83) argued that 
means-testing was more effective at reducing poverty in old age social 
pensions. For now, the rolling out of coverage to those who have none 
fosters close collaboration between the two organizations, since both 
are primarily focused on creating coverage. However, these differences 





This chapter has outlined the global social governance of pensions under-
taken by IOs. It has shown how the field has been characterized by both 
contestation and cooperation between the two main IOs in the field. It is 
clear that major shifts in the global economic paradigm have been the 
main driving force for change in the organizational environment of IOs in 
the field. It has allowed new actors such as the World Bank to enter the 
field and also determined the varying power of the ILO in having influ-
ence over the international agenda. In addition to the two main actors in 
the field, the chapter has also demonstrated the partial roles played by 
other powerful IOs in shaping the discourse, including the role of the EU 
in undermining the multi-pillar pension model in Central and Eastern 
Europe—the region that was most associated with wholeheartedly embrac-
ing the message of the World Bank on pension provision. How IOs 
respond to this changing environment has also been shown to be deter-
mined in part by their intrinsic features. These features can act as a con-
straining force, which was the case with the ILO. In addition, the intrinsic 
features of the organization may allow for policy debate that can lead to 
shifting positions on the policy stance of the organization.
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CHAPTER 6
Governing Children’s Rights in Global Social 
Policy—International Organizations 
and the Thin Line Between Child Protection 
and Empowerment
Anna Holzscheiter
IntroductIon—LocatIng chILdren’s rIghts 
In gLobaL socIaL governance1
Without doubt, the protection, welfare and well-being of children lie at 
the heart of social policy, domestically and in global governance. Both the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, to a lesser extent, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) mirror the particular vulnerability 
and needs of children in the areas of international development coopera-
tion they focus on. Children constitute a group that is most relevant to 
some of the core areas of social policy, such as education, social welfare 
and healthcare—particularly for very young children (i.e. immunization 
1 I thank Martha van Bakel for invaluable research support in writing this chapter.
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regimes). The centrality of child welfare in (global) social policy, however, 
is poorly reflected in the social policy literature which pays little attention 
to this specific age group (Yeates 2014) or reduces relevant social policies 
to child abuse, child poverty and child labor (Yeates and Holden 2009). It 
is, thus, all the more important to include children and their rights in a 
compendium on global social governance.
Despite the centrality of children in (global) social policy, any attempt 
to discuss children’s rights in light of global social governance will inevita-
bly have to address that global social policies targeting children and their 
social environment are situated in a field of tension. The tension lies 
between traditional child protection approaches, which are based on an 
assessment of children’s (special) needs, and more progressive approaches, 
which recognize children’s rights as human rights and reflect the changing 
legal status of the child in international politics. To think of global social 
policy under the rubric of ‘children’s rights’ thus implies a changing status 
of children as a sociopolitical group in global governance. This status is 
associated with rising claims on behalf of children (or by children them-
selves) for equality and social justice, a turning-away from primarily needs- 
based approaches to child protection and a stronger focus on the 
participation of children and youth in the making, implementation and 
assessment of global social policy. Consequently, any discussion of child 
protection and children’s rights in the context of global social policy will 
have to address fundamental questions that have confronted national and 
international law and the politics of children’s rights for a long time: How 
to resolve the numerous conflicts of (best) interest and rights between 
children, their parents or guardians, and public authorities as they are 
reflected, for example, in public discourses on abortion, child custody or 
child abuse and neglect?
Global child rights governance—also in its narrower focus on social 
issues and policies such as health, housing, food security, social benefits or 
education—has been evolving toward a field of global governance marked 
by a growing visibility of children and stronger claims for social justice 
made on their behalf, or sometimes even directly made by children them-
selves. Thus, this contribution will not only address how international 
organizations have seized and ‘governed’ matters of child protection and 
child rights in their activities—it will also place these activities in the con-
text of an increasing recognition of children’s social, political and econ-
omy agency and, as a consequence, in the context of claims toward more 
direct and meaningful involvement of children as “affected persons” of 
social policy in international organizations (Holzscheiter 2018).
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Children’s rights in contemporary international politics are comprised 
of a mixture of general human rights principles and specific rights tailored 
to the unique needs and situation of human beings below 18 years of age. 
In global politics, those rights are anchored in the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC or CRC), which was adopted in 1989 by 
the UN General Assembly and which, in its 41 substantive articles, com-
prises rights from all generations and ‘classes’ of human rights, spanning 
civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. While global social 
governance for children’s rights (as part of a broader child rights regime) 
is composed of a whole array of international rules, organizations and col-
laborative structures, the UNCRC certainly constitutes the backbone of 
and core normative reference in international social policymaking relevant 
to children.
In its widely noted General Comment No. 5 on the General Measures 
of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
CRC has underlined the four general principles or pillars underlying a 
contemporary understanding of children’s rights: children’s right to life 
and survival; the principle of the best interests of the child; the child’s 
right to be heard; and non-discrimination (Committee on the Rights of 
the Child 2003). These principles reflect the special vulnerability of chil-
dren and they are of immediate relevance to global social governance. 
Thus, global social governance geared toward children’s rights applies to 
areas that are concerned with the survival and well-being of children, takes 
into account the best interests of the child, ensures that children are being 
granted possibilities to articulate their viewpoints and interests, and makes 
certain that children are not discriminated against in social policy—neither 
on the basis of their age nor on the basis of the many other potential rea-
sons for discrimination such as sex, color, political opinion, national ori-
gin, disability, religion and so forth.
As I argue in this chapter, thinking about global social governance in 
terms of children’s rights rather than child protection necessitates paying 
heed to all types of human rights, not just privileging social and economic 
rights. This is because the changing status of the child in international law 
toward a holder of rights also has profound implications for addressing 
questions of equality and social justice. The ensuing discussion of core 
actors, actor constellations, discourses and ‘leitmotifs’ in global social pol-
icy on children’s rights will demonstrate three things: first, a constant 
broadening of the ‘catalogue’ of social policy issues considered relevant 
for ensuring the well-being of and adequate living conditions for children. 
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The idea that children are bearers of human rights has thus dislocated 
childhood from a narrow, traditional social policy agency focusing on 
health, social security, education, housing, childcare, labor and food secu-
rity toward more fundamental social questions such as discrimination (i.e. 
gender, age), social exclusion, inequality and (distributive) justice, includ-
ing intergenerational justice.2 Second, the contribution aims to highlight 
the implications of reconsidering more traditional, protectionist and 
objectifying approaches toward children in the context of changing inter-
pretations of children’s rights, particularly for global social governance. 
Third, the chapter exposes the centrality of the United Nations and its 
various specific organizations—particularly those active in development 
cooperation—in addressing and implementing child rights norms in global 
social governance. As the discussion below will show the ‘moral authority’ 
of the United Nations in the area of child rights is grounded in the cir-
cumstance that the UNCRC serves as the focal legal and normative refer-
ence for virtually all organizations aiming to become more child 
rights-oriented in social policymaking and implementation. However, the 
chapter also discusses how global and regional organizations focused on 
social policy beyond the UN relate to child rights in their organizational 
philosophies and practical activities. Such a broadening of the IO popula-
tion beyond the United Nations allows us to portray global social gover-
nance related to ‘children’s rights’ as a contested space in which neither 
the meaning of ‘children’s rights’ nor the necessity of prioritizing the 
‘child rights’ lens or ‘frame’ in social policy are undisputed.
the hIstory of chILdren’s rIghts In InternatIonaL 
organIzatIon and Law
Social policy with regard to children and the increasing global governance 
of childhood as a separate sphere of international cooperation has quite a 
long history. This history is marked by three distinct, coevolving processes: 
first, the gradual segregation of childhood as a distinct sphere of social life 
and the dissociation of childhood from sites that became associated with 
adults (work, street, factory); second, an increasing awareness of universal 
childhood experiences emerging from new academic sub-disciplines such 
as pediatrics, pedagogy or developmental psychology; and third, related to 
2 See contributions on education (Niemann and Martens), disability (Schuster and 
Kolleck), health (Kaasch), food (Wolkenhauer) in this volume.
 A. HOLZSCHEITER
143
these two processes, a steadily growing internationalization of childhood, 
reflected in a diversification of international legal rules, institutions and 
policies specifically targeting children and adolescents. In the context of 
these three large processes, the meaning of ‘children’s rights’ in domestic 
and international politics has considerably changed and expanded.
In 1973, Hilary Rodham (now Clinton) famously related to children’s 
rights as a “slogan in search of a definition” (Rodham 1973, 487). As 
much as the contours of children’s rights have become more defined since 
then, they continue to be appropriated by a diverse array of actors and 
often reflect quite different approaches toward the well-being of children. 
Not surprisingly, childhood constitutes a much-contested concept, laden 
with conflicting ideologies and values—and also an object of reference 
onto which very diverse social and moral expectations are projected 
(Rizzini 2001, 315). Revisiting twentieth-century child protection poli-
cies and debates in international politics, it is clear that despite a terminol-
ogy of ‘children’s rights’, discourses on children and childhood were, for 
a long time, dominated by paternalistic, objectifying perspectives that pre-
sented children as inherently irrational, innocent, vulnerable and mute 
(Holzscheiter 2010). It was only in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury and, particularly, in the course of the 1970s and 1980s—with new 
perspectives on children in sociology, psychology and pedagogy—that 
children’s rights were no longer exclusively couched in a language of ‘sal-
vation’ and benevolence. Rather, it was possible to observe a shift in con-
cern for protecting children to a concern for protecting their rights 
(Freeman 1983, 18). However, while debates became gradually infused 
with a new terminology of children’s rights as legal claims rather than 
moral goods, international law and policies still reflect a tension between 
a child rights perspective on child well-being on the one hand and a needs- 
based perspective on the other (McGillivray 1997, 14).
With the adoption of the UNCRC and its clear definition of children as 
all human beings between 0 and 18 years of age, international law and 
politics on children’s rights expanded toward adolescence as a legal gray 
zone. As I discuss further in later sections of this contribution, the intrica-
cies associated with including adolescents or quasi-adults in an interna-
tional child rights regime are only unsatisfactorily and artificially ‘resolved’ 
by maintaining separate international rules and institutions for children 
and youth. At the same time, the drafters of the UNCRC sought to incor-
porate a certain flexibility in this treaty by introducing the idea or ‘for-
mula’ of children’s evolving capacities, that is, their gradually increasing 
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capacity to make informed judgments, articulate their viewpoints and 
become independent rights-holders (Holzscheiter 2010; Hammarberg 
1990). This new identity of the child in international law is most strikingly 
expressed in Article 12 of the Convention: “States Parties shall assure to 
the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the 
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child.” The contemporary children’s rights regime anchored in the 
CRC thus captures an image of the child as maturing toward a competent 
social, political and economic human being. In the following sections, I 
will discuss the historical evolution of children’s rights in the context of 
global social policies.
Children’s Rights and the Recognition of Children’s Vulnerability 
and Special Status
The growth in specific legal provisions, policies and organizations address-
ing children in international politics paralleled a general trend in interna-
tional law-making in the second half of the twentieth century. The history 
of international organizations, particularly after 1945, is also a history of 
the growing recognition of the special vulnerabilities of specific groups—
such as women, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, migrant workers or 
people living with disabilities—and their need for protection. It is in the 
context of this dynamic that children were also becoming a group that was 
granted specific rights, with more and more international organizations 
creating specific departments for child-focused activities or even special 
international programs catering to the situation of children, such as the 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, for example.3
Historically, international legislation targeting children specifically 
could be found in international human rights law, humanitarian law and 
labor law (van Bueren 1998, xix). After 1945, the creation of special funds 
and programs, most notably the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), but also the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), resulted in a significant expansion of child-focused activities, 
especially in the context of development cooperation. It is also in these 
areas that social policy activities of international organizations were 
becoming increasingly justified and extended with reference to child rights 
principles.
3 Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, see: https://www.who.int/
pmnch/en/. Accessed February 25, 2020.
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earLy gLobaL socIaL PoLIcy for chILdren: 
InternatIonaL cooPeratIon on economIc 
and sexuaL exPLoItatIon
Among the earliest provisions dealing with child-specific issues were those 
that targeted labor, trafficking and humanitarian law. In fact, the first 
international treaties explicitly including children in their scope were those 
that addressed exploitation, either in the context of labor regulations or in 
the context of slavery. In 1904, an International Agreement for the 
Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic” was adopted by the International 
Conference on Traffic in Women and Children based in Paris, dealing 
explicitly with children as trafficked persons (Marshall 1999, 112). Some 
years later, the League of Nations covered the same issue area by an 
International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and 
Children (1921) and the Slavery Convention (1926). Equally important 
for global social governance was Convention No. 5 on the minimum age 
for employment, which figured among the first Conventions formulated 
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and was adopted at the 
ILO’s very first session in 1919. The ILO Convention No. 5 prohibits the 
work of children under the age of 14 in industrial establishments. Further 
ILO Conventions regulating child labor were added in 1973 when the 
ILO reformulated the Minimum Age Convention, adopting Convention 
138 concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment. The 
new Convention 138, which supplements Convention 5, in fact obliged 
States Parties to fix a minimum age for admission to employment and 
work and to pursue a national policy designed to guarantee the effective 
abolition of child labor. It was, however, specifically in the context of ILO 
Convention No. 198 on the ‘Worst Forms of Child Labour’ that the ten-
sions inherent to the children’s rights regime under the UNCRC became 
acutely visible. This had a lasting and rather conflictual impact on the 
relationship between transnational child worker associations advocating 
for child participation and recognition of children as social and economic 
agents on the one hand, and traditional, protective, abolitionist interna-
tional organizations and actors advocating for the widest abolition of child 
labor possible on the other hand.
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gender, gIrLs and gLobaL socIaL PoLIcy
It was in the context of discussions on prohibiting child marriage that 
gender issues and the ‘girl child’ emerged for the first time in the United 
Nations. In 1963, the UN adopted a Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages which foresaw 
that children should neither be allowed nor coerced to marry, working 
toward “eliminating completely child marriages and the betrothal of 
young girls before the age of puberty” (Rosenblatt 2000, 187). On a 
more general level, it was of course the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979 that 
elevated gender discrimination to a cross-cutting theme in international 
politics and also referred to children in the context of gender discrimina-
tion. It contains several articles that have a bearing on children, both in 
terms of the relationship between mothers and their children as well as 
with regard to the special situation of the girl child.
In Article 5(b), CEDAW envisages that “family education includes a 
proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition 
of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and 
development of their children,” it being understood that the interest of 
the child is the primordial consideration in all cases (van Bueren 1993, 
57). Relating to the girl child, Article 10 calls for equal opportunities in 
education and for equal respect for men and women.
These provisions testify to a growing recognition of the child’s best 
interests in family matters and, by defining them as superior to the inter-
ests of other parties (parents, public authorities, custodians), a slow but 
steady elevation of the child’s status in international law. The growing 
recognition of gender dynamics as being relevant to social governance and 
the identification of the ‘girl child’ as a particularly vulnerable group of 
children resulted in the creation of specific programs and policies targeting 
the discrimination of girls in social policy, most notably in education, and, 
to a lesser extent, in health. In 1990, 44% of the programs funded by the 
World Bank proposed activities to improve female education, and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) adopted the World Declaration on Education for All. These 
landmarks were the starting point for a gradual mainstreaming of gender 
issues into the activities of IOs, which also meant an increasing focus on 
girls as especially vulnerable and in need of social protection (Vaughan 
2010). More recently, multi-stakeholder initiatives have emerged in this 
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area, such as the United Nations Girls’ Education Initiative (UNGEI) 
established in 2008. The changing status of the child in international poli-
tics has also been reflected in the activities of a number of international 
organizations beyond those of an explicit child-related mandate such as 
UNICEF (Fig. 6.1).
the evoLutIon of chILdren’s rIghts 
In InternatIonaL Law
With the adoption of the UNCRC, all those different provisions scattered 
among previously existing international legal documents were drawn 
together in what was then the most comprehensive international human 
rights treaty ever written and adopted. The CRC, however, was not the 
first international legal document devoted solely to children, their well- 
being and their rights. The League of Nations had formulated a very short 
set of moral aspirations for children in its 1924 Declaration of the Rights 
of the Child (“The child that is hungry must be fed…”),4 and the UN set 
out to formulate a brief catalog of children’s rights for the first time in its 
1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child up until the 1970s; however, 
the international politics on childhood was, essentially, a politics of pro-
tecting children under exceptional circumstances—those exploited, hun-
gry, in situations of armed conflict or violence, disabled or neglected. 
Thus, for a long time, children’s rights were placed in the context of social 
policy toward those most in need, framed in terms of charity, benevolence 
and caring for those most vulnerable and exposed.
In the context of this rather narrow child rights perspective and agenda, 
the CRC stood out as a groundbreaking document, formulating a set of 
universal rights to be claimed by each and every child (i.e. the individual 
child). It was also the first international treaty that identified concrete 
duty-bearers, namely the States Parties, but also extended duties to par-
ents, families, legal guardians and society at large to ensure, fulfill and 
respect children’s rights. There have been several attempts to categorize 
and systematize the 41 substantive articles in the CRC. Some authors have 
suggested to use the ‘3 Ps’ (provision, protection, participation) in order 
to classify children’s rights, while others have differentiated alongside the 
negative/positive divide or, classically, using the differentiation between 
4 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924. https://www.humanium.org/
en/text-2/. Accessed February 25, 2020.
















































political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. Beyond these largely 
legal exercises, however, the CRC is also interesting in the way it seeks to 
capture a universal image of childhood to which all of the drafters of the 
CRC could agree. Although the CRC contained a number of ground-
breaking elements that extended children’s rights toward adolescents and 
thereby dramatically increased the number of rights-holders, it was also 
still firmly grounded in long-standing protective and paternalistic images 
of childhood. At the same time, it also sought to give expression to cultur-
ally varying notions of childhood and child protection. As I will discuss 
below, the contemporary discussion on the CRC is nevertheless not only 
preoccupied with questions of compliance, governance and implementa-
tion—it also interprets the CRC as essentially a reflection of Western or 
Northern ideas and ideals of childhood, as an instrument of power and as 
an example of governmentality.
With regard to monitoring and assessing the national implementation 
of children’s rights principles, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
occupies a paramount role. Under the CRC, States Parties are obliged to 
submit reports on their progress in implementing the provisions of the 
CRC on a regular basis. Article 44 of the CRC stipulates that States Parties 
must submit their first report after a maximum of two years after ratifica-
tion, thereafter every five years. These reports are then reviewed and com-
mented on by the CRC Committee which consists of 18 independent 
experts (originally only 10 experts) and meets annually in Geneva. The 
Committee is not only guiding States Parties in their implementation 
through its Concluding Observations—it also revisits the rights of the 
child in light of new issues and legal interpretations through its General 
Comments. The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on a Communications Procedure (OP3-CRC)—which was 
adopted in 2011 and entered into force in 2014—constitutes yet another 
groundbreaking step in the fortification of the status of the child as an 
individual and active rights-holder under international law. The Optional 
Protocol establishing a Complaints Mechanism for children under inter-
national law foresees the possibility for individuals or groups of individuals 
to submit communications directly to the CRC Committee if they are 
within the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be the victims of a vio-
lation of either the CRC or its Optional Protocols committed by the 
State Party.
Narrowing down a discussion of children’s rights to global social gov-
ernance, it appears that the contemporary child rights regime covers the 
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majority of the substantive social governance issues assembled in this 
edited volume: employment and child labor; care; migration; education; 
gender; disability; health; water (as in access to clean and safe drinking 
water); and food security. For all of these dimensions of global social gov-
ernance, legal provisions exist specifically for children.
the contemPorary Io LandscaPe 
and ‘organIzatIonaL ecoLogy’ of chILdren’s rIghts
Types, Roles and Constellations of IOs in Global 
Social Governance
Revisiting global social governance as it relates to children’s rights brings 
to light an extremely densely populated, pluralist and complicated land-
scape of intergovernmental, non-governmental and hybrid, public-private 
organizations and networks. It is nevertheless possible to identify several 
central—and a large number of peripheral—international organizations 
and rule-systems protecting children and promoting their rights in global 
social policy. These organizations can be classified using classical typolo-
gies such as standard-setting organizations versus operational organiza-
tions versus financing organizations, or general IOs versus specialized 
organizations and programs. With regard to monitoring State Parties’ 
compliance with their obligations under the CRC, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child stands out as the most central actor, supported, of 
course, by a broad array of non-state actors and other crucial mechanisms 
such as the Universal Periodic Review. Due to its history as the first special 
fund set up for children, UNICEF stands out as the most well-known 
international organization working on issues of child protection and chil-
dren’s rights. Despite its outstanding role, however, UNICEF only began 
to embrace the philosophy and terminology of children’s rights in the late 
1990s. In fact, the organization had been a mostly invisible actor in the 
drafting of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and, due to its 
focus on countries in the Global South, had been very reluctant to embrace 
a child rights agenda that would lead away from its traditionally needs- 
based, child protection approach.
Three standard-setting international organizations stand out as particu-
larly pertinent to global social policy for children: the International Labour 
Organizations (ILO) as the core rule-making authority in the area of child 
labor and, to a lesser extent, the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
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the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO). Even though the World Bank does not have a separate pro-
gramming area for children, its project portfolio reveals that child health 
and primary education, in particular, are recurring focal points of World 
Bank-funded projects. Other international organizations immediately rel-
evant to global social policy for children are UNDP and the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). A broader trend starting in the 
1990s (but particularly after 2000) toward the creation and institutional-
ization of more hybrid, public-private (or multi-stakeholder) initiatives 
has also involved the establishment of a broad array of issue-specific or 
problem-specific partnerships for health, education, water, sanitation or 
food security targeting children specifically. Outstanding examples of such 
partnerships or initiatives are the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), the Global 
Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, or the Partnership for 
Maternal, Newborn and Child Health. Even more recently, a number of 
inter-agency initiatives involving two or more international organizations 
(such as the European Union (EU) and UNICEF, for example) have been 
set up in order to jointly address issues such as child malnutrition.5 At 
present, the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030 are the 
main drivers behind increasing inter-agency collaboration and coordina-
tion in development cooperation, as well as cooperation focused on chil-
dren as a specific group.
As an expression of the growing visibility and salience of child-related 
matters and the increasing acceptance of child protection norms in all 
areas of international politics, it appears that organizations and bodies that 
had hitherto not dealt with children’s issues and rights have also become 
involved in this area. Former child soldiers have been speaking in front of 
the Security Council on matters related to children and armed conflict. 
The International Criminal Court has been investigating the use of child 
soldiers in armed conflict as a crime against humanity and a basis for pros-
ecuting war crimes. The UN Global Compact has included the “effective 
abolition of child labour” (Principle 5) in its 10 Principles for socially 
responsible global business. Together with the ILO, the Global Compact 
5 Generally see: UNICEF, “What we do.” https://www.unicef.org/eu/what-we-do. 
Accessed February 25, 2020; UNICEF Ethiopia, “EU Partnership Paves the Way for Better 
Nutrition for Children and Women in Ethiopia.” https://unicefethiopia.org/2017/03/01/
eu-partnership-paves-the-way-for-better-nutrition-for-children-and-women-in-ethiopia/. 
Accessed February 25, 2020.
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has set up a Child Labour Platform for fostering dialogue on best practices 
and sharing experiences, particularly in abolishing child labor in the supply 
chain.6 As an extension to these activities, UNICEF, the Global Compact 
and Save the Children (the most powerful transnational NGO in the field 
of child protection and children’s rights) have developed the ‘Children’s 
Rights and Business Principles’ in order to highlight the specific situation, 
needs and rights that children have and thereby give more concrete shape 
to the UN Business and Human Rights principles.
It is also on the level of regional organizations such as the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe that an increasing recognition of 
child rights in the context of discourses and policies on social inclusion/
exclusion is observable. The necessity of becoming more receptive to 
human rights standards in the creation and implementation of social poli-
cies is clearly visible, at least at the level of programmatic language of the 
EU and the OECD, especially where children are concerned. In her recent 
paper, Kišūnaitė assesses the extent to which “European governance and 
policies create a favourable framework for protecting children’s rights” 
(Kišūnaitė 2019, 173). Her paper portrays the European Union as a late-
comer with regard to incorporating child rights principles in its policymak-
ing, claiming that “children’s rights protection arrived at the forefront of 
EU policies just ten years ago” (173). So far, in the context of the European 
Union, child rights have been explicitly included in Art. 3.3 of the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 24). In 
2011, the EU adopted its Agenda for the Rights of the Child as an instru-
ment toward the mainstreaming of child rights in all EU policy spheres. In 
this EU Agenda, a few selected areas of action are identified, including the 
protection of children “when they are vulnerable”—the area that most 
clearly relates to social policy issues such as poverty and social exclusion, 
health, disability and education (European Commission 2011).
A recurrent theme in discourses on children’s rights and discrimination 
against children in national and international policies has been the avail-
ability, dissemination and particularly disaggregation of data for children. 
As a consequence, global social governance in the name of children’s 
rights has come to embrace an increasing amount of initiatives working 
toward the improvement of the ‘data situation’ concerning children. In 
6 Global Compact & ILO, “Share Best Practices on the Child Labour Platform.” https://
www.unglobalcompact.org/take-action/action/child-labour. Accessed February 25, 2020.
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particular, methodologies for monitoring children’s economic and social 
rights have been described as “exploding” in recent years, such as the 
development of specific indicators or benchmarks, child rights-based bud-
get analysis or child rights impact assessments (Nolan 2013). Clearly, such 
initiatives envisage a stronger knowledge base for evidence-based policy-
making on behalf of children and, more generally, a stronger visibility of 
children in the budgets of national authorities and international organiza-
tions.7 UN Data, the central data repository of the United Nations,8 con-
tains a wealth of statistics on the specific situation of children, concerning 
for example school enrolment, health status or gender inequality. In this 
regard, the Millennium Development Goals (as well as their successor, the 
SDGs) with their clear preference for measurable development indicators 
have contributed significantly to the growth in statistical data on the spe-
cific situation of children in social policy areas such as health, education, 
nutrition and labor. The above-mentioned EU Agenda for the Rights of 
the Child also calls for better “evidence-based” policymaking in the area 
of child protection and child rights, asking its member states to establish 
“child-rights related policy targets” and address “gaps in knowledge about 
the situation and needs of the most vulnerable groups of children” 
(European Commission 2011, 5).
As the above makes abundantly clear, the governance of childhood and 
children’s rights through global social policies has evolved from a rather 
narrow field of international cooperation largely in the hands of UN spe-
cial agencies and programs such as UNICEF or WHO (administering a 
rather narrow basic needs agenda) to a central dimension of international 
policymaking and global governance in all areas of international coopera-
tion. Children’s rights can thus be considered a cross-cutting theme or 
norm-catalog that has found its way into the work and policies of all inter-
national organizations in one way or another. When it comes to address-
ing children’s rights in global social policy, most IOs with a specific focus, 
expertise, and programming area on children deal with social policy issues 
in low- and middle-income countries. There is, therefore, a strong overlap 
between global social policy and development cooperation. It is in the 
context of social policies addressing the Global South, however, that the 
notion of children’s rights confronts particular political and cultural 
7 Examples: UNICEF, “UNICEF Data: Monitoring the situation of children and women.” 
https://data.unicef.org/. Accessed February 25, 2020.
8 UNdata Explorer. http://data.un.org/Explorer.aspx. Accessed February 25, 2020.
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challenges. Here, repeatedly, the contemporary children’s rights regime 
has been assessed as “too weak” to significantly change “the material reali-
ties of vulnerable children’s lives” (Grugel 2013, 19). Children’s social 
policies have been described as being fraught with complexities and “per-
sistent deprivations” (Khadka 2013, 616). Applying a political economy 
perspective on social rights in the developing world, Khadhka questions 
the prioritization of rights in the “mainstream child rights discourse” and 
its usefulness in resource-poor contexts (Khadka 2013, 616) Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 IOs, children’s rights and selected recent activities




In partnership with the EU, UNICEF has implemented a 
number of policies, programs and actions to reduce malnutrition 
and stunted growth in children under 5 years as articulated in the 
UNICEF Strategic Plan 2018–2021 and the EU Nutrition 
Action Plan 2014. Examples include:
Since 2016: Partnership for Improved Nutrition in Lao to 
improve nutritional status of women and children.
Since 2018: West and Central Africa regional project where 
225,000 cartons of ready-to-use food were distributed to 
children at risk of malnutritiona
International Labour 
Organization (ILO)
Since 2015: International Programme on the Elimination of Child 
Labour and Forced Labour (IPEC+) Flagship Programme 
operates in 55 countries and aims to eliminate all forms of child 
labor by 2025 and to dismantle systems of forced labor and 
human trafficking by 2030, in line with the UN 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)b
Since 2018: Accelerating action for the elimination of child labor 
in supply chains in Africa (ACCEL Africa) implemented in Ivory 
Coast, Egypt, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda focusing on 
cacao, coffee, gold, cotton and teac
Eliminating child labor and forced labor in the cotton, textile and 
garment value chains: an integrated approach (co-funded by the 
European Union) targeting Burkina Faso, Mali, Pakistan and 
Peru to ensure a cotton supply chain free of child labord
World Health 
Organization (WHO)
Since 2013: Global Action Plan for Pneumonia and Diarrhoea 
(GAPPD) to end preventable childhood deaths by pneumonia 
and diarrhoea by 2025, which account for 29% of child deaths 
globallye
Since 2016: Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and 
Adolescent’s Health 2016–2030 to attain the highest standard of 
health for women, children and adolescents in line with the UN 
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Since 2019: From access to empowerment: UNESCO strategy for 
gender equality in and through education 2019–2025 to deliver 
the UN’s Education 2030 Agenda as part of the SDGs through 
better data, frameworks for advancing rights and teaching for 
empowermentg
July 2019: Paris International Conference, Innovating for girls’ 
and women’s empowerment through education in partnership 
with the G7h
World Bank 2013–2017: Funded by the Global Partnership for Education, the 
Pacific Early Age Readiness and Learning Program (PEARL) 
improves school readiness and early literacy in Pacific island 
nationsi
2014–2018: READ: Results for Education Achievement and 
Development Project in The Gambia to improve access to basic 
education, improve quality of teaching and strengthen education 
systemsj
aUNICEF, “Nutrition.” https://www.unicef.org/eu/nutrition. Accessed February 25, 2020
bILO, “International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and Forced Labour (IPEC+).” 
https://www.ilo.org/global/about- the- ilo/how- the- ilo- works/flagships/ipec- plus/lang%2D%2Den/
index.htm. Accessed February 25, 2020; ILO, “International Programme on the Elimination of Child 
Labour and Forced Labour (IPEC+).” https://www.ilo.org/global/about- the- ilo/how- the- ilo- works/
flagships/WCMS_495567/lang%2D%2Dru/index.htm. Accessed February 25, 2020
cILO, “Accelerating action for the elimination of child labour in supply chains in Africa (ACCEL Africa).” 
https://www.ilo.org/ipec/projects/global/WCMS_698536/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. Accessed 
February 25, 2020
dILO, “Eliminating child labour and forced labour in the cotton, textile and garment value chains: an 
integrated approach.” https://www.ilo.org/ipec/projects/global/WCMS_649126/lang%2D%2Den/
index.htm. Accessed February 25, 2020
eWHO, “Ending preventable child deaths from pneumonia and diarrhoea by 2025.” https://www.who.
int/maternal_child_adolescent/documents/global_action_plan_pneumonia_diarrhoea/en/. Accessed 
February 25, 2020
fWHO, “Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescent’s Health 2016–2030.” https://www.
who.int/life- course/partners/global- strategy/en/. Accessed February 25, 2020
gUNESCO, “From access to empowerment: UNESCO strategy for gender equality in and through edu-
cation 2019–2025.” https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000369000. Accessed February 
25, 2020
hUNESCO, “G7 France/UNESCO International Conference—Innovating for girls’ and women’s 
empowerment through education.” https://en.unesco.org/events/g7- franceunesco- international- 
conference- innovating- girls- and- womens- empowerment- through. Accessed February 25, 2020
iWorld Bank, “Early Childhood Development.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/earlychildhood-
development#3. Accessed February 25, 2020
jWorld Bank, “GAMBIA—READ: Results for Education Achievement and Development Project.” 
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects- operations/project- detail/P133079?lang=en. Accessed 
February 25, 2020
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gLobaL socIaL PoLIcy on chILdren’s rIghts between 
ImPLementatIon and contestatIon 
As contemporary reflections on the meaning and implications of children’s 
rights (particularly those promoted by the CRC) in 2020 have exposed, 
the adoption of a legally binding human rights treaty for children has had 
a catalytic effect on legal, political and societal change in most countries of 
the world. It has also led to a reconfiguration of global social governance, 
both in terms of the broader norms shaping global social governance and 
in terms of the transformations of international institutions and actor 
landscapes and constellations. Based on the CRC, more and more organi-
zations active in development cooperation have been formulating, adopt-
ing and implementing child rights-based approaches to development; the 
number of independent national human rights institutions for children has 
significantly increased (UNICEF 2013) all over the world, and many 
countries have adopted National Plans of Action or changed national con-
stitutions and law in order to reflect the obligations of their governments 
under the CRC. Long-standing think tanks and NGOs have created new 
departments or programming sections exclusively for children and youth, 
specialized research institutes dedicated to child-related issues have been 
established, and of course countless new civil society actors have entered 
the landscape of global social governance on children’s rights. UNICEF, 
the largest intergovernmental organization (IGO) addressing the special 
situation of children, has reformulated its programming priorities by 
implementing a rights-based approach (RBA) with the Convention at its 
core. In this respect, the CRC can be seen as the principal driving force 
behind a global culture of children’s rights and an ever-increasing salience 
of children’s rights in international and domestic politics.
At the same time that efforts to implement children’s rights domesti-
cally and internationally have accelerated, however, scholars have also 
started to question this (pre)dominance of matters of implementation in 
research on children rights, particularly a rather rigid and simple under-
standing of how international human rights standards are realized in 
domestic contexts (Holzscheiter et al. 2019). The contemporary debate 
on children’s rights among scholars and practitioners, which has largely 
been informed by Postcolonial and Critical Theory, also brings to light 
moments and processes of contestation and resistance to a powerful global 
discourse on appropriate childhood encapsulated in children’s rights stan-
dards, questioning the easy traveling of seemingly universal values across 
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time and space. Authors who have assessed the relevance of the CRC in 
the Global South have pointed to a tension between these global ideals, 
on the one hand, and social and cultural practices in the Global South, on 
the other, looking, for example, at corporal punishment, child participa-
tion or working children (Balagopalan 2019; Fay 2019; Imoh 2019). 
Accordingly, contemporary engagement with children’s rights in the con-
text of global governance reconceptualizes the relationship between these 
norms and global and domestic institutions, policies and practices as more 
ambivalent and contentious, assuming that the meaning of such norms 
cannot be inferred and understood independently of the context (local, 
cultural, linguistic, political, historical, institutional etc.) in which they are 
debated and enacted (Wiener 2018; Kaime 2010). Following this twist in 
the debate on children’s rights, scholarly interest has shifted toward 
regional human rights treaties and institutions (such as the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the ASEAN Commission on the 
Rights of Women and Children, the European Court of Human Rights, 
or Independent National Human Rights Institutions) as vital ingredients 
of a stronger cultural embedding of core principles and ideas codified in 
the CRC.
Taming the Beast of Children’s Rights—The Separation 
of Children and Youth Advocacy in Global Social Policy
An analysis of the organizational landscape in which global social gover-
nance related to children’s rights is taking place not only brings to light 
the strong diffusion of children’s rights across most, if not all, interna-
tional organizations (i.e. child rights mainstreaming)—it also exhibits con-
flict lines around the separation of children from other social groups 
enjoying special protective status in international politics, above all women 
and youth. More than ever, contemporary global social governance seeks 
to address adolescents and youth as a previously ‘forgotten’ group. At the 
same time, it can be argued that the separation of children’s issues and 
youth issues which is visible when looking at the programming areas of 
international organizations is an artificial construct, particularly in light of 
the broad definition of ‘childhood’ under the CRC which includes chil-
dren between 0 and 18 years of age. This arguably artificial separation can 
also be characterized as a more protective child rights agenda and a more 
emancipatory, agency-oriented youth agenda. It is reflected in the fact that 
most organizations maintain different programming sections on 
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child- related issues (often associated with child protection) and on youth 
matters (often framed as matters of youth ‘agency’ or ‘empowerment’).9 
The Joint United Nations Programme on human immunodeficiency 
virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) (UNAIDS) 
has separate program areas for ‘children’ and ‘young people’. While the 
former targets unborn or very young children (i.e. pediatric HIV, seeking 
to eliminate new HIV infections in children), the ‘Youth Programme’ 
established in 2012 describes young people as beneficiaries, partners and 
leaders, seeking to “strengthen young people’s leadership skills.”10 Child 
(rights) focused global social governance thus testifies to dynamics of 
institutional fragmentation in which contentious issues in child-related 
social policies are relegated to the ‘youth’ realm in order to ensure govern-
ability (e.g. sexual and reproductive rights, youth unemployment, youth 
participation).
Ios and dIscourses on chILdhood In gLobaL 
socIaL governance
For many, the contemporary notion of children’s rights encapsulates a 
rather specific ideal of childhood as a phase in life that is “free of responsi-
bilities, which would include work, and dominated by education and lei-
sure within the family context” (Baker and Hinton 2001, 190). In fact, 
children’s rights as formulated in the CRC and interpreted by the CRC 
Committee continue to be challenged on the grounds of their modern, 
Western bias (Imoh and Ame 2012). Boyden, even if very tentatively, has 
insinuated that the CRC might be even more ‘Western’ in its character 
than other human rights treaties (Boyden 1997, 197). This Western bias 
expresses itself, after all, in an image of children as non-economic and 
non-political human beings. Although social policy issues still continue to 
be closer to a traditional discourse and focus on child rights as passive 
rights to protection, cross-cultural dialogue in the area of social policy and 
protection also appears to be more promising, as evidenced, for example, 
9 See for example UNDP’s activities on “empowering youth” under the rubric of 
“Democratic governance and peacebuilding.” https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/
home/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/empowering-youth.html. Accessed 
February 25, 2020.
10 UNAIDS, “Young people.” https://www.unaids.org/en/topic/young-people. 
Accessed February 25, 2020.
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by the establishment of regional human rights institutions on child rights 
such as the ASEAN Commission on the Rights of Women and Children in 
2010 or the creation of a Rapporteur on Children’s Rights in the Context 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1998.
Notions of childhood primarily experienced in the global North, there-
fore, constitute a powerful leitmotif in global social governance as much 
as they are the target of contestation by different ‘norm-antipreneurs’ 
(Bloomfield and Scott 2018), many of whom are from the Global South. 
In fact, it is against the ‘benchmark’ of a globalized ideal of childhood and 
its core settings—home, school, family—that certain ‘blind spots’ in global 
social governance have become apparen, such as  children living in the 
streets, or child-headed households. At the same time, it is above all in 
global social governance that dissident voices have made themselves heard 
and where demands for the recognition of children’s economic agency, in 
particular, have also brought with them forceful claims for seeing chil-
dren as social and political agents. With its long historical legacy, the inter-
national debate on appropriate rules and policies to regulate child work 
and abolish child labor is a showcase for contending philosophies on child-
hood and children’s rights and the ongoing resistance to the social, eco-
nomic and political agency of under-18s. On a more general level, these 
debates testify to the disputed nature of children’s (transnational) citizen-
ship, both in terms of the abstract sense (i.e. children as citizens with social 
and political rights) and in terms of concrete debates over nationality, citi-
zenship and (un)equal access to social services (education, health, hous-
ing, social benefits).
concLusIon
As this chapter has demonstrated, international organizations are indis-
pensable promoters of children’s rights in global social governance. They 
pursue a wide range of activities geared toward the diffusion, implementa-
tion and concretization of international children’s rights standards in 
global, regional and domestic social policy. Seeking to foster a growing 
and sustained sensitivity and commitment to children’s rights in diverse 
social policy fields (education, health, food, housing), the financial contri-
butions of international organizations have been particularly critical in 
low- and middle-income countries. While highlighting the manifold posi-
tive contributions of international organizations in making children’s 
rights a systematic consideration in global social policy, this chapter has 
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also sought to point to the contested meaning of ‘children’s rights’ when 
it comes to accepting an image of children as direct and active rights- 
holders, including their right to participate in decisions affecting them. 
Incorporating children’s rights in global social policy thus requires inter-
national organizations to consider these rights as consequential not only 
to the policies and programs they promote vis-à-vis individual countries, 
but also to their own polity and procedural rules, including the necessity 
to increase the participatory space and possibilities for articulation for 
rights-holders aged 18 and below.
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CHAPTER 7
Global Discourses, Regional Framings 




Education is commonly heralded as one of the key policies for fostering 
future progress and well-being. Accordingly, governments, national stake-
holders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and International 
Organizations (IOs) advocate improvements in education almost as a sine 
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qua non for sustainable human development. Hence, education policy is 
also conceptualized as a social policy in the sense that it enables individuals 
to acquire skills for living an independent and fulfilled life while also pro-
viding states with a toolkit to stimulate economic growth and social cohe-
sion. However, different actors hold different views on the goals of 
education: while some emphasize the positive economic effects that edu-
cation has on states and individuals, others refer to the feedback loop of 
education on the social integration of societies. In short, there is no uni-
versally or uniformly accepted idea about the purposes of education.
At the same time, education has gradually and constantly become an 
increasingly internationalized issue area. By being under constant pressure 
through ongoing globalization processes, social policies in general and edu-
cation policy, in particular, can no longer be viewed without reference to the 
global context (Deacon 2007, 7; Mundy 2007). This expanding internation-
alization is best reflected by the multitude of activities and initiatives of IOs 
in the policy field of education. Since the second half of the 1990s in particu-
lar, education has been seen as a domain that was boosted into the global 
arena of policy making in the context of international initiatives, such as the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the auspices of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), and the European Bologna Process. In response, 
national education systems were, for the most part, urged to respond to new 
challenges from the knowledge economy.
Central to the impact of IOs in international politics in general and in 
education, in particular, is their ability to exercise autonomy and authority 
at the same time (Niemann 2012). As they are often equipped by their 
founders to set agendas, foster implementation, and make binding deci-
sions in the face of state sovereignty, IOs are more than the sum of their 
member states’ interests (Koremenos et al. 2001). Thus, they can be con-
sidered powerful actors who possess “a sphere of autonomy and a resource 
they can use to shape the behavior of others in both direct and indirect 
ways” (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, 162). IOs are thus able to shape 
discourses, to make decisions which may counter the wishes and virtues of 
their members, as well as influence policy implementation.
For education, it is now indisputable that IOs influence international 
and domestic education policy making processes. In particular, it has been 
shown that major IOs active in education, such as the OECD, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), or 
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the World Bank, set and influence agendas for education purposes and 
goals in significant ways. As we argued elsewhere, the OECD is today able 
to disseminate its program through large-scale education assessments 
globally—reaching well beyond the group of its member states (Niemann 
and Martens 2018). The globally operating UNESCO significantly 
changed the discursive frame regarding the context of education: from 
education for peace to education in conflict (Lerch and Buckner 2018). 
However, beyond single case studies on prominent IOs in education, we 
know comparatively little about how the population of education IOs is 
constituted and how they reflect on and promote education purposes.
In this contribution we have two analytical objectives. First, we map the 
population of education IOs to describe the organizational field in which 
the social policy discourse in the sub-area of education takes place. The 
assessment of what types of IOs deal with education is summarized in a 
typology to identify different clusters of IOs and provide accounts of both 
their characteristics and the different niches they have populated in the 
organizational field of education policy. Second, given that IOs can be 
viewed as influential, autonomous actors, it is important to show which 
ideas they develop and promote regarding education. How to think about 
an issue heavily influences which actions are taken and which recommen-
dations are given. Hence, the repercussions that IO activities can have on 
states and their education systems are ultimately shaped by the ideational 
framing of IOs. We thus analyze the ideas IOs hold regarding education 
and show how the discourse on education has developed over time within 
the population of IOs.
Overall, both of our research aims are related. By generating a typology 
of education IOs and identifying different clusters, we also link the clusters 
to overarching education ideas. In this chapter, we provide an empirical 
assessment of the population of education IOs and analyze the ideas these 
IOs hold regarding education (purpose) as suggested by the introduction 
of this volume. Accounts that might explain the observed phenomena are 
discussed in the concluding paragraphs.
What We KnoW about educatIon Ios
The research on IOs in the field of education mainly focuses on case stud-
ies of large and globally visible IOs. Overall, few contributions examine 
IOs in education in an encompassing or overarching way (exceptions 
being, McNeely 1995; Mundy 2007) and few deal with more than one 
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case or undertake a comparative analysis (exceptions being, e.g., Moutsios 
2009; Resnik 2006). Most prominent, however, are case studies about the 
‘usual suspects’ of IOs in education, namely UNESCO, the World Bank, 
and the OECD. Academic literature on the World Bank’s engagement in 
education, for example, focuses primarily on financial issues, its lending 
policy, and how these have shaped the economic and education policies of 
governments (Banya and Elu 2001; Jones 1997). Other literature criti-
cally reflects on the World Bank’s economic ideology and suggests alterna-
tives to its view (Heyneman 2003; Klees 2002) or analyzes individual 
aspects of the World Bank’s work in education, such as different regions, 
educational levels, or its work in the context of development (Mazrui 
1997; Verger et al. 2014).
Since UNESCO has long been an IO in education, academic work on 
its activities dates back decades. Given its structural incorporation into the 
worldwide UN system, academic work on UNESCO and its activities in 
education primarily look at its engagement in developing countries of the 
Global South along with its basic education goals, such as literacy (e.g., 
Jones 1988). Current literature focuses on its implementation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education (e.g., Walid and 
Luetz 2017). By contrast, the OECD is the newest ‘kid on the education 
bloc.’ Although its main focus is laid on economic cooperation among 
Western economically developed states, it became an “eminence grise” 
(Rinne et al. 2004) by the turn of the millennium in the field of education 
after establishing its Programme for International Student Assessment, 
better known under its abbreviation PISA. Since then, academic literature 
on the OECD, on education, and on PISA in particular has increased 
substantially: for example, literature examines how PISA came about 
(Henry et al. 2001; Martens 2007), how the OECD exercises governance 
in education and what impact PISA has (Bieber and Martens 2011; Grek 
2009), and how the OECD promotes its education model and itself 
worldwide as “infrastructural modes of global governance” (Sellar and 
Lingard 2014) or as a “knowledge broker” (Niemann and Martens 2018) 
in education.
Taken together, there is a lot of literature on the internationalization of 
education policy in general and about the role or impact that individual 
IOs play or have in this process. However, there is surprisingly little knowl-
edge about how the population of education IOs as a whole is constituted, 
what characteristics can be observed, and how this has been changing over 
time. We aim to fill this research gap.
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PoPulatIon of Ios In educatIon
In order to understand what influences the ideas of education IOs and 
determines organizational change, it is essential to identify who is actually 
populating the organizational field of international education policy. Next 
to IOs in education policy, there are obviously also many NGOs, think 
tanks, private foundations, and donors who are influential players in the 
field; however, in this contribution, we concentrate only on IOs which are 
conceptualized and synonymously used with the term Intergovernmental 
Organizations (IGOs) (Rittberger et al. 2012). Thus, although perhaps 
some NGOs, like the Gates Foundation, are considerably important and 
active players in the global education sphere, they were not considered in 
our analysis.1 Of the couple of hundreds of existing IOs, only a few deal 
with education policy and even fewer leave a recognizable footprint that 
makes them influential players in education policy. Identifying who is out 
there in the internationalized area of education policy is a promising first 
step in providing some explanations as to why and how the discourse has 
developed.
Defining ‘Education’ IOs
In our case, it is the issue area of education that is the distinctive feature of 
those IOs we are interested in. In this regard, an IO is defined as an ‘edu-
cation’ IO if it has three complementary features regarding its policy pro-
gram, organizational structure, operational activities, and aspired scope. 
First, education has to be mentioned in the IO’s programmatic mission 
statement as a designated task of the IO (be it in the IO’s preamble, 
founding treaty, amended treaties, or on its current websites). Second, it 
has to have its own permanent organizational (sub-)department, unit, or 
otherwise named structural component which specifically deals with issues 
of education (or training). Third, the IO has to address education policy 
issues. Hence, we exclude IOs from our definition of education IOs that 
1 Accordingly, the Global Partnership for Education is not part of our data set as states only 
function as donor countries. Similarly, intergovernmental organizations in a legal sense need 
to be distinguished from simple groupings or coalitions of states, such as the Education 
Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe (ERISEE), Conférence des ministres de 
l’éducation des pays ayant le français en partage (CONFEMEN), or the Coordinación 
Educativa y Cultural Centroamericana (CECO), which we also do not consider in this 
chapter.
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deal with strictly educational topics, like teaching methods or coordinat-
ing scientific cooperation, and do not address education policy. For 
instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also has an 
educational focus, but its activities mainly address the training of own staff 
with regard to security-related issues. It does not have any overarching 
education idea on potential education reforms or on how to organize edu-
cation policy which it seeks to disseminate to its members. It also excludes 
IOs such as the Islamic Development Bank which only gives out 
scholarships.
While IOs are institutions that “can cover several issue areas of interna-
tional relations” (Rittberger et al. 2012, 6), this means that education IOs 
do not necessarily have to focus solely on education issues. Education can 
be one of many policy fields the IO is committed to. Another analytical 
constraint for us is that we only include IOs that were still active in 2019. 
Since we are interested in analyzing the contemporary discourse on educa-
tion, dissolved or suspended education IOs are not in our sample.
The Population of Education IOs
Taking the definition of IOs into account, we identified the population of 
education IOs by searching the Yearbook of International Organizations 
(YIO) as well as the Correlates of War (COW) data sets. Every single IO 
mentioned in these two data sets which met the key criteria of an IO defi-
nition, in general, was individually examined regarding its constituting 
documents (e.g. preamble, founding, or amended treaties) and its web 
pages and as to whether they refer to education as a field of activity. In our 
search, we included all initiatives of IOs in the education sector which 
relate to school education (primary and secondary level) and/or the ter-
tiary education sector. Each IO was examined by hand as regards any 
activities related to education. After reviewing the individual organiza-
tions, a total of N=30 organizations were identified from the two data sets 
(see Table 7.1).
The identified education IOs feature several different characteristics 
that allow for a more nuanced geographic clustering. In our set, five IOs 
are related to the United Nations family and thus promote education 
issues worldwide. Next to UNESCO, the ILO, and the World Bank, the 
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are 
also involved in education issues. A special case of a worldwide active 
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Table 7.1 Education IOs
IO Acronym Full IO name Year of 
establishment
Number of 
member states  
in 2020
ADB Asian Development Bank Est. 1966 67
ABEGS Arab Bureau of Education for the Gulf 
States
1975 7
AfDB African Development Bank 1963 80
ALECSO Arab League Educational, Cultural and 
Scientific Organization
1970 22
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1989 21
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1967 10
ASEF Asia-Europe Foundation 1997 49
AU African Union 2002 55
CARICOM Caribbean Community 1973 15
CBSS Council of Baltic Sea States 1992 11
Commonwealth Commonwealth of Nations 1931 54
ECCAS Economic Community of Central 
African States
1983 11
EFTA European Free Trade Association 1960 4
EU European Union 1992 27
IADB Inter-American Development Bank 1959 48
IFESCCO The Intergovernmental Foundation for 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Cooperation
2006 8
ILO International Labour Organization 1919 186
ISESCO Islamic Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization
1979 52
Mercosur Southern Common Market 1991 5
OAS Organization of American States 1948 35
OECD Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development
1961 36
OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States
1981 11
OEI Organization of Ibero-American States 
for Education, Science and Culture
1949 23
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation
1985 8
SEAMEO Southeast Asian Ministers of Education 
Organization
1965 11
UNASUR Union of South American Nations 2008 12a
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization
1945 193
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees
1950 102
UNICEF United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund
1946 72
WB The World Bank Group 1944 173–189
aMember states as of 2017. Several states recently suspended or withdrew their membership in UNASUR 
due to the crisis in Venezuela, https://www.dw.com/de/lateinamerikanisches-b%C3%BCndnis-unasur-
vor-dem-ende/a-45070291. Accessed March 20, 2020
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education IO outside the UN system is the OECD. Although the OECD 
technically has a restricted membership which only includes the most 
advanced economies, its scope reaches well beyond its member states in 
terms of its education activities (and program). The IO provides services 
and recommendations for any state that is interested in joining the 
OECD’s education portfolio (e.g. participation in PISA, PISA for 
Development, etc., see Addey 2017). We thus classified the OECD as a 
global education IO.
Most education IOs, however, can be found on a regional level. In 
total, 20 regional education IOs exist (see Fig. 7.1). In Europe this cate-
gory includes the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the European 
Union (EU), and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which is even 
limited to a specific region within Europe. In Asia, most education IOs 
also narrowly focus on sub-continental regions, particularly on South and 
Southeast Asia. Next to the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education 
Organization (SEAMEO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also active education IOs. An exception 
within Asia is the Intergovernmental Foundation for Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (IFESCCO), a sub-organization of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of former states of the 
Soviet Union. In the Americas, there are even six IOs active in the field of 
education and these include the Organization of American States (OAS), 
Mercosur, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), as well as the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB). On the African continent, the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the African Union (AU), and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) make reference to education issues, with 
ECCAS being a partially autonomous regional organization within the 
AU framework. In the Arab world, the Arab League Educational, Cultural 
and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) and the Arab Bureau of Education 
for the Gulf States (ABEGS) are education organizations.
In addition, four IOs cannot be clearly assigned to one particular 
region. However, since membership to them is bound by other factors 
that do not cover all states, they are categorized as transregional IOs. For 
instance, Europe and Asia ‘share’ the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), 
and the Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science 
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and Culture (OEI) has members from Latin and Middle America, as well 
as from the European countries of Portugal and Spain. The Commonwealth 
Secretariat, which describes itself as “a voluntary association of 52 inde-
pendent and equal sovereign states, […] [t]hirty of our members are small 
states, many of which are island nations,”2 also spans across several regions 
(but not the globe). Finally, access to the Islamic Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) is bound to the religious alignment 
of the state toward Islam. Thus, we can see substantial differences between 
the IOs regarding the requirements for membership: while few education 
IOs are open to all sovereign states, the majority have a restricted mem-
bership which is bound to certain conditions, be they regional, cultural, or 
economic preconditions.
In systemizing our findings regarding the population of education IOs 
beyond geographic patterns, we find a divided organization field (see 
Fig. 7.1). On the one hand, we have seven specialized education IOs, also 
characterized by an E in their name which stands for Education. One of 
their major founding missions, and in some cases their sole founding mis-
sion, is thus to deal with education topics. We refer to these as distinct 
education IOs. Unlike UNESCO, the six smaller distinct IOs all cover 
their specific education ‘niche’: ISESCO, a sub-unit of the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation, represents Islamic education goals on religious 
grounds, SEAMEO represents the values of the Southeast Asian region, 
ALECSO and ABEGS are bound to the Arab region, IFESCCO to the 
former Soviet region, while the OEI can be characterized as consisting of 
an Ibero-Portuguese cultural heritage. Interestingly, three distinct educa-
tion IOs cover the Arab/Islamic area. In terms of niche theory, this indi-
cates that the overall competition in this area is not yet settled and reflects 
a strong emphasis on education in this cultural sphere.
On the other hand, this minority of distinct education IOs within the 
organizational field is facing a majority of IOs that cover several policy 
fields, with education being only one of them. Thus, a key characteristic of 
the other group of education IOs is that they only discovered education as 
an area of expertise at some point in time after their foundation. They usu-
ally do not have any outstanding education focus embedded in their 
founding treaties, but their scope of issues is either broad and general, or 
specialized in other single policy fields. We refer to these IOs as derivative 
education IOs. The largest group of derivative education IOs are nine IOs 
2 http://thecommonwealth.org/about-us. Accessed March, 19, 2020.
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whose original missions primarily pertained to economic cooperation, 
most noticeable the different ‘banks’ which focus on economic growth 
and development but also started to work on education. This finding also 
underscores that education becomes increasingly important and that 
diverse IOs feel the need to cover education topics in order to address 
their original aims. For instance, the World Bank views education as an 
intermediary means to fight poverty. For the OECD, education is decisive 
in generating human capital. Hence, in order to fulfill their original 
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Fig. 7.1 Mapping the population of education IOs. (Source: own account, col-
ors indicate primary focus area of IOs)
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From this map in Fig. 7.1 we can see that the more specialized an 
education IO is with regard to membership rules (restricted) and issue 
area (distinct), the less competition it faces within its niche. For instance, 
the AU almost has a monopoly when it comes to education on the African 
continent. In contrast, six IOs address education issues in the Americas 
and six cover Asia. Furthermore, two specialized education IOs are active 
in the Arab region. In addition, the global players, that is the three UN 
organizations, the World Bank, the ILO, and also the OECD, compete 
with each other in the field of education. This competition is not restricted 
to international forums but also takes place on the regional and national 
level, since all global IOs conduct and fund on-site education projects. On 
the one hand, some IOs like the ISESCO or SEAMEO have populated the 
niches for Islamic education and Southeast Asian education, but this does 
not mean that they do not face any competition or that they have a 
monopoly on education within their regional or cultural niche. Since oth-
ers, like the OECD or UNESCO, operate globally, the activities of regional 
education IOs are interfering with programs of the global IOs. For example, 
the OECD’s quasi-monopoly on defining large-scale education measure-
ments also influences how other IOs view education outcomes (Martens 
et al. 2016).
When taking the temporal development of education IOs into account, 
at least three instances have to be highlighted (see Fig. 7.2). First, a steady 
expansion took place: the number of education IOs rose from just 2  in 
1945 to 30 in 2018. There was no sharp increase in any particular decade 
but rather constant expansion between 1945 and the mid-1990s. Second, 
the field of education IOs was established almost as far back as the 
mid- 1990s. Although education did not become a highly international-
ized policy field until the late 1990s, only two additional education IOs 
were established after 2005 (namely, the derivative UNASUR and the 
distinctive IFESCCO). Hence, education IOs could be assumed to be the 
causes, rather than the effects of increasing internationalization in the edu-
cation area. Furthermore, all IOs in our population that existed by 1996 
also covered education. This means that while in previous periods there 
were some IOs, like the ADB, which did not incorporate education 
into their thematic portfolio after their establishment; all IOs that were 
identified as education IOs from the mid-1990s onward covered educa-
tion topics from the beginning of their existence. Third, the derivative 
education IOs that originally had a focus on economic issues were 
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comparatively latecomers (red bars in Fig. 7.2). While other derivative IOs 
began including education during the decade of 1956–1965, just one of 
five existing economic IOs also dealt with education. In 1966–1975, the 
share rose to 50%, and by 1996 all nine economic IOs also included 
education in their thematic portfolio.
educatIon leItmotIfs and dIscourses
The typology of education IOs has shown that the population in this 
policy domain is multi-layered, diverse, and partially competitive. Against 
the background of how the field of education IOs is organized, we address 
the ideas and leitmotifs that are featured in the discourse because an analy-
sis of the education ideas put forward by IOs helps to assess how the dis-
course on education has developed over time and if a certain framing 
became dominant or vanished. As a criterion, we added the necessity that 
the IO has to publish visibly on education and has to aim for actively par-
ticipating in the global education discourse. Hence, to be analyzed regard-
ing its discourse as an education IO, it must go beyond self-proclaiming to 
cover education topics: the IO has to be active in the field. If an IO met 
our defined requirements for being classified as an education IO but lacked 








<1945 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 2006-2018
PopulationGeneral & Specific IOsEconomic IOsEducation IOs
Fig. 7.2 The rise of education IOs over time
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global discourse), we excluded that IO from further discourse analysis. 
Thus, 24 IOs remained to be analyzed regarding their discourses.3
What Are Education Ideas?
Ideas on education usually establish some kind of means-end relationship: 
ideas frame how the purpose of education is perceived. In this regard, 
education reforms that IOs recommend to their member states are strongly 
shaped by the underlying ideas and “[i]deas have a lasting influence on 
politics through their incorporation into the terms of political debates” 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 20). Moreover, ideational leitmotifs are 
not static and can change over time. Thus, we expect that education IOs 
vary regarding the leitmotifs they hold. Since IOs compete for influence 
within their thematic niche and exert soft governance through ideational 
framing (see Niemann et al., in this volume), we also expect IOs within 
the field of education to disseminate their own views on the purpose of 
education. In doing so, they compete with each other for cognitive author-
ity and legitimacy.
In addition, the birth characteristics of IOs’ thematic scope can influ-
ence their lasting ideas on education. IOs may propagate their mission 
statements universally if they claim global significance; however, they may 
also pursue cultural or regionally specific goals, such as concentrating edu-
cational policy activities on a particular cultural area, making them inap-
plicable to a broader international community. For UNESCO, for example, 
the universalistic principle of ‘education as a human right’ is in the fore-
ground; the ILO promotes social justice as well as human and workers’ 
rights as part of a United Nations special agency concerned with labor that 
operates worldwide, whereas Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization and Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization 
appear to propagate more culturally particularistic values. Being a globally 
active IO, the OECD’s PISA study claims global validity for their exam-
ples of ‘what works’ and influences the educational reform processes of 
small nations that did not even participate in the PISA study (Niemann 
and Martens 2018). As another example, ISESCO diffuses cultural ideas 
from religious-Islamic education as a primary goal while simultaneously 
3 Six IOs are excluded from further detailed discourse analysis due to limited publications 
(less than ten publications on education policy in the English language). Excluded IOs: 
AfDB, ASEF, CBSS, IADB, IFESCCO, and Mercosur.
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following global benchmarking guidelines, such as standardized measure-
ment and comparison (Martens and Niemann 2019).
With regard to ideal types of education leitmotifs, a distinction can be 
drawn between two overarching key topics in the literature on educational 
goals. On the one hand, education may be considered from a utilitarian 
perspective which emphasizes positive economic effects of education as 
the engine of economic growth. As such, it expressly serves the develop-
ment of human capital through the transfer of applicable skills, which 
leads to increased productivity. “From an economic background educa-
tion provides a helpful means of improving the competitiveness of a 
national economy. It serves as a tool to generate a nation’s wealth by 
coordinating investments in human capital” (Nagel et al. 2010, 15). This 
conception of utilitarian educational goals is often accompanied by stan-
dardization efforts of curricula and the increasing measurement of so- 
called competencies. In contrast to a utilitarian perspective, education 
purpose may also be framed from a citizenship standpoint. From this per-
spective, education is essential to the emergence of social capital and iden-
tity formation, since education in modern societies establishes or maintains 
the political integration of a society (Nagel et al. 2010, 15). Among these 
benefits is the transmission of common behavioral and cultural norms, and 
of a common language and a common history. Education and educational 
policy are considered the tasks of society as a whole, with the goal of 
empowering every individual citizen to participate in the social framework 
and guarantee social cohesion (Shuayb 2012). Both views are not mutu-
ally exclusive according to a zero-sum logic but can complement each 
other. However, when under a common framework, one key topic can be 
prioritized over the other.
Furthermore, both views can be applied to an individual or to a collec-
tive perspective on education purpose. On the one hand, Nagel et  al. 
(2010) argue that education can be viewed within the utilitarian concept 
as a mechanism for individual skill formation or as a tool for fostering the 
growth of productivity and the wealth of nations. On the other hand, the 
liberal citizenship framing contains the idea that education can be under-
stood as a “means of self-fulfillment and personal refinement by taking 
part in a collective cultural enterprise” or as a social right or duty which 
helps to increase each individual’s chances of political and social participa-
tion (Nagel et al. 2010, 15). For the conceptualization and operationaliza-
tion of such leitmotifs in education policy, we distinguish four ideal-typical 
principled beliefs of education (see Table 7.2). We apply this classification 
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of the guiding principles of education in order to make variations of the 
means and concepts of education in different international organizations 
visible.
For example, in IO recommendations for education reforms, the over-
arching education purposes of economic utilitarianism and liberal citizen-
ship are translated in concrete policy programs and activities in education. 
Thus, the perspective of economic utilitarianism is often combined with 
the promotion of standardized learning assessments and a curricular focus 
on skills relevant to the labor market. EFTA positions that “Education is 
one of the core objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustain-
able and inclusive growth.”4 In contrast, a citizenship framing tends to 
lead to the advocacy of social inclusion, individual’s rights, and self- 
refinement. UNASUR, for example, wants to “[e]nsure and promote the 
right to education for everyone”;5 for UNICEF, “Universal access to 
quality education is not a privilege – it is a basic human right.”6 Hence, the 
general leitmotif of an IO heavily influences what the IO recommends to 
do in education policy.
What Ideas Are IOs Promoting?
When comparing the population of education IOs and summarizing their 
education ideas, it can be shown that over time some profound develop-
ments took place in how education is viewed by the population of IOs in 
this field. Figure  7.2 displays the percentage of references to a certain 
education idea made by IOs in their main publications on education 
between 1919 and 2018. These publications were mostly mission state-
ments, general proceedings on concepts, and progress reports. The data 
was coded according to the categories of the theoretical framework as 
outlined in Table 7.2. For example, in the period from 1996 to 2018, 27% 
of the coded IOs (N=24) referred to education purpose as liberal and 
individual. It is important to note that IOs can have more than one pur-
pose at the same time. Naturally, this overview only offers a first glance at 
education ideas and IOs.
4 http://www.efta.int/eea/policy-areas/flanking-horizontal-policies/education-training-
youth. Accessed March 19, 2020.
5 https://www.academia.edu/22909516/regionalism_and_higher_education_in_south_
america_a_comparative_analysis_for_understanding_internationalization. Accessed June 
23, 2020.
6 https://www.unicef.org/education/. Accessed March 19, 2020.
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The assessment shows some major trends in the ideational framing 
of education within the population of IOs and at least two general 
developments can be identified. First, the normative Lib./Coll. fram-
ing of education was always prominently put forward by IOs. Although 
it has slightly declined, it is still omnipresent when IOs address the 
purpose of education. For the vast majority of IOs, conceptualizing 
education as something to support citizenship issues and to promote 
universal norms is a core tenet.
Second, the economic-oriented utilitarian view on education continu-
ously gained considerable support. This idea emphasizes the return on 
investment that education can bring through the development of the 
national economy (collective) and the enhancement of (individual) skills. 
While the individual focus on skill formation almost reached its peak by 
the early 1990s (and remained constantly relevant afterward), the view 
that education collectively serves the advancement of national economies 
became progressively more important. Especially since the mid-1990s, 
IOs have claimed that the purpose of education is to accumulate wealth 
for national economies. In contrast, the Lib./Indiv. framing tended to 
remain on a lower level. In the face of the growing emphasis on human 
capital development, it seemed to become unimportant for IOs to also 
emphasize the benefits of education for personal refinement or self- 
development. In sum, the utilitarian-oriented leitmotifs gained relevance, 
but not at the expense of the Lib./Coll. framing. Today, the two interpre-
tations coexist within the population of education IOs.
Table 7.2 Guiding leitmotifs of education





education as a means to boost 
individual productivity
Self-fulfillment:






education as a means to boost 
national productivity
Social right and duty:
education as a means of political and 
social participation
Adapted from Nagel et al. (2010, 16), own account
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Competing or Complementing Paradigms on the Global Level?
The coexistence of ideas also implies that almost all education IOs became 
multi-purpose IOs. This means that they hold more than one idea regard-
ing education at the same time (see Fig. 7.3). While at the early phase 
(before 1956) each IO had one principal leitmotif regarding the purpose 
of education, this rose to 2.5 leitmotifs on average in the period from 
1996 to 2018. It is also shown in Fig. 7.2 that nowadays, with the excep-
tion of the Lib./Indiv. perspective, all four ideational meta-frames are 
almost equally present. Hence, IOs increasingly communicate a holistic 
education idea and have broadened their scope by including diverse per-
spectives within one complementary ideational superstructure (Fig. 7.4).
The general developments regarding IOs’ holistic leitmotifs in educa-
tion can be illustrated by analyzing how different education IOs which 
have a leading position in global education policy have framed education 
over time. Two groups of IOs can be distinguished: first, economic educa-
tion IOs that incorporated a liberal framing of education purposes, and 
second, liberal IOs that increasingly included economic reasoning. Linking 
these findings to the theoretical concepts depicted in Table 7.2, expan-
sions on both the horizontal and the vertical axis can be observed.
The utilitarian-driven view on education was always central to the 
World Bank’s education discourse: education should serve the purpose of 

















Fig. 7.3 Education leitmotifs of IOs over time. (Source: own account)
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Bank discovered education as a field of activity in the early 1960s, more 
economic-leaning approaches became institutionalized in its education 
program and the development of human capital was prioritized (Heyneman 
2003). While the economic-oriented leitmotif was strengthened under the 
Washington Consensus, the Bank’s education ideas continued to remain 
in line with neoclassical economic thinking when a Post-Washington 
Consensus began to emerge in the 1990s (Mundy and Verger 2015). In 
the view of the Bank, education affects how well individuals, communities, 
and nations fare and countries need more highly educated and skilled pop-
ulations because the level of acquired “skills in a workforce […] predicts 
economic growth rates of a states” (World Bank 2011, 3), and learning is 
essential for human capital development (World Bank 2018). However, 
the Bank currently also frames education as a human right (World Bank 
1999; World Bank 2018) and recognizes the limits of the market model 
for education (Robertson 2012). In sum, the economic view is still central 
to the Bank but embedded in a more holistic framework which also 
includes the positive effects that education can have on social develop-
ments. However, liberal views are linked (and subordinated) to an eco-
nomic reasoning, namely one that emphasizes a return on investment.
The same applies to the OECD, which believes that the advancement 
of education systems should contribute first and foremost to human capi-
tal formation and secondarily to the progress of social citizenship. From 
the early 1960s to the mid-1970s and under the leading paradigm of 
Keynesianism, the emphasis of the OECD’s education activities progres-
sively shifted toward issues related to the labor market and economic 
growth (Rubenson 2008). During this phase, the social and equity com-
ponents of education policy “receded to the background, giving way to 
economic concerns” (Papadopoulos 2006, 25). The neoliberal interpreta-
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moved to a neoclassical supply-side orientation (Mundy 2007; Sellar and 
Lingard 2014). Since the mid-1990s, the OECD worked on strategies 
that dealt with developing human capital to counteract the negative effects 
of globalization (Henry et  al. 2001; OECD 1996). Today, the OECD 
views human capital as “a major driver of a country’s trend productivity, 
not least through its impact on innovation” (OECD 2010a, 18) and 
national education systems “need to equip people with knowledge, skills 
and tools to stay competitive and engaged” (OECD 2010–2011, 3). 
However, the OECD does not neglect a wider social aspect of education, 
having noted that education serves the provision of social cohesion 
(OECD 2010b) and overall well-being, including health issues for exam-
ple (OECD 2007). Remarkably, social cohesion refers to economic fac-
tors: in order to create more social cohesion, education should enable 
individuals to advance economically. Concerning this matter, social dimen-
sions were also included in the OECD’s leitmotif of education, however, 
under an economic-centered framework.
UNESCO, in contrast, claims that the primary purpose of education is 
to promote norms and values. The IO laid down in its constitution that 
education is a means “to further universal respect for justice, for the rule 
of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are 
affirmed for the peoples of the world” (UNESCO 1945, Article 1). This 
view remains at the core of UNESCO’s work in education and was reem-
phasized in the following decades. Much like the World Bank and the 
OECD, however, UNESCO’s framing of education also underwent some 
changes, though in a different way. While the former two IOs extended 
along the horizontal axis as presented in Table 7.2 by adding a liberal layer 
to their otherwise (purely) economic view on education, UNESCO 
extended along the vertical axis from having a solely collective purpose of 
education to one that integrated an individual purpose as well. The IO 
emphasized the notion of citizenship and focused “on educating the 
whole individual in order to provide the learner with the capacity to flour-
ish” (Vaccari and Gardinier 2019, 78). Lerch and Buckner (2018) show 
how UNESCO’s “ideational underpinning” as regards education has 
shifted over the decades since its inception in 1945. While for a long time 
it envisioned education at a collective level as contributing to international 
peace, an additional layer about individual human development was added 
over the years. Whereas in the old view education was seen as a collective 
instrument of socialization for international understanding, the recent 
shift to the individual proclaims the view of education as a right to 
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personal development. As a result, UNESCO expanded the scope of  its 
discourse so that it would not only focus on those in need due to warfare 
but also on individuals whose right to education was at risk.
conclusIon
The social policy field of education is populated by different kinds of IOs 
and different kinds of education ideas. Both have proven to be dynamic. 
Geographically, the population of education IOs has expanded and today 
consists of several different types: some IOs have a clear global reach and 
ambition; most IOs have a transregional, regional, or cultural focus and an 
accordingly restricted membership bound to certain conditions; several 
IOs focus on education, often in combination with science and culture; 
and many IOs deal with education in conjunction with an additional focus 
they have.
Regarding ideas and discourses, global trends and paradigm shifts have 
also affected the education ideas of IOs and influenced which leitmotif had 
the upper hand in certain periods. For example, the general paradigm shift 
from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism was also reflected in IOs’ ideas 
regarding education. While the neoliberal Washington Consensus surged 
in the 1980s, a countermovement to the neoliberal agenda emerged in the 
early 1990s. Recently, the SDGs set a universal framework. Generally, two 
phases can be distinguished. The first period spans most of the time until 
the early 2000s and was characterized by mostly antagonistic competition 
between the utilitarian and citizenship perspective. Two camps of IOs 
wrestled to dominate the discourse and gain cognitive authority and legiti-
macy over education ideas. The second phase started in the early 2000s 
and was marked by a more integrative approach of both views. While each 
education IO still maintains a predominant view on the purpose of educa-
tion, they tend to subsume both idealistic framings under one discourse.
Taking the findings on population and discourse together, it is remark-
able that especially the derivative banks which became increasingly 
involved in education policy no longer envision the sole purpose of educa-
tion as economic utilitarianism, rather they now also promote (collective) 
citizenship values. According to their view, integrating the goals of liberal 
citizenship into the ideational education agenda allows for fostering eco-
nomic development on one hand. On the other hand, IOs like UNESCO 
which always strongly emphasized the role of education in disseminating 
universal norms and values included economic-oriented considerations 
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when referring to the purpose of education. They acknowledge that 
economic growth contributes to stable societies.
The way in which IOs view education purpose has become increasingly 
similar. We cannot see that one idea ‘wins.’ We find the puzzling situation 
of isomorphic polymorphism: while the ideational portfolio of IOs has 
become increasingly similar, the ideas within their portfolios have become 
more diverse. These are sound arguments supporting the claims of a world 
society (Meyer et al. 1997) in the population of education IOs. On the 
whole, IO ideas seem to converge.
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CHAPTER 8




This chapter focuses on family policy as an object of global social gover-
nance. Family policy can encompass a very wide scope, including norms 
governing marriage and separation, sexual and reproductive health and 
rights, and in-family violence. Such a broad definition would bring into 
focus an equally wide range of international organizations (IOs) such as 
the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF),1 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the International Organization for Migration 
1 If the chapter were focused on child policy per se, UNICEF would be a central actor but 
here it plays a more modest role, primarily as a critic of the Bretton Woods institutions’ neo-
liberal adjustment policies in the 1980s.
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(IOM), to list just a few. In this chapter, however, I largely follow 
Saraceno’s definition of family policy, namely: “All those public policies 
that are explicitly designed to affect the situation of families or individuals 
in their gender and intergenerational family roles, and to thus have clear, 
though possibly unintended, consequences for such families and individu-
als” (2013, 444). Even thus, narrowing the scope of family policies leaves 
open the range of objectives they may serve, such as dealing with demo-
graphic challenges (declining fertility/population aging), tackling child 
poverty/combating the intergenerational transmission of poverty, invest-
ing in human capital formation, encouraging women’s labor force partici-
pation and promoting gender equality. The main IOs involved in this field 
have emphasized various aspects at different times and in different ways, 
reflecting divergent assumptions about the role and nature of families and 
their organizational mandates.
From the 1990s to 2008, the family policy field was bifurcated, albeit 
traversed by a common discourse: social investment. One part, focused on 
family norms in the North, following the shift from the male breadwinner 
to the adult earner family with its work-family tensions. Here, the main 
IOs were the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
The second focused on the South and policies targeting children in poor 
families. Although UNICEF clearly played an important role on the 
ground, it was the World Bank that took the lead in elaborating and dis-
seminating the core ideas. Since the 2008 crisis, the field has come together 
in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that simultaneously address 
the Global North and South. The dominant discourse is ‘inclusive growth’, 
challenged by the more critical discourse on the ‘care economy’.
Following an introduction to the analytical framework and the key IOs, 
the second section discusses the ILO’s evolving standards for family sup-
ports and then analyzes the two parts of the field, bringing out the distinct 
ways in which the OECD and the World Bank interpreted social invest-
ment in the family. The third section looks at the adoption of inclusive 
growth by the ILO, the OECD and the World Bank in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis. This discursive shift, in combination with renewed 
attention to gender equality, involved an important ‘layering’ of new ideas 
into the organizational discourses developed in the previous period, 
including elements of the ILO’s ‘decent work’ agenda and the concept of 




Like other chapters in this volume, this chapter combines attention to the 
global policy field’s organizational environment with an examination of 
the intrinsic features of the key IOs within that field. The organizational 
environment is composed of the configuration of actors—here limited to 
IOs—in that field and the rules and belief systems that arise in the broader 
societal context (Niemann et  al., introduction to this volume). 
Organizational environments structure opportunities and the range of 
‘legitimate’ ideas even for the dominant IOs within them. At the same 
time, fields are subject to contestation and change. An important part of 
that struggle is discursive and takes place within a “universe of political 
discourse”, which establishes the legitimate actors within the field and 
influences the range of acceptable policy alternatives (Jenson 1986, 25). 
While alternative ideas may be introduced to contest the parameters of 
debate, in normal times such dissident ideas tend to be confined to the 
margins. Openings, however, may occur in conjunctures marked by the 
emergence of events that give rise to more wide-ranging debates about 
what is to be done. At such times, diverse ideas jostle for attention. In the 
1990s, the concept of social investment came to structure the way IOs 
interpreted policies targeting families. Since 2008, inclusive growth has 
risen to prominence.
In terms of the intrinsic features of the key IOs within a field, clearly the 
organization’s mandate, membership and internal structure matter. As in 
previous work, however, I also find the concept of organizational 
discourse(s) particularly useful. Clearly, an organization’s mandate and the 
sediment of its past practices leave their imprint on its culture, but the lat-
ter is also subject to change. The concept ‘organizational discourse’—that 
is the “claims encapsulating long term political projects as defined by the 
organization in question” (Dostal 2004, 445)—is better capable of cap-
turing these important discursive shifts. Organizational discourse thus rec-
ognizes that IOs do become involved in new projects that can significantly 
reshape their policy agendas and transform crucial elements of their 
bureaucratic cultures.
IOs often have more than one organizational discourse, however. As 
bureaucracies, they factor problems into manageable components. As a 
result, “different segments of the organization may develop different ways 
of making sense of the world, experience different local environments, and 
receive different stimuli from outside; they may also be populated by 
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different mixes of profession or shaped by different historical experiences” 
(Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 24). Thus, a unit charged with dealing 
with family policy is likely to develop a distinctive way of seeing, which 
may (or may not) influence how other parts of the organization see the 
world. At the same time, the organization’s dominant discourse is likely to 
have an impact on the way the unit engaged in family policy translates 
concepts circulating more broadly in its organizational environment.
The ILO can perhaps be considered the first to make family policy an 
object of global governance. Founded in the aftermath of World War I, its 
original mandate was to regulate international labor protection agree-
ments. With the adoption of the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944, the 
ILO secured a position as the main UN forum “for social questions associ-
ated with post-war reconstruction” (Hughes and Haworth 2011, 12). 
The ILO has a history of cooperative competition with the OECD on 
social policy (Leimgruber 2013), and as it became involved in develop-
ment, it engaged in cooperation (and competition) with the Bretton 
Woods institutions in the South. Since the late 1990s, the concept ‘decent 
work’ has been central to its organizational discourse.
The two IOs that have played a key role in the elaboration of the social 
investment and inclusive growth discourses are the OECD and the World 
Bank. The OECD’s mandate has been to promote growth through trade 
and investment liberalization, facilitate cooperation among its members 
and coordinate the latter’s role in promoting development. Growth has 
remained central to its mandate but its “growth paradigm proved remark-
ably flexible in adapting to changing circumstances, integrating newly 
emerging problems and perspectives without changing its basic tenets” 
(Schmelzer 2016, 14). Although the Economics Department has remained 
guardian of the growth mandate, the Directorate for Employment, Labour 
and Social Affairs (DELSA) elaborated the OECD’s social investment 
approach, which included family policy. DELSA also provides a forum for 
engaging with the ILO including servicing the G20 and it interacts with 
the European Directorate for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.
The World Bank has come to see itself as ‘the’ knowledge organization 
in the field of development (Hammer 2013, 12). Its conception of devel-
opment has changed over time, from an emphasis on physical infrastruc-
ture to poverty alleviation and human capital development under 
McNamara in the 1970s, neoliberal structural adjustment in the 1980s, 
and, in the 1990s, the restoration of the Bank’s ability to ‘see’ and miti-
gate poverty (Vetterlein 2012). From 1996 to 2014, its Washington 
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headquarters was organized into five thematic networks. The Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management network contributed to the elabo-
ration of the Bank’s understanding of social investment, in which the early 
child development group played a key role. While the Bank thus includes 
diverse ways of seeing, nonetheless its Development Economics Vice- 
Presidency (DEC) has been effective in imposing a dominant perspective 
(Hammer 2013, 30).
The last organization is UN Women, formed in 2010 from the merger 
of four pre-existing agencies and units. For our purposes, the two most 
important of the original agencies were the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UN International Research and 
Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), estab-
lished following the First UN Conference on Women. Headquartered in 
New York, UNIFEM had a network of regional offices through which it 
provided support to women’s organizations as advocates and assisted gov-
ernments in implementing their international commitments to gender 
equality.2 Headquartered in Santo Domingo, INSTRAW focused on gen-
der research, training and capacity building. Prior to the formation of UN 
Women, both organizations had been involved in research and activities 
around gender and migration. Along with the ILO and the UN Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), UN Women is playing an 
important role in bringing the concept of the care economy into global 
discourse.
FAmIly PolIcy: From SocIAl conSumPtIon 
to SocIAl InveStment
This section covers the period from the Keynesian-welfare and develop-
mental state forms to the rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s. 
Neoliberalism has not been without its own contested failures, however. 
Both the ILO and UNICEF pushed back against the Washington 
Consensus, opening the way for the World Bank’s adoption of a social 
investment discourse. Through the series of conferences culminating in 
the Fourth UN Conference on Women (Beijing) and the World Summit 
for Social Development in 1995, the UN remained an important site for 
contesting neoliberalism. In particular, the Beijing Platform of Action 
2 https://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/gm_facts/Unifem.pdf. Accessed February 
25, 2020.
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established the foundation for the gender equality norm while the World 
Summit sparked the formation of the ILO’s ‘decent work’ discourse 
(Hughes and Haworth 2011, 73). Opposition to neoliberalism in the 
OECD came from units like DELSA and certain member states, as well as 
through its engagement with European intellectuals who played a central 
role in forging the Northern variant of the social investment discourse.
In the post-war period, the ILO acted as a global promoter of workers’ 
social and industrial rights. In the 1950s and 1960, it adopted a series of 
social security conventions to protect the male breadwinner and his depen-
dent family3 against the adverse impact of sickness, invalidity, unemploy-
ment or old age. This did not mean that it ignored working women. A 
series of conventions and recommendations targeting the working mother 
would help it to flesh out—and then to modify—its family policy. ILO 
Convention 003 (1919) on Maternity Protection sought to protect mar-
ried and unmarried mothers from exposure to dangerous work during 
pregnancy. It also recommended women not work for at least six weeks 
following confinement, during which they should be provided with a sti-
pend sufficient for the ‘full and healthy maintenance’ of herself and her 
child. This convention (Number 103) was revised at the 1952 meeting of 
the International Labour Conference to include all mothers “irrespective 
of age, nationality, race or creed” including those performing paid domes-
tic work. The convention was revised again in 2000 (Number 183). Like 
its predecessors, Convention 183 included provision for maternity leave 
(now 14 weeks), employment protection, cash and medical benefits, pro-
tection from work harmful to mother or child, and established the right to 
paid time for breastfeeding during working hours. A key addition appeared 
in the accompanying Recommendation Number 191—that the employed 
mother or father be entitled to parental leave following the expiry of 
maternity leave.
In 1965, the ILO had passed Recommendation 123 that focused on 
the problems women face in reconciling their dual family and work respon-
sibilities. While these problems could be addressed by measures affecting 
all workers (e.g. the reduction of the normal working day), the ILO also 
encouraged member states to facilitate the development of services, like 
3 A number of these conventions explicitly referred to the male breadwinner. See for exam-
ple Convention Number 102 Social Security (Minimum Standards) passed in 1952. https://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_
INSTRUMENT_ID:312247. Accessed February 25, 2020.
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childcare and home helps. In the wake of the first two UN Conferences for 
Women, the ILO passed Convention 156 (Equal Opportunity and Equal 
Treatment of Men and Women Workers with Family Responsibilities) and 
its associated Recommendation 165 which build on the earlier founda-
tions, including Article 5, reiterating working families’ need for supportive 
services like childcare. Recommendation 165 made it clear that the grow-
ing army of precarious workers also needed such supports and included 
the infrastructural supports so important for easing women’s burdens in 
the barrios and rural areas of the South, such as access to transport, clean 
water and energy.
Thus, the ILO’s conception of the family and the kind of supports it 
needs evolved in response to changed material circumstances (most nota-
bly women’s rising labor force participation) and the emergence of wom-
en’s equality as a global norm. In addition to recognition of the adult 
earner family, the ILO, with its mandate centered on the world of work, 
was becoming aware of the need to extend these protections to the 
expanding informal economies of the South and of ‘non-standard work’ in 
the North. Accordingly, under Somavía’s directorship, the ILO began to 
elaborate a new organizational discourse, centered on the concept of 
‘decent work’. The latter is comprised of four pillars: job creation, rights 
at work, social protection and social dialogue “with gender equality as a 
cross-cutting objective”.4 Following the 2008 crisis, ‘decent work’ would 
begin to be filtered into the discourses of other IOs, as it addressed a blind 
spot in the latter’s social investment discourse: investment in human capi-
tal would mean little if not complemented by change on the demand side 
(i.e. good jobs).
The OECD began to reflect on changing family forms through the 
efforts of its Working Party 6 (WP6) on the Role of Women in the 
Economy (Mahon 2015). While WP6 and its research on these issues were 
disbanded in 1998, DELSA took on the task of elaborating the founda-
tions of a new organizational discourse based on an ‘after-Keynesian’ jus-
tification for social, including family, policies: the ‘active society’. In 
contrast to both the Keynesian emphasis on sustaining consumption 
against the risks faced by the male breadwinner and the conservative dis-
course focused on the need to discipline an ‘underclass’ grown dependent 
on social assistance, the active society sought to enable those currently at 
4 https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. 
Accessed February 25, 2020.
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the margins, including lone mothers, to participate in the labor market 
and society by investing in their human capital.
Building on this foundation, New Orientations for Social Policy (1994) 
called for a shift from income maintenance to social policies designed to 
promote labor market participation. At the same time, it heralded the 
appearance of the adult worker family. A Caring World, prepared for the 
1998 social policy ministers’ meeting, focused on the adult worker family 
as a key support for flexible labor markets and efforts to reform social 
insurance systems geared to the male breadwinner family. States thus 
needed to facilitate work-family reconciliation via public investment in 
childcare and family leave policies. Seeing as such ‘family-friendly’ policy 
was a new project for DELSA, it launched a major thematic review, Babies 
and Bosses (2001–2007), which would lead to the institutionalization of 
this new organizational discourse within DELSA and the OECD. While 
activating lone parents and reforming continental social insurance systems 
remained part of this agenda, Babies and Bosses also came to emphasize 
support for the adult earner family through quality childcare, shared 
parental leave and more flexible work arrangements. While elements of the 
OECD’s inclusive growth discourse would later be added to this concep-
tion of social investment, they can be seen more as a process of layering 
onto, rather than divergence from, the core assumptions.
In some respects, the World Bank’s embrace of social investment could 
be viewed as a rediscovery, as the Bank had earlier recognized the impor-
tance of human capital development under McNamara’s presidency 
(1968–1980). Largely forgotten following the Bank’s embrace of struc-
tural adjustment programs, UNICEF’s pushback against the latter in the 
form of ‘adjustment with a human face’ opened space for the survivors of 
the McNamara era within the Bank to again push for investment in human 
capital, with a focus on the poor Southern child. This child-centered ver-
sion of the discourse began to be institutionalized with the creation of the 
post of Child Development Specialist in the then-Human Development 
Network. Its first occupant, Mary Eming Young, commissioned numer-
ous studies of the issue and convened three international conferences 
(1996, 2000 and 2005) on Early Childhood Development (ECD). In the 
name of ECD, the Bank also became a leading proponent of conditional 
cash transfers (CCTs), which typically target mothers in poor families who 
are offered cash benefits in exchange for ensuring that their children get 
health checks and stay in school.
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Thus, the Bank’s version of the social investment discourse held to the 
neoliberal thrust of the original Washington Consensus, while conceding 
a role for the ‘right kind’ of social policy. There the Bank took a narrower 
view than the OECD, focusing on very poor children to break the inter-
generational cycle of poverty. Although it was prepared to offer financial 
support for narrowly targeted investments in young children’s education, 
health and nutrition, local governments were expected to free up revenue 
for this by disinvesting social programs seen to benefit those employed in 
the (shrinking) formal economy. In clear contrast to the ILO and the 
OECD, women appeared not as workers but as human capital in the mak-
ing (girls), or as mothers. Traditional maternal practices were blamed for 
children’s malnutrition (Psacharopoulos 1995, 31), and poor families 
were generally faulted for failing to provide sufficient cognitive stimulation.
This apparent split within the family policy field between a gender- 
responsive social investment approach, focused on adult earner families in 
the North, and a blend of neoliberalism with traditional views of the fam-
ily, focused on poor children in the South, can be somewhat misleading, 
however. To be sure, early childhood education and care have been incor-
porated into policy agendas in Latin America, framed in part by the World 
Bank’s discourse but the ILO and UNIFEM were also active in carrying 
their organizational discourses to the South (Blofield and Martinez- 
Franzoni 2015, 28).5 Thus, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the ILO 
has had an impact on maternity leave policies in the region (Blofield and 
Martinez-Franzoni, 2015). UNIFEM used its connections with national 
women’s machineries and women’s organizations to support dissemina-
tion of the UN’s gender equality norm (Phillips and Cole 2009, 191). 
The UNFPA and the German aid agency brought together Latin American 
feminist scholars to produce an important volume on the tension between 
changing family norms and policy practices (Mora et al. 2006) while the 
UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) has disseminated ideas more in tune with the OECD’s discourse 
than the World Bank’s (Mahon 2018).
5 They do not identify the Bank as the key IO here but their description of the dominant 
frame—early development of the human capital of poor children—is more consistent with 
the Bank’s discourse than that of the OECD or the ILO.
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IncluSIve Growth And the cAre economy: 
ImPlIcAtIonS For FAmIly PolIcy dIScourSeS
The 2007 food crisis and the 2008 financial crisis opened a new contested 
failure of neoliberal orthodoxies. While absolute poverty (in the South) 
remained of concern, a series of studies by the leading IOs—World Bank 
(2006), ILO (2008) and OECD (2008, 2011)—lent credence to the 
arguments of critical social movements that the top one percent were cap-
turing the lion’s share of growth dividends. The (re)discovery of inequal-
ity, in turn, helped to get other IOs to incorporate the ILO’s ‘decent 
work’ agenda and created room for dissemination of the idea of inclusive 
growth. At the same time, while feminists brought the concept of wom-
en’s unpaid domestic labor to the fore, the Stiglitz, Fitoussi and Sen 
(2009) report gave it added prominence by calling for a broadening of 
income measures to include unpaid care work. The OECD and the World 
Bank reports on gender equality (2012) also acknowledged women’s 
unpaid domestic labor. These developments paved the way for the global 
adoption of the three Rs—recognize, reward and redistribute unpaid 
domestic labor—which would subsequently be brought together with the 
idea of decent work in the broader concept of the care economy. All of 
these discursive developments held implications for thinking about fam-
ily policy.
These institutional and discursive changes in the environment are 
reflected in the IOs’ organizational discourses. All three IOs have embraced 
inclusive growth, along with elements of the ILO’s decent work discourse. 
All three have come to recognize the importance of women’s unequal 
share of unpaid domestic work. At the same time, each translates these 
into terms that modify its pre-existing organizational discourse.
The crisis provided an opening for the ILO to get other IOs to recog-
nize that informality and precarious work were making it more difficult for 
families to earn sufficient incomes. Prior to the crisis, the ILO had also 
begun to elaborate an additional strategy—a global social protection 
floor6—to address this. More specifically, the floor meant national com-
mitments to address important family needs: essential health care, includ-
ing maternity care, that meets the criteria of availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality; basic income security for all children, including 




access to nutrition, education, care and any other necessary goods and 
services; income security for active age adults unable to earn adequate 
incomes due to maternity, illness, unemployment or disability; and basic 
income security for older persons. If implemented, the floors would help 
families currently excluded from social insurance schemes by informality 
or precarity to provide for their needs across the life cycle.
Elsewhere I have described the broader changes to the OECD’s domi-
nant organizational discourse (Mahon 2019). A key change was the adop-
tion of the New Approaches to Economic Challenges (NAEC), which 
posed a direct challenge to the orthodox ideas of the hitherto dominant 
Economic Department. NAEC’s inclusive growth can be seen as enhanc-
ing the centrality of DELSA’s organizational discourse within the OECD 
as a whole, as social investment remains central to the NAEC’s concep-
tion: “a reorientation away from a risk-only approach to welfare provision, 
towards a life-long enabling platform that furnishes individuals with capac-
ity enhancing assets in the form of human and social capital, good health 
and active support in labour markets…that builds on strong foundations 
for learning and adaptation for life and through life” (OECD 2017a, 5).
This does not mean that the OECD failed to incorporate new ideas into 
its organizational discourse. Inequality has received considerable attention 
since the publication of Growing Unequal, and this concern has been insti-
tutionalized through the creation of the OECD’s Centre for Equality and 
Opportunity. At the same time, the latter’s work reflects the OECD’s con-
tinued commitment to the adult earner family. For instance, Under 
Pressure: The Squeezed Middle Class (2018a) reiterates the lessons learned 
through Babies and Bosses. It calls for measures to promote women’s full- 
time employment, noting that in contrast to dual-income families, one 
and a half earner families make up a growing share of lower-middle-income 
families.
The OECD’s conception of the gender-equal family now includes rec-
ognition of women’s unpaid labor. The OECD has also taken on elements 
of the ILO’s decent work agenda, most notably through its renewed Jobs 
Strategy, Good Jobs for All in a Changing World of Work (2018b). This shift 
is also reflected in its ongoing studies of child policy (OECD 2015, 2016). 
While continuing to stress encouraging parental employment (preferably 
full-time) through the provision of appropriate supports (paid leave, qual-
ity childcare), measures to support “the creation of stable, high quality 
jobs that are both sufficient and accessible to the lower-skilled parents” 
have been added onto this (Thévenon and Manfredi 2018, 11). In other 
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words, it is not sufficient to enable adult family members to work; they 
also need to be able to find and secure good jobs.
While the family discourse that built on the Babies and Bosses founda-
tion focused on families with children, the OECD has come to recognize 
that eldercare is also an important issue that families, especially women, 
have to deal with. Here again, socio-economic and gender inequality are 
of concern. Thus, the background documents prepared for its high-level 
conference on policies for equal aging noted that countries with higher 
levels of social protection for long-term care had lower rates of informal 
care and thus less gender inequality (2018c). The main message, however, 
remained the importance of supporting the adult earner family: “While 
many countries need to improve long-term care supports and continue 
pension reforms to make retirement income systems financially and socially 
sustainable, policy efforts to limit old-age inequalities cannot rely only on 
measures targeted to older people. It is more efficient to address socio- 
economic inequalities when they arise rather than remedy their conse-
quences, including gender inequalities, which tend to widen with old age” 
(OECD 2018c, 6).7
The changing environment was also reflected in the Bank’s discourse 
and the Bank, in turn, contributed to those changes. The Growth 
Commission (2006–2008) played a role both in the adoption—and the 
wider dissemination—of inclusive growth. The Commission’s report dif-
fered, however, in important ways from the way the Bank came to trans-
late inclusive growth. For instance, while the adoption of inclusive growth 
meant for the Bank the addition of ‘shared prosperity’ defined as improv-
ing the incomes of the bottom 40 percent, the Commission had also pro-
posed dealing with those at the top by sharing the wealth through the tax 
system (Commission 2008, 62). Although both versions emphasized 
investment in human capital, the Commission noted that such investment 
would not bear fruit without complementary development of the demand 
for quality labor (Commission 2008, 37).
More specifically, the Bank’s conception of inclusive growth continued 
the earlier focus on investment in human capital, with a particular empha-
sis on the early years. One whole chapter of The Changing Nature of Work 
focuses on lifelong learning, in which early child development is assigned 
a foundational role: “The most effective way to acquire the skills demanded 
by the changing nature of work is to start early. Early investment in 
7 See also Preventing Ageing Unequally (2017).
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nutrition, health, social protection, and education lay strong foundations 
for the future acquisition of cognitive and socio-behavioral skills. They 
also make future skills acquisition more resilient to uncertainty. Early 
childhood investments are an important way to improve equality of oppor-
tunity” (World Bank 2019, 73). Early child development programs con-
tinue to be given pride of place in the report’s ‘new social contract’.
Like the OECD, the Bank has had to deal with the issue of demand for 
labor. Its 2013 World Development Report, Jobs, discussed the ILO’s 
concept of “decent work” (World Bank 2013, 15–17). However, while it 
agreed that those in the informal sector needed a voice, it did not see col-
lective bargaining as the way to achieve this and cautioned against too 
stringent labor market regulations. Its later report, The World of Work, 
however, nods in the direction of the ILO’s social protection floor where 
it appears under the rubric of ‘progressive universalism’ (2019, 106). 
Progressive universalism would involve extending coverage to all in the 
form of a basic level of social assistance, to be complemented by basic 
social insurance covering ‘contingencies’ like maternity. A somewhat more 
generous social insurance system would be mandated for formal sector 
workers, supplemented by a ‘nudged’ or third-tier voluntary system.
Women also feature as more than just mothers and girls in the Bank’s 
inclusive growth discourse. The Bank’s 2012 World Development Report, 
Gender Equality and Development, portrayed investment in gender equal-
ity as ‘smart economics’. The Bank’s 2016–2023 Gender strategy, Gender 
Equality, Poverty Reduction and Inclusive Growth, reiterated the 2012 
report’s arguments for investing in women and girls as smart development 
policy: “increased women’s labor force participation and earnings are 
associated with reducing poverty and faster growth; income, employment 
and assets empower women, which benefits men, children and society as a 
whole” (World Bank 2016, 12). Now programs like center-based child-
care are presented as a ‘double win’, helping increase girls and women’s 
engagement in education and productive activities while promoting early 
development and lifelong learning for young children (World Bank 2016, 
38). Women’s unequal share of unpaid domestic work is also recognized 
and warrants redistribution by including men and boys and through the 
provision of care services, including eldercare. The 2019 World 
Development Report recognizes that women’s informal caregiving inter-
feres with their engagement in the labor market and goes on to note that 
“Effective social care entails reimagining a role for the state in reducing 
involuntary unemployment by providing services in several areas. These 
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include childcare, disability and old-age care, psychological support for 
the long-term unemployed, support for social kitchens, and rehabilita-
tion…” (World Bank 2019, 126).
This raises the broader question of the ‘care economy’, a concept which 
the ILO and UN Women have helped to put on the agenda. As Ilkkaracan 
notes, the care economy “entails the production and consumption of 
goods and services necessary for the physical, social, mental and emotional 
well-being of care-dependent groups, such as children, the elderly, the ill 
and people with disabilities, as well as healthy, prime working age adults” 
(2018, 8). UNRISD’s pioneering study, the Political and Social Economy 
of Care (2006–09), can be credited for going beyond the ‘care crisis’ in 
the North to show that care is also an issue for the South. Much of that 
care continues to be carried out in the home as unpaid labor by family 
members or the low-paid labor of domestic workers. Its conclusions pre-
saged the 3Rs, arguing for (1) recognition and guaranteed rights of care-
givers and receivers; (2) distribution of the costs more evenly across 
society; (3) the support of professional, decently paid and compassionate 
forms of care (UNRISD 2016). Investing in the development of quality 
care services provided by workers who receive fair wages can offer both 
direct supports to families and generate a substantial number of new 
‘decent’ jobs if, as the ILO argues, the high road to the care economy is 
taken. To this the ILO would add voice (or representation) for care work-
ers, care recipients and unpaid caregivers (ILO 2018, xliii). Moreover, as 
the ILO report, Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work, 
notes, such jobs are not likely to be replaced by robots given the relational 
nature of care work (ILO 2018, xxvii). In other words, the care economy 
holds the potential for generating decent work while providing families 
with the supports they need.
In the WDR 2019 report, the Bank seems to recognize this potential, 
but in other documents, it is clearly looking to the market to create these 
jobs. Thus, its gender strategy notes, “Governments can establish sup-
portive business practices to foster the development of care services and 
intervene to encourage greater involvement of fathers in childcare and 
men in care for sick and elderly dependents. The private sector can invest 
in care services for better business outcomes and promote approaches that 
help workers of both sexes balance their work and family responsibilities” 
(2016, 44). Through the International Finance Corporation, the Bank has 




The very labor-intensive character of much of care work, however, 
means that it is difficult to combine private, for-profit provision with 
decent work and decent care. The ‘gold standard’ is most closely approxi-
mated in the Nordic countries, where such services are typically both pub-
licly financed and publicly provided (Esping-Andersen 1999). To be sure, 
not all states currently possess the capacity to provide quality care with 
decent working conditions nor are they likely to do so in the near future. 
Nevertheless “if NGOs, social enterprises or businesses are to act as the 
primary institutional framework for social provisioning, the infrastructure 
still needs to be financed by the state” (Ilkkaracan 2018, 38). To this 
might be added the need for “fiscal space which would mean abandoning 
austerity-oriented macro-economic policies and investing in human capa-
bilities while relieving women of unpaid work in the family and generating 
(decent) employment” (UN Women 2019, chapter 5).
concluSIonS
This chapter has traced shifts in global social policy discourses directed at 
families, from the ILO’s post-war conventions that supported the devel-
opment of social security for the male breadwinner family through to the 
current family as it appears in the inclusive growth and care economy dis-
courses. The original split in the global family policy environment reflected 
the post-war division between the North and the South. The crises of the 
Keynesian-welfare and developmental state forms opened the way for neo-
liberalism. Although neoliberalism may have become dominant, it was 
challenged and subject to change. The OECD developed a concept of 
social policy focused on investing in the adult earner family. In response to 
UNICEF’s arguments and inspired by US research on policies to help 
poor families, the World Bank, in turn, rediscovered poverty and invest-
ment in human capital, especially that of the child, as a solution in 
the 1990s.
The ILO and UNRISD began to challenge these two variants of social 
investment as the new millennium dawned. The ILO’s concept of decent 
work highlighted an important lacuna: investment in developing human 
capital requires an environment favorable to the creation of good jobs, yet 
labor and commodity market deregulation were generating the opposite. 
The ILO’s idea of a global social protection floor addressed another aspect 
of the same phenomenon—the growth of non-standard and informal 
economy jobs excluded a growing number of families from traditional 
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social protections. In the meantime, feminists were pushing for the recog-
nition of women’s unpaid domestic labor. At the same time, research 
within the key IOs was beginning to document the growth of inequality 
within as well as between countries. The food crisis of 2007 and the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 opened the way for these ideas to be incorporated in the 
discourses of the OECD and the World Bank and to do so in ways that 
blurred the old North-South division. The seeds of a conception of a care 
economy, an idea that calls for a more radical rethinking of how to support 
families, were planted by UNRISD and the ILO and UN Women have 
become its champions
There are a few important issues that this chapter has not been able to 
deal with. First, while the nuclear, adult earner family may be the new 
norm, it is by no means the only form. In some parts of the world, the 
extended family remains important (UN Women 2019, chapter 2). This is 
important to bear in mind, especially given the increase in transnational 
families and the transnational care chains to which these have given rise, as 
mothers and/or fathers migrate to secure family livelihoods, leaving chil-
dren in the care of others, often other family members. IOs like the 
OECD, the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) have grasped aspects of these care chains, albeit in a fragmented 
manner (Mahon, 2020). With its focus on decent work and the care econ-
omy, the ILO has done better and UN Women’s (2019) most recent 
report devotes a whole chapter to families on the move. The chapter has 
also neglected the heteronormative assumptions that often lie at the heart 
of global family policy discourses. In this context, it is worth noting the 
2018 OECD Ministerial Policy Statement, Social Policy for Shared 
Prosperity, which recognized “the continued challenges faced by histori-
cally disadvantaged groups in our countries, including racial and ethnic 
minorities; indigenous communities; migrants, refugees, and other dis-
placed persons; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) 
people; older persons; and people with disabilities” (OECD 2018d, 3).
A second set of issues has to deal with the resources needed to realize 
the promises of ‘inclusive growth’ and the care economy. Clearly, this 
involves challenging the austerity policies adopted by many countries, 
often with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. It would also 
involve dealing with the issue of tax avoidance, especially by large corpora-
tions like Amazon and Google as well as the very wealthy. In this respect, 
the OECD/G20 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS), 
 R. MAHON
203
which has garnered official support from over 125 countries, is potentially 
important.8
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CHAPTER 9
Disability as a ‘New’ Global Social Theme: 
The Role of International Organizations 
in an Expanding Global Policy Field
Johannes Schuster and Nina Kolleck
IntroductIon
Disability as a global social policy issue has gained increasing importance 
during recent decades. Largely responsible for this development has been 
a shift in the general conceptualization of disability—from a medical per-
spective that views disability as a person’s limitations to the perception of 
disability as limitations imposed by society. After many years of struggle 
for recognition, the adoption in 2006 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) by the United Nations (UN) repre-
sented a seminal step in establishing disability as a human rights issue. Due 
to this new acknowledgment of disability as a global social policy issue, a 
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global organizational field1 with a variety of different international actors 
has emerged around the topic, with strong involvement by International 
Organizations (IOs).
Today, global policy is no longer made by nation states alone but 
includes a heterogeneous set of different public and private stakeholders, 
such as IOs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Jakobi 2009). 
The concept of global governance underlines the influence of non-state 
actors in the interplay with state actors in relation to a specific policy 
(Rosenau 1995; Zürn 2018). Moreover, the diverse actors of an organiza-
tional field are interdependent, which means that they build networks to 
form alliances and disseminate information in order to strengthen their 
positions (Adam and Kriesi 2007). IOs often have a particular mandate 
that allows them to act in a frame predefined by their member states. 
However, public administration scholars have agreed that IOs and their 
administrations exert additional political influence by shaping discourses 
and setting agendas for specific topics (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 
Bauer et al. 2017). This means that the traditional principal-agent model—
with leading nation states as principals creating international regimes as 
their agents that work on predefined problems—is outdated in some fields 
of social policy, making it particularly interesting to investigate the 
role of IOs.
An investigation of the population of IOs in a specific social policy field 
needs to consider two approaches: the organizational environment and 
the intrinsic features (Abbott et  al. 2016). Whereas the organizational 
environment encompasses the general characteristics of a policy field (i.e., 
the beliefs and norms) as well as the involved actors and their relationships 
(i.e., the social networks), the intrinsic features relate to the inherent char-
acteristics of organizations (such as membership rules and thematic orien-
tation) and the way these define an organization’s scope of action 
(Niemann et al. in this volume). As there is still only limited knowledge 
about the population of IOs in disability policy, the aim of this chapter is 
to introduce disability as a global social policy theme and to identify 
important actors, with a particular focus on IOs.2 First, we give an  overview 
1 We refer to the concept of organizational field as ‘the aggregate of actors’ of a policy field, 
which further includes the rules and belief systems, as well as the relational networks that 
arise in the broader societal context (see Niemann et al. in this volume).
2 Most studies on the topic of global disability policy and the CRPD, which will also be 
discussed in this chapter, either focus on the historical development or describe the content 
and status quo of the CRPD (e.g., Della Fina et  al. 2017; Arnardóttir and Quinn 2009; 
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of the policy field and its development from a global perspective and 
present the main IOs in terms of their involvement in disability policy. In 
order to approach a mapping of the organizational field of global disability 
policy, we identify the most central actors and their connections based on 
Twitter data. We then present the main topics discussed in the field, fol-
lowed by a short conclusion of the chapter.
Background of (gloBal) dIsaBIlIty PolIcy dIscourse 
and Involvement of Ios
In general, disability policy is a comparably novel topic of social policy. 
Before the twentieth century, persons with disabilities were mostly hidden 
from society, and it took governments until the end of the Second World 
War to explicitly address the needs and rights of disabled persons through 
policies. According to Drake (1999, 36–41), domestic disability policies 
can be evaluated along a spectrum from policymaking that denies disabil-
ity rights, to an approach that seeks to identify individual disadvantages in 
order to provide necessary services for adjustment, to a social approach 
where disabled people are accorded the rights to participate in society as 
equal citizens. For a better understanding of disability in both national 
and global context, two main concepts can be distinguished: the medical 
model3 and the social model of disability (Kayess and French 2008; Harpur 
2012). In this section, the two models are explained and related to IOs, 
thereby partly describing the intrinsic features of these IOs. Subsequently, 
an additional model—the economic model—is presented and the role of 
regional organizations is briefly discussed.
The Medical Model and WHO
The medical model of disability conceives of disability as “a personal 
tragedy” and focuses on the “affliction caused by the particular condition 
or impairment and the provision of cure, treatment, care and protection to 
change the person so that they may be assimilated to the social norm” 
(Kayess and French 2008, 5). Thus, in this model the limitations are 
Kayess and French 2008) and disability policy (e.g., Barnes and Mercer 2004; Oliver 1996), 
but lack more detailed information about actors and processes in global disability governance.
3 Other scholars, such as Oliver (1996) or Priestley (1998), refer to the medical model as 
the “individual model”, but describe the same concept.
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caused by the impairment itself, neglecting the role of the social environ-
ment and the barriers it builds. In social policymaking, this conception has 
led to disability policies that categorized persons with disabilities accord-
ing to their disadvantages and that urged them to adjust according to their 
unique and individual needs, for example, the Chronically Sick and 
Disabled Person’s Act (1970) and the Disability Discrimination Act 
(1995) in the UK (Priestley 2000) or the Rehabilitation Act (1973) in the 
USA (Barnes 2011). This model enhanced welfare policies to support the 
disabled individuals in their adjustment, such as accommodating them in 
separate houses or providing financial support and care (Priestley 2000). 
Inherent in such an approach is an increased expenditure on health care 
and research (Jeon and Haider-Markel 2001). These attempts created a 
whole new professional system of welfare that aimed to rehabilitate per-
sons with disabilities. This, in turn, exempted persons with disabilities 
from (labor-related) duties and established and institutionalized a climate 
of societal segregation (Drake 1999).
The one IO that is closely intertwined with the medical model is the 
World Health Organization (WHO). In order to establish universal defini-
tions for different forms of disability and impairment, WHO published the 
International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps 
(ICIDH) in 1980. The document was divided into three categories, 
impairments, disabilities, and handicaps, with concise definitions for each 
(WHO 1980, 27–29). The classification system was used for the assign-
ment and provision of services and benefits. This focus of WHO on the 
medical model lasted until the beginning of the twenty-first century. The 
organization then replaced the ICIDH with its International Classification 
of Functioning Disability and Health (ICF) and thereby adopted—at least 
to some extent—the social model (Barnes 2011). Other activities of WHO 
include the community-based rehabilitation guidelines—published in 
close cooperation with other inter-governmental and non-governmental 
actors (e.g., the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNESCO, or 
the International Disability and Development Consortium (IDDC))—
which mainly cover the provision of medical support (Lang et al. 2011), 
or the World Report on Disability, published together with the World 
Bank, which provides a comprehensive outline of the status quo around 
persons with disabilities and provides suggestions for all sorts of different 
stakeholders (WHO 2011).
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The Social Model and the UN
In contrast to the individual model, the social model of disability states 
that “contingent social conditions rather than inherent biological limita-
tions constrain individuals’ abilities and create a disability category” (Stein 
2007, 85). This concept—which was promoted by a growing disability 
rights movement that started to emerge in the 1960s, particularly in the 
US and the UK—shifts the focus from the impairment itself to the society 
as the cause of barriers (Kayess and French 2008). The movement was 
substantially led by the British disability rights network known as the 
Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation, which rejected more 
mainstream ideas in order to enforce the acknowledgment of the social 
model (Shakespeare 2010). This sociopolitical or rights-based approach to 
disability policymaking implied that the adjustment of the physical envi-
ronments of disabled persons to their needs was what was necessary, rather 
than a “medical repair” of the concerned persons themselves (Jeon and 
Haider-Markel 2001, 216).
In tracing the development of the disability rights movement and thus 
the emergence and acceptance of the social model, we can see that they are 
closely interlinked with the UN (Degener and Begg 2017; Stein 2007). 
The first non-binding declarations, such as the Declaration on the Rights 
of Mentally Retarded Persons in 1971 and the Declaration on the Rights 
of Disabled Persons in 1975, still tended to emphasize individuals’ medi-
cal needs. In contrast, by declaring the year 1981 the official International 
Year of Disabled Persons—which was succeeded by the International 
Decade of Disabled Persons (from 1983 to 1992)—the UN gave particu-
lar attention to the rights and interests of persons with disabilities (Stein 
2007). A seminal step was then made with the adoption of the Standard 
Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities in 
1993, which although only “soft law and legally unenforceable” (Stein 
2007, 89) nevertheless represented an initial UN instrument that exhorted 
member states “to ensure the equalization of opportunities for disabled 
persons” (Stein 2007, 89). Until today, the Standard Rules are conceived 
as a leading watershed in the development of global disability rights. 
Finally, at the beginning of the new millennium, disability rights succes-
sively became a human rights issue worthy of their own convention, hav-
ing been promoted by individual states (such as Mexico and New Zealand) 
as well as scientific studies which looked at the neglect of disabled persons 
in the core human rights conventions beyond the medical perspective. 
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The convention itself was discussed and drafted by an Ad Hoc Committee 
which was established in December 2001 and included significant involve-
ment by civil society organizations. After a process of eight sessions, the 
final document was adopted in December 2006 and came into force in 
May 2007 (Degener and Begg 2017).
Today, the UN is the driving force in global disability policy. The imple-
mentation of the Convention is monitored by the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is located at the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. Signatories are obliged 
to submit reports on the progress of the implementation of the CRPD 
every four years. The Committee then evaluates the reports and returns 
general observations, including recommendations for further implemen-
tation. Moreover, the main tasks of the Committee comprise the prepara-
tion of General Comments on specific issues of the Convention as well as 
the examination of individual complaints (Uerpmann-Wittzack 2018). It 
should be noted that as well as the Committee’s other tasks, the develop-
ment of the reports is exercised in close consultation with different non- 
state actors, foremost disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs).
Besides the Committee and its administration, the main focal point of 
the CRPD and disability rights at the UN is the CRPD secretariat, which 
is located at the UN headquarters in New York. The secretariat falls within 
the Division for Inclusive Social Development (DISD) of the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). The secretariat 
is established to promote the international normative framework on dis-
ability, to support other inter-governmental bodies concerning disability 
rights issues and to service the annual Conference of States Parties (COSP) 
(UN Enable 2020). The COSP represents—for human rights treaties in 
particular—an innovative mandate and provides a forum for constant 
exchange and discussion between member states, IOs, and civil society 
organizations (de Búrca et al. 2013).
However, the promotion of disability rights in the UN is not limited to 
the main bodies, but also brings together other UN divisions and special-
ized agencies, such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the 
World Bank. UNESCO is an official supporter of the CRPD and has 
adopted an action plan including “research and evidence-based data col-
lection, development of policies and strategies on inclusion of persons 
with disabilities, building an enabling environment and raising awareness, 
development of appropriate tools for instruction and capacity building” 
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(UNESCO 2020). In doing so, UNESCO places a strong emphasis on 
the promotion of inclusive information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), as can be seen from the publication of model policies for inclusive 
ICTs to support UNESCO member states in the implementation of spe-
cific issues concerning disability policy (Watkins 2014). Whereas the focus 
of UNESCO is linked strongly to the CRPD, UNICEF’s concern with 
disability rights has been an integral part of their work since the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (see also Holzscheiter in this volume). 
Predominantly focusing on the rights of children with disabilities as “one 
of the most marginalized and excluded groups in society” (UNICEF 
2020), UNICEF follows three disability goals. First, it commits itself to 
being “an inclusive organization for all” (UNICEF 2020), stating that the 
organizational staff includes an adequate number of persons with disabili-
ties, but also undertakes efforts to raise awareness on disability issues. 
Second, it aims to “develop leadership on the rights of children with dis-
abilities and build capacity among [its] staff and [its] partners” (UNICEF 
2020). This means engaging in collaborative relationships with other UN 
stakeholders as well as actors from civil society, academia, or the private 
sector. The third goal is to “mainstream disability across all of our policies 
and programs, both in development and humanitarian action” (UNICEF 
2020). UNICEF mostly implements programs in different countries, pre-
dominantly in the Global South, in order to support them in the imple-
mentation of the CRPD.
As one of the leading IOs in the global social policy field, the World 
Bank is also considering disability. Its goal is to “integrate disability into 
development through its analytical work, data and good-practice policies” 
and to include disability-related issues in its operations (World Bank 
2020). Besides the World Report on Disability (WHO 2011) that has been 
published together with WHO to give a comprehensive image of the 
global status quo in disability policy, the World Bank has a focus on the 
inclusion of disability and disabled persons in its own work. As mentioned 
in its Disability Inclusion and Accountability Framework, the guiding prin-
ciples in the World Bank’s disability-inclusive work are based on the CRPD 
and encompass nondiscrimination and equality, accessibility, inclusion and 
participation, as well as partnership and collaboration (McClain-Nhlapo 
et al. 2018). This suggests a rights-based perspective of the organization 
that is in slight contrast to its previous collaboration on this issue 
with WHO.
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The Economic Model
A third dimension of disability policy that can be found in the literature 
has emerged in close relation to the shift from the medical to the social 
model and, therefore, has implications for the understanding and setup of 
the global disability policy field: an economic definition. From this per-
spective, disability is understood as a “health-related inability or a person’s 
functional limitations on the amount or kind of work that disabled people 
can perform”, with associated calls for policy solutions to remove these 
barriers (Jeon and Haider-Markel 2001, 216). Consequently, disability 
policymaking is supposed to aim at an inclusion of persons with disability 
into the labor market in order to have them contribute to the economic 
success of a country. Moving toward the establishment of such inclusive 
environments—even if most of them have not yet been implemented suc-
cessfully—implies a shift from a welfare system for disabled people to a 
‘workfare’ system (Peck 2001). The underlying assumption of this 
approach is that citizens who benefit from the welfare system need to con-
tribute by participating in the labor market—a system of conditionality 
that is increasingly implemented by Western welfare states (Geiger 2017; 
Soldatic and Chapman 2010). The IO that exerts a particular influence on 
the development of such a model is the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). In a collection of country 
reports from 2003, the OECD discusses opportunities to integrate dis-
abled people into society in general as well as ways to secure their income 
by building inclusive structures in the labor market (OECD 2003). 
Another series of books published between 2007 and 2010 called Sickness, 
Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers also examined different country 
case studies according to the inclusiveness of their employment structure 
for persons with disabilities (OECD 2010). A similar agenda is set by the 
ILO, which has continuously extended its instruments in regard to the 
rights of persons with disabilities. The ILO adopted a first recommenda-
tion concerning Vocational Rehabilitation of the Disabled (R099) in 
1955 in order to “meet the employment needs of the individual disabled 
person and to use manpower resources to the best advantage” (ILO 
1955). The recommendation was then renewed in 1983 (R168) and led 
to the technical Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled 
Persons) Convention (C159), which entered into force in 1985.
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Regional Organizations
The global disability policy field not only consists of IOs but also of 
regional organizations. As the first-ever supranational organization to sign 
an international human rights treaty, namely the CRPD, the European 
Union (EU) has a disability strategy that addresses eight priority areas: 
accessibility, participation, equality, employment, education and training, 
social protection, health, and external action (European Commission 
2010). One main objective of the EU is the collection of comprehensive 
information and data on the implementation status of the CRPD in its 
member states. For instance, it has launched the European Agency for 
Special Needs and Inclusive Education, an independent organization that 
provides information about the schooling of persons with special needs in 
the member states. Even broader thematically is the Academic Network of 
European Disability Experts, which offers a database summarizing the 
implementation status of the Convention in regard to the most important 
topics, such as accessibility, education, or employment.
There is significant variation in the ways in which other regional IOs 
address disability rights. Two examples stand out because of their explicit 
strategies and policies. The African Union introduced two African Decades 
of Disabled Persons (2000–2009 and 2010–2019), which led to the 
recent adoption in January 2018 of an additional Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. The main purpose of the Protocol is “to promote, protect and 
ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human and people’s rights by all 
persons with disabilities, and to ensure respect for their inherent dignity” 
(African Union 2018, 5). Similarly, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) adopted the Enabling Masterplan 2025 in November 
2018 to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities. This is con-
ceived as an additional framework in support of the implementation of the 
CRPD in ASEAN member states (ASEAN 2018).
maPPIng the gloBal dIsaBIlIty PolIcy fIeld Based 
on twItter data
As we have already shown in this chapter, the population of IOs in the 
field of disability policy is diverse and contains many different organiza-
tions. Besides these international and supranational actors, the global dis-
ability policy sphere also comprises a variety of NGOs, mostly DPOs, that 
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are engaged in the advocacy of disability rights. During the disability rights 
movements in the late twentieth century, these organizations played a 
crucial role in achieving self-advocacy, using international advocacy net-
works to share ideas and information (Priestley 2007). Moreover, in the 
context of the CRPD, DPOs have had an influential role since the drafting 
process, with significant involvement in the meetings of the Ad Hoc 
Committee (Degener and Begg 2017; Stein and Lord 2009). The close 
interaction between the member states of the Convention with stakehold-
ers from civil society is also explicitly mentioned in Article 32 (United 
Nations 2006) and is further considered in the monitoring process of the 
Committee. Moreover, despite the differences in disability concepts and 
policies, the UN endeavors to establish programs that combine forces for 
the promotion of disability rights outside and inside the organization. For 
instance, the Inter-Agency Support Group for the CRPD was established 
in 2006 in order to integrate disability into the UN system, and the UN 
Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities brings together dif-
ferent stakeholders—including the ILO, UNESCO, or WHO as well as 
civil society organizations, such as the International Disability Alliance or 
the IDDC—to advance disability rights on a global scale.
Consequently, it can be assumed that IOs and DPOs use means of soft 
governance—that is, institutional and discursive resources—to diffuse and 
implement the standards set in the CRPD (see Niemann et al. in this vol-
ume). We argue that in order to do so, they build networks to collectively 
shape discourses around disability rights. This makes an analysis of such 
networks a promising approach to better understand the global disability 
policy field. However, mapping global networks that comprise a diverse 
set of global actors is challenging (Dicken et al. 2001). In order to address 
this challenge and to acknowledge the increasing relevance of new ICTs 
for the exchange of information, we draw on Twitter data.
The social media platform Twitter is used for real-time information and 
discussion and has gained increasing importance in politics over recent 
years (Weller 2014). Different political actors contribute to the platform 
to promote their ideas, for mobilization or organization (Dubois and 
Gaffney 2014; Guo and Saxton 2014; Conover et al. 2012). Users can 
participate in issue-specific discussions by adding a so-called hashtag (‘#’) 
to a word (e.g., #crpd or #disability). Moreover, users can interact with 
other users by mentioning them (i.e., placing the @-symbol in front of a 
username so that the user in question receives a notification), replying to 
them (a mention at the beginning of a tweet), or retweeting them 
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(republishing another user’s tweet). By collecting tweets on a specific 
topic and extracting the interactions made in these tweets, issue-specific 
Twitter networks can be mapped.
For the present analysis, we obtained Twitter data that were published 
during the COSPs to the CRPD in the years 2013 to 2017. To identify 
references to the CRPD and to disability policy, we filtered for specific 
hashtags such as #crpd, #cosp, or #disability. In total, we identified 44,545 
tweets, which led to an overall network consisting of 16,712 accounts (so- 
called nodes) and 38,737 interactions (edges). We used techniques of 
social network analysis (SNA) to map the network and the relations 
between the different actors and to identify central actors (Borgatti et al. 
2013). SNA is particularly suited to exploring the ‘hidden influence’ that 
actors exert in a given organizational field because it shifts the unit of 
analysis from individual attributes of actors to their embeddedness in social 
relations (Jörgens et al. 2016; Kolleck et al. 2017).
In order to present an overall impression of the network, Fig. 9.1 shows 
the network with labels for the 20 most central actors according to eigen-
vector centrality. This measure represents the centrality of a node in rela-
tion to the centrality of the nodes it is directly connected to. It can 
therefore be seen as an indicator of an actor’s popularity in a network 
(Borgatti et al. 2013). The size of the labels is proportional to the eigen-
vector centrality value. The figure indicates that the most central nodes 
belong to the UN, namely the official UN account, the UN entity for the 
empowerment of women, the account of the secretariat of the CRPD 
(UN Enable) and UNICEF. Other UN accounts that appear among the 
top 20 are directly linked to the division and department to which the 
CRPD is assigned (i.e., the Division for Social Policy and Development 
(DSPD)4 in the UNDESA) or represent the official Special Rapporteur on 
the rights of persons with disabilities. In addition, the International 
Disability Alliance and the Ecuadorian president, Lenín Moreno, show 
high centrality values. Other central actors are mostly NGOs and DPOs or 
their representatives, such as the IDDC, Lumos, the European Disability 
Forum (EDF), or Catherine Naughton (EDF Director). The clustering of 
these nodes in the network suggests that they are closely interconnected. 
Aside from that, the lack of other IOs in this list is quite remarkable, even 
though for the most part they are not explicitly concerned with disability 
4 Today, the DSPD is part of the DISD.
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rights (see Section “Background of (Global) Disability Policy Discourse 
and Involvement of IOs”).
Figure 9.2 provides a reduced network containing only the interactions 
between IO-related accounts. In this network, the size of the nodes repre-
sents the eigenvector centrality. As could be observed in the overall net-
work, the most central nodes in the IO-IO interaction network belong to 
the aforementioned UN agencies. According to the graph, one particu-
larly prominent organization is the UN International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), a specialized agency that is established to facilitate global 
Fig. 9.1 The overall twitter network of the COSPs 2013–2017
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connectivity. This is not surprising given that the organization is con-
cerned with ICTs and the analyzed data were created using ICTs. Hence, 
it can be assumed that the ITU has a particular interest in appearing prom-
inently in online social media. Rather remarkable is the position of WHO 
and the OECD. Though among the most influential actors in global dis-
ability policy, they seem to be excluded from the Twitter network. 
However, the extent to which this is due to an actual lack of interaction 
with other relevant actors or rather a general reluctance to engage in social 
media activity cannot be ascertained from this data.
When looking at the IO-NGO interactions (see Fig. 9.3), we find simi-
lar results to the overall network. Aside from UN accounts directly related 
Fig. 9.2 Twitter network of the most central IOs during the COSPs 2013–2017
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to disability rights, the DPOs hold the most central positions in the net-
work (in regard to both the centrality value and the actual position). 
Overall, it can be observed from this analysis of Twitter data that both IOs 
and NGOs use Twitter to exchange information. The most central actors 
in the network are UN agencies directly related to disability policy as well 
as DPOs. This suggests that those actors with an explicit agenda for dis-
ability policy use the available channels—including online platforms—to 
promote disability rights, whereas the topic is less important to others. 
However, it must first be noted that the data was collected in the context 
of a UN event, making it more likely for UN actors to participate, and 
second, that social media platforms are still used to different extents by 
official political actors. For this reason, inferences from these results must 
be made with caution.
Fig. 9.3 Twitter network of central IOs and NGOs
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maIn toPIcs In gloBal dIsaBIlIty PolIcy
The presentation of IOs in the field has already shown that disability is 
often discussed in conjunction with other forms of discrimination and can 
hardly be discussed separately from other social and development policy 
issues. Hence, in the context of disability rights, a specific focus is placed 
on other marginalized groups who need more immediate consideration 
when they also have a form of disability. Most commonly, children (or 
youth) and women (and girls) with disabilities are discussed—often in 
combination—in the global disability discourse as groups prone to multi-
ple marginalization. First of all, women with disabilities (Article 6) and 
children with disabilities (Article 7) are addressed with specific articles in 
the Convention. Moreover, a closer look at the thematic setup of the 
COSPs to the CRPD shows that the specific consideration of children and 
youth (main theme 2012, sub-themes 2014 and 2015) as well as women 
and girls (main theme 2012, sub-themes 2015 and 2018) is important in 
discussions about the implementation of the Convention. Also, the 
General Comment No. 3 by the CPRD Committee pays particular atten-
tion to women and children, stating that they “face barriers in most areas 
of life” (United Nations 2016a, 1). According to the UN, the main dan-
gers for women and children with disabilities are poverty, lack of health 
care, the general degree of social inclusion and participation, and lack of 
employment and equal education (United Nations 2014; United Nations 
2016a). However, it must also be noted that children and women with 
disabilities in the Global North face different challenges to those in the 
Global South and that the focus of politicians and advocates can differ in 
light of this. Being at the intersection of several forms of marginalization 
and discrimination, the topic of children and women with disabilities is 
dealt with in close cooperation between the respective units of the CRPD, 
the CRC and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (Watson 2012; Kayess et al. 2014; see also 
Holzscheiter in this volume).
One of the most controversially discussed topics during the meetings of 
the Ad Hoc Committee to the CRPD was that of education (Biermann 
and Powell 2014; de Beco 2018). The main argument involved the posi-
tion on whether the Convention text should exclusively demand inclusive 
education or whether schooling in separated special schools or classes 
should still be maintained as an option. Although member states are asked 
in the final version in Article 24 to “ensure an inclusive education system 
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at all levels” (United Nations 2006, 16), the schooling of persons with 
disabilities still differs widely across the world. The CRPD Committee has 
emphasized the importance of education as a disability rights issue by pub-
lishing the General Comment No. 4 on inclusive education (United 
Nations 2016b). At the same time, WHO’s ICF is still used to justify 
special education systems. From a medicalized perspective, the classifica-
tion can be useful for the allocation of resources (Schiemer 2017). As is 
the case for children and women with disabilities, education for persons 
with disabilities on a broader, more global level also needs to address dif-
ferent issues depending on the region. In countries of the Global North 
such as Germany, the main argument is between supporters of a traditional 
segregation system with special schools and proponents of a comprehen-
sive, inclusive system. In contrast, countries in the Global South (e.g., 
Nigeria) are still struggling to provide any sort of education for disabled 
children (Biermann 2016). Hence, DPOs emphasize the importance of 
assuring general access of persons with disabilities to the education system, 
first and foremost, though they also support the inclusive approach.
In an increasingly digitalized world, another crucial topic for disability 
policy is technology. As different scholars point out, the provision of assis-
tive and accessible technology is mandatory for the inclusion of people 
with disabilities in policymaking processes. For instance, Trevisan and 
Cogburn (2019) emphasize that official UN conferences lack accessibility 
and thereby exclude disability rights advocates from participation. Only 
the COSPs to the CRPD meet the needs of disabled persons, making it 
difficult to represent persons with disabilities in events that do not explic-
itly address disability policy. Moreover, Alper and Raharinirina (2006) 
have shown through their systematic review that assistive technologies for 
individuals are also still rare. This topic is also taken into account by differ-
ent IOs in the context of disability policy. Just recently, “technology, digi-
talization and ICTs for the empowerment and inclusion of persons with 
disabilities” was announced as a sub-theme for the CRPD COSP 2019, 
making technology a sub-theme at the conference for the third time (after 
2012 and 2016). A UN specialized agency that directly addresses the 
intersection of ICTs and disability—and that appeared prominently in the 
CRPD Twitter network—is the ITU. In order to meet the needs of per-
sons with disabilities in using ICTs, as is required by Article 9 of the 
CRPD, the ITU provides policymakers with reports and guidelines as well 
as trainings and capacity-building programs. This material is published to 
enable member states of the ITU to make their ICTs accessible. Discussing 
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accessible and assistive technology in the context of global disability policy 
is particularly interesting as it represents the part of the field that is most 
profitable for private business actors. Hence, new partnerships between 
public (inter-)governmental actors, civil society and businesses are already 
forming at the global level and can influence future disability policymak-
ing (Goggin and Newell 2007; Stienstra et al. 2007).
conclusIon
The main objective of this chapter was to examine disability as a ‘new’ 
global social policy theme. Both the development of global disability pol-
icy and the involvement of different IOs in that organizational field were 
examined. In order to approach a mapping of the global disability policy 
network and to identify particularly central actors as well as their interac-
tions, social network analysis was used to map the Twitter network sur-
rounding the UN CRPD. Finally, the main discourses of the field were 
identified.
The development of disability policy, both at national and global levels, 
was mainly influenced by a shift from the general conceptualization of dis-
ability as a negative condition of individuals that needed to be reacted to 
with care and welfare in order to assimilate them to the social norm (the 
medical model), toward a perception of disability as barriers and limita-
tions imposed by society that disabled persons have to face (the social 
model). The two main IOs in the field—the UN agencies assigned to the 
CRPD on the one hand and WHO on the other—stand divided by this 
discourse. While the UN tends to promote the right of persons with dis-
abilities to a society and environment without barriers, WHO tends to 
maintain the medicalization of disability. However, since the adoption of 
the CRPD, the UN has undoubtedly been the dominant actor, driven by 
its monitoring system that obliges its member states to regularly disclose 
their disability policy. As Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel (2013) note, this 
rather new mode of governance can best be described as ‘experimentalist 
governance’ (see also Sabel and Zeitlin 2010). Experimentalist gover-
nance is characterized by “a set of practices involving open participation 
by a variety of entities (public or private), lack of formal hierarchy within 
governance arrangements, and extensive deliberation throughout the pro-
cess of decision making and implementation” (de Búrca et al. 2013, 16). 
In an iterative process, it is left to the member states of an international 
treaty to establish ways of incorporating the goals of the treaty into their 
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domestic policy framework and, in return, their performance is regularly 
assessed by IO bodies. This iterative process can create a dynamic of peer 
pressure that often leads to a continuous strengthening of policy targets 
accompanied by a gradually evolving institutionalization and formaliza-
tion of the procedural rules.
This structure offers diverse opportunities for IOs to engage in global 
disability policy. However, as the Convention is still rather new, there is 
currently not much research on the involvement and especially the inter-
play of different actors, such as the UN and WHO. To date, only the 
important role played by civil society organizations and their robust rela-
tionship with the UN bodies have been emphasized by different authors 
(Lord and Stein 2008; Degener and Begg 2017; de Búrca et al. 2013). 
Our empirical mapping of the CRPD Twitter network also suggests that 
the CRPD-related accounts are well connected to other UN agencies and 
to crucial civil society actors, while WHO is rather excluded from these 
discursive networking activities (see also Schuster et al. 2019). It will be 
interesting to see how the organizational field around global disability 
policy will develop in the future and what role WHO will play. Moreover, 
the increasing focus on persons with disabilities as ‘human capital’—with 
the OECD as a driving force behind an economic model—has the poten-
tial to steer global disability policies toward the creation of workfare states. 
In theory, this is in line with the social model and the focus on the right to 
inclusion. Consequently, critics of the social model state that a mere focus 
on the social barriers neglects the bodily impairments, and that this in turn 
can deny the necessity of medicalization (Thomas 2004). Hence, scholars 
have recently made attempts to synthesize the medical and the social 
model in order to take into account “the complete background of an indi-
vidual’s life and living”, including environmental and personal factors 
(Barnes 2011, 66). Adding the economic model, future disability policy—
both at global and national levels—will have to be made within this area of 
tension between the different conceptualizations, thereby leaving space 
for IOs to exert their influence.
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Characterizing Global Health Governance 




Health is commonly considered as one of the most fundamental, but also 
highly challenging needs in individual and societal life. As a policy field, it 
extends and connects to an incredibly broad and complex set of issues 
such as different notions of well-being, different types of illnesses (e.g. 
infectious and non-infectious), different groups of people, the various 
functions and elements of public and private health care systems and 
diverse service providers. Part of these issues extend beyond national 
spheres of social problems or policymaking—most clearly communicable 
diseases do not stop at national borders. Furthermore, migration leads to 
national systems of social and health protection being confronted with 
constantly new categories of people as well as new health challenges; 
health care professionals, pharmaceutical companies and other providers 
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have long crossed national borders in their provision of health care, 
medical goods and insurance plans.
This has led to some conceptual tension, as health care systems (here 
understood as institutions of social protection responsible for the provi-
sion and financing of health care) are established and organized as dis-
tinctly national (or sub-national) institutions. Nevertheless, at transnational 
policy levels there is significant activity on various health care system- 
related issues which entails the emergence and involvement of a high 
number of global policy actors. Better yet, there is a clear trend toward an 
increasing number of global actors, as for example Youde (2015, 130) 
puts it “the global health governance architecture has become far more 
encompassing and wide-ranging in recent years”.
The focus of this chapter is on global actors (population) of and ideas 
(arguments) on health care systems, for the purpose of producing a char-
acterization of the current global health governance architecture in the 
field. This first requires an illustration of global health governance in gen-
eral so as to understand its specific actor set. The positions and constella-
tion of key International Organizations (IOs) are then illustrated by a 
mapping of four central IOs: the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
World Bank, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
The main ideas of these four IOs regarding health care systems are pre-
sented in relation to each other and by taking into account their discourses. 
This is then taken further to characterize the global health governance 
architecture based on contestational and collaborative relationships 
between these IOs. While finalizing this chapter, the world has come 
under threat from a massive global health crisis. Thus, in an additional 
paragraph, this chapter also discusses the preliminary implications of the 
Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic for altering that 
architecture. The concluding section reflects upon the implications of the 
ante- and emerging post-COVID-19 situation for global social gover-
nance in the field of health care systems.
Global HealtH Governance
The population of IOs in the field of health is subject to a very large body 
of literature under the frame of global health governance. For the purpose 
of this book on global social governance, I combine such approaches with 
those of the global social policy and governance literature.
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Global social governance has generally been defined as being comprised 
of a huge number of different actors. Often, the relationship between 
these actors has been characterized by competing organizations, some of 
which claim to be the key and central actors in the game (particularly, 
Deacon 2007; Kaasch and Martens 2015; Kaasch and Stubbs 2014; Yeates 
2008). Apart from other activities, these actors provide social policy pre-
scriptions for different social policy fields, including for health care systems 
(Kaasch 2015). This involves various activities such as the collection, pre-
sentation and interpretation of relevant data, the development of concepts 
and the prescription of ‘appropriate’ social policy measures and instru-
ments to meet social problems. IOs present these ‘products’ as informa-
tion, recommendations, ideal models, reform suggestions and the like. In 
the academic literature, these activities by IOs and their outputs have been 
conceptualized and studied as ideas, discourses or knowledge production 
(see, e.g. Béland and Orenstein 2013; Stone and Maxwell 2005).
Concerning the population of IOs, global health governance literature 
draws a picture of a plurality of different sorts of actors. These include 
public and private actors, collective and individual ones, as well as various 
sorts of actor networks. Given their nature—that of being set up by gov-
ernments, granted with mandates and tasks, and intensely observed and 
covered by worldwide political and media actors—IOs have a very impor-
tant position and role.
In explaining the emergence of global policies in the field of health, 
some characterizations portray global health governance as a response to 
global health challenges, an expression of international cooperation, and 
as such a necessity, given current global (health) problems. Part of the 
argument is that the nature of global health problems and the limitations 
of national health care systems lead to global health governance (e.g. 
Fidler 2010; Smith and Lee 2017). Even though the transnational charac-
ter of these problems may be more than obvious to the researcher, the 
political reality is that there is no consequential referral of competency to 
transnational policy levels. As we can see with reactions to the global threat 
of COVID-19, the measures and responses are strongly national. 
Therefore, the political and legal realities contradict explanations of the 
nature of the problem shaping or causing global social and health gover-
nance architectures: policymaking competence in the health care system is 
at national policy levels with very few and minor exceptions.
Another part of the literature characterizes global health governance 
more qualitatively and often combines this with normative claims on the 
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desired nature of global health governance. This does not contradict other 
assessments which describe global health governance as the concerted 
efforts to privatize health services and global health activities, accompa-
nied by “indirect efforts by the same actors that present bona fide social 
justice and equity-oriented public health approaches” (Birn et al. 2016, 
753). For sure, health markets are an important part of the global econ-
omy in many ways, and the ‘concern’ for public health is also strongly 
shared at a global level, which is reflected in the globally constituted com-
munities raising their voices in the name of social justice in health. The 
notion of ‘the global’ informing this chapter, however, is the interest and 
concern of global actors as regards issues of (national) health care systems. 
This approach does not assume a legal competence in regulating health 
care systems from transnational policy levels; neither does it assume a rel-
evance of global actors in terms of the nature of contemporary health 
issues. What it does is observe and study global actors with a (direct or 
indirect) mandate to ‘speak’ on health care systems. This implies an analy-
sis of mandates, ideas and inter-actor relationships (for more detail on this 
approach, see Kaasch 2015; Kaasch and Martens 2015).
For the purpose of this book, this chapter focuses on only one type of 
actor, namely IOs. IOs have been founded with broad and general aims, 
usually directed at either a policy field or a group of (vulnerable) people. 
As part of such mandates, they intervene within, but also beyond specific 
policy fields and react to changing conditions as well as varying and emerg-
ing problems and crises. Furthermore, they do not conduct their work in 
isolation from each other. Inter-actor relationships are dynamic, suscepti-
ble to shifts, and are part of what causes changing settings in global health 
governance (Kaasch and Martens 2015; Fidler 2010; Cooper and Farooq 
2015). Furthermore, as Ng and Prah Ruger (2011, 17) argue, such rela-
tionships are often characterized by “insufficient coordination, the pursuit 
of national and organizational self-interest, inadequate participation by 
the recipients and targets of aid, and sheer lack of resources”. There is also 
another “concept” used to refer to global health governance: chaotic plu-
ralism (Van Belle et al. 2018, 1). This is where the individual global health 
actors, including IOs, often appear in a contradictory light and are por-
trayed as not living up to their responsibilities for various reasons. The 
contradictory image in the approach used for this chapter, however, is 
focusing on the secretariats or headquarters of IOs and their ideas on 
health care systems only. While the concrete ideas developed and commu-
nicated may reflect national perspectives or experiences, these are usually 
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not systematically interest-driven as to any IO staff member’s national 
background (another issue would be analyses driven by providers of extra- 
budgetary funding, but the level of analysis and type of documents studied 
is assumed to be at a level where this is not a strong factor).
The meaning of IOs in the context of this chapter is, therefore, focused 
on what they express and recommend (arguments) with regard to the 
specific issue of health care systems. On the one hand, such ideas are being 
shaped by organizational mandates generating some sort of path depen-
dence. On the other hand, they are also being adjusted and they change in 
reaction to a number of contextual and historical factors. Ideas might 
change as concepts of a social or health problem become broader or more 
diversified; there might be new actor alliances that let shared terminolo-
gies and concepts emerge; better or altered problem descriptions might 
generate a need for new or adjusted solutions; or there might be strategic 
reasons (such as more and competing actors in the field) that might lead 
to new or different approaches by a single IO. In that sense, the popula-
tion in terms of number and inter-actor relationships of global actors in 
the field of health care systems has an important impact on the architec-
ture of arguments.
MappInG Ios In Global HealtH Governance
Global health governance is characterized by a multiplicity of actors. These 
actors may be very different in their composition, size, mechanisms or 
power. Most visible are international organizations (WHO and the World 
Bank in particular), philanthropic organizations (particularly the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation), hybrid organizations (particularly the Global 
Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria) and non-governmental 
organizations (most well-known are perhaps the International Red Cross, 
Doctors Without Borders and the Cooperative for American Remittances 
to Europe (CARE)).
Looking at IOs more specifically, the answer as to which organizations 
matter and how many populate the field critically depends on the specific 
health field or issue looked at. Focusing on health care systems, WHO is 
in the center considering its mandate and role within the United Nations 
(UN) system. The World Bank is critical, given its power to provide fund-
ing for research and projects on health care systems. However, there is 
more than that: on the one hand, there are other IOs focused on specific 
health issues such as the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 
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(UNAIDS). On the other hand—and this will be the focus of this chapter—
there are other more generally social policy-related IOs that include health 
care systems as an important component in social protection in their work. 
These are the ILO and the OECD (see also Kaasch 2015).
In the following sections I describe the roles of WHO, the World Bank, 
the ILO and the OECD in matters of health care systems in more detail, 
as well as how they collaborate, compete or—more generally—relate to 
each other.
World Health Organization: Key Mandate, Encompassing Ideas 
but Multiply Contested Position
In terms of its mandate and position within the UN system, WHO is the 
first and central IO to look at when it comes to global health policies. It is 
the UN’s health agency and by mandate concerned with all kinds of health 
policies at various levels. This certainly holds true for medical information 
and where health care systems (as institutions of social protection) are 
concerned, though neither its mandate nor its actual role are straightfor-
ward or uncontested.
More specifically, WHO’s constitution provides the IO with both a 
norm-setting and coordinative function in the field of health care systems. 
In terms of ‘policy content’ or ideas, the general aim is the “attainment by 
all people of the highest possible level of health”, stipulated in the WHO 
constitution, which has been specified into a mandate to assist govern-
ments in strengthening their health services (Constitution of WHO, 
article 2c; see WHO (2020a)). Nevertheless, due to WHO’s multi-faceted 
mandate, the resulting role and position have been changing over time 
because of financial and organizational constraints as well as a changing 
global architecture. Over the decades, WHO has defined itself as the 
“health conscience” (World Health Assembly (WHA) 1973) in the 1970s, 
the “health advocate” (WHO 1998) in the 1990s and the “directing and 
coordinating authority in international health works” (WHO 2006) in the 
2000s. Since the 2010s, there is a tendency to supply broad descriptions 
of a set of WHO roles. Furthermore, the fact that WHO is not alone and 
uncontested in the field, but part of a broader global governance scenarios 
is much more reflected: “WHO is joint lead agency with the ILO in the 
United Nations initiative to help countries develop a comprehensive Social 
Protection Floor” (WHO 2010). In its latest (13th) General Program of 
Work, WHO shows itself as an actor providing public goods, a 
 A. KAASCH
239
science- and evidence-based organization setting global norms and 
standards, an advocate for health as a human right, an organization net-
working “to build a community to work for the shared future of human-
kind” (WHO 2019, 3) and an institution to monitor global health 
developments. It is also active in developing plans together with national 
governments for better health care systems and for the realization of uni-
versal health coverage (UHC). Beyond that, at the global (horizontal) 
level, WHO assumes a role in “raising global awareness of UHC” (WHO 
2019, 19; see also Cook et al. 2020).
Operationalizing its health care system mandate, WHO structures its 
strategic priorities around three main areas, namely universal health cover-
age, health emergencies and health promotion (WHO 2019). More spe-
cifically, the concepts under which health care systems have been dealt 
with have seen a certain dynamic and changes over time, even though 
most of them did not fully replace each other and have also seen times of 
‘revival’. Among them are primary health care and health for all (in the 
1970s), health care systems strengthening, social determinants of health, 
UHC and social health protection (as part of the social protection floor 
initiative and collaboration in the 2010s). Furthermore, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (and to a lesser extent the prior Millennium 
Development Goals) have provided a framework within which health care 
systems have been approached.
Currently, WHO mostly defines its ideas and strategies on health care 
systems specifically in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), particularly in connection to the aim of achieving UHC. This is 
also combined with the social protection floor framework and initiative 
that increasingly turned into a UN initiative, including meetings on a reg-
ular basis, and which was particularly driven by WHO jointly with the ILO 
and the World Bank. The core idea being that essential health care should 
be one of four basic social security guarantees.
In sum, the arguments brought in by WHO have importantly—even if 
under different headings and buzzwords—centered around what is now 
called UHC. It stands for the aim of universal access to primary health 
care, to financial risk protection, to people-centered health care systems 
and to comprehensiveness in service provision and access. This ideational 
account can be regarded as a somewhat cohesive and coherent approach, 
promoted with the justification of a normative and coordinative mandate 
of the IO. WHO’s position as a global actor more generally, but also the 
quality of its health care system assessments and recommendations, has 
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been questioned and criticized frequently, however, which limits the IO’s 
power to live up to its tasks (e.g. Youde 2018; Kaasch 2015). The follow-
ing sections will show how and by whom WHO got challenged in the 
position of the lead agency in global health governance in the field of 
health care systems.
World Bank: Derived Mandate, Changing Ideas and Multiple 
Powerful Positions
The World Bank has been founded with a completely different idea from 
WHO. It is a financial institution with funding means, more independent 
but also linked to the UN system, and it does not have a health mandate 
in the first place. However, over the years, it has increasingly considered 
the health sector as a field to engage with in aiming to fight poverty (which 
is part of its mandate according to the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA)). Thus, the World Bank has 
also evolved into a massive knowledge actor in the field of health care 
systems.
The World Bank’s engagement in health developed from the 1980s 
onward in particular. That meant, on the one hand, that the IO increased 
its interest and activities in the health sector. But, on the other hand, it 
also led to a more encompassing and thorough understanding and con-
cept of what the meaning and content of health care systems is. Over time, 
this brought the World Bank away from earlier and pretty much standard 
economic arguments thrown on the health sector (which were often not 
really appropriate either, such as the promotion of user fees, or most basic 
health care) to much more elaborate and comprehensive concepts of 
health care systems which appreciate the functions of UHC and their 
meaning as systems of social protection necessary for developmental suc-
cess. Still, the main focus is on those health care system-related issues and 
needs that are particularly critical for low- and middle-income countries, 
as those are the World Bank’s main ‘clients’.
Apart from developing a health mandate out of poverty reduction, the 
World Bank has continuously justified its role in the field through specific 
strategies for the health sector that have become increasingly comprehen-
sive and specific in terms of its understanding of and role in health care 
systems. Through these strategies, the World Bank manifests a very broad 
and very competent role in engaging with national health policymakers, 
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the implementation of projects, and facilitating knowledge exchange. It 
uses the illustration of comparative advantages to justify its role, such as 
expertise in health financing, governance, accountability in health service 
delivery and the like.
Despite a certain degree of contradiction between WHO and World 
Bank approaches and their claims on necessary action in health care sys-
tems, recent years have been remarkably characterized by collaboration 
between the two (and other) IOs, particularly in the area of UHC and 
social protection floors. Therefore, the ‘struggle on positions’ (Deacon 
2007; Kaasch 2015) has been sidelined by more or less strategic collabora-
tion and increasingly shared frameworks of reference. UHC is now the key 
concept used to explain and develop the World Bank’s health strategy, as 
it is said to respond to the World Bank’s twin goals (ending extreme pov-
erty and increasing equality and shared prosperity) and is linked to the 
Sustainable Development Goals as well as other collaborative global health 
initiatives.
Nevertheless, what provides the World Bank with a clear comparative 
advantage is the number of staff they have, and that they possess the means 
to run different sorts of activities and projects related to health care sys-
tems. Within its headquarters, there are many health system experts, par-
ticularly in its Human Development Network Section on Health, Nutrition 
and Population, but also in its social protection unit and other units that 
have an overlap with health care system-related issues. In this way, the 
World Bank has developed into a key source for policy evidence and policy 
advice in this social policy field.
In terms of health care systems support (in the positive sense) or the 
impact on national health care systems (in a critical sense), the World Bank 
is certainly much more powerful than WHO, particularly when it concerns 
low- and middle-income countries, and to some extent also when calling 
for actions in and through health care systems in crisis response situations. 
Regarding the shaping of key ideas or arguments, however, WHO’s con-
cepts have proven more appealing and are now also reflected in many 
World Bank utterances and guide many World Bank initiatives.
International Labor Organization: Questioned Mandate, 
Coherent Ideas and Limited Position
Founded a hundred years ago, the ILO is the UN agency mandated with 
the promotion of social justice and human and labor rights. As a tripartite 
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organization, it shows quite a different structure compared to WHO and 
other IOs within the UN system, but in its secretariat (the International 
Labour Office), a number of staff also work on health care systems as part 
of the ILO’s social protection framework. In terms of justifying its man-
date, the ILO’s engagement in social protection and health is, similarly to 
the World Bank, related to fighting poverty, addressing income security 
and as such improving access to health services.
However, the ILO’s initial concerns were predominantly on the specific 
needs of workers and that has also informed their initial take on health care 
issues. That has played out in a twofold way: health issues connected to 
the workplace and health as dimension of social security related to the lives 
of workers. Accordingly, and as we can see in the World Labor Report 
2000 (International Labour Office 2000), there are adverse effects of 
health problems on earning capacity, and there is financial risk connected 
to the inability to work due to health problems. In the meantime (and also 
in a broader than health care system sense), however, the ILO has adjusted 
its take on these issues in recognition of the fact that many people work in 
the informal sector. For example, Scheil-Adlung made this explicit by 
explaining that “to be meaningful, legal health coverage needs to result in 
effective access for all residents of a country” (Scheil-Adlung 2014, 6).
This broader perspective on residents, rather than workers, had impor-
tant implications for how the ILO could position itself as a general global 
health actor, at least as far as health means social health protection, and in 
doing so it can  be seen as giving voice to health care systems as well. 
Nowadays, the ILO even relates to the UHC aim and related agendas: it 
has diagnosed that insufficient funding is the main problem for providing 
essential health care, which then increases the risk of financial hardship 
(ILO 2019, vii).
The potential power of the ILO is different to both WHO and the 
World Bank in the sense that the ILO possesses a function in facilitating 
international law as a result of its tripartite assembly, which includes the 
Secretariat (Deacon 2013). Beyond that, the ILO has had a strong role in 
coordinating (partly with WHO and the World Bank) the Social Protection 
Floor initiative. In terms of providing specific ideas, what can be found is 
only derived from a very small number of staff members able to engage the 
issue (Kaasch 2015, 67).
Overall, even if the ILO is not considered in most of the global health 
literature, an account of global social governance in the field of health care 
systems must not leave this organization out of the picture. It is the 
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organization providing the frame through which to view health (care sys-
tems) as an element of social protection. In this way, the ILO contributes 
a logic different to the more medical or technical perspectives, but also to 
perspectives of the most basic provision of health care necessary to lift 
people out of poverty. Instead, it leans toward being an integral part of a 
system making societies more equal and improving health in a socially 
sustainable way. Nevertheless, its potential of positioning itself as a strong 
global actor in the field of health care systems is limited, and does not go 
much beyond one field within its coherent concept of social protection.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: 
Derived Mandate, Expanding Idea and Growing Position
Much like the ILO, the OECD is not typically considered to be a global 
health actor in its own right (particularly not in global health governance 
literature). However, global social policy and governance literature have 
increasingly focused on this IO (e.g. Mahon 2019; Deeming and Smyth 
2019). In the past few years, there has been a significant expansion in the 
OECD’s health work, so that my own account from 2015 describing the 
OECD’s involvement in health policies as only just evolving and depen-
dent on “an explicit demand from its member states for specific activities 
and engagement in health policies” (Kaasch 2015) now appears to be 
somewhat outdated.
Originally, the OECD’s health work grew out of its statistical work in 
the second half of the 1970s. Beginning in the 1980s, health has been 
dealt with as part of the social policy work of the OECD, but still mostly 
in terms of statistical work. Then, with the 2000s, the OECD’s work 
became more analytical, also in a qualitative sense, particularly in the con-
text of the OECD Health Project (2001–2004). Over the past decades, 
the OECD’s role in health seems to have become the most integral part of 
its engagement, and no longer accompanied by much of an explicit legiti-
mizing reasoning.
This is the case even in a twofold sense: for its own member states, the 
OECD has taken on an important role in assessing and comparing their 
health care systems. In this way, it challenges the competence of WHO in 
the field of health care systems. What started with a small number of very 
careful, country-specific health care system assessments on demand 
(Kaasch 2010) has developed into an encompassing role in supporting 
OECD member states understanding and enhancing their health care 
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systems to become more people-centered. This has provided the basis for 
the development of new assessment methods, tools and guidance by this 
IO on health care systems. At the same time, the OECD is increasingly 
part of the global health (development) community, engaging in develop-
ment agendas in the field of health, including the attainment of the SDGs 
and realizing the UHC agenda (OECD 2017b).
In the past, OECD health work was clearly characterized by dealing 
with health, on the one hand, as a social service and, on the other hand, as 
an economic factor. These perspectives have got increasingly balanced 
over time. Health care systems, according to OECD work, should provide 
accessible health care (for all citizens), respect equality and equity, provide 
high-quality health care, be mindful of economic efficiency, and also pro-
vide for redistribution and income protection (e.g. OECD 2004). Similarly 
to the other IOs discussed here, the OECD now fully subscribes to the 
UHC agenda, justifying that by stating that its work could show that 
“UHC contributes to promoting more inclusive growth; improves health 
outcomes; and is affordable” (OECD 2017a).
The OECD fulfills its health mandate by providing its highly acknowl-
edged data and expertise, while at the same time joining in collaborative 
endeavors with WHO, the ILO, the World Bank and others. This mix of 
approaches makes it an increasingly powerful global voice on health care 
systems and provides the OECD with a position as a legitimate and cred-
ible actor in the field.
cHaracterIzInG Global HealtH Governance by Its 
arcHItecture or arGuMents
Looking at the field of health care systems in terms of global social gover-
nance, we can identify several decades of discourse with an increasing 
number of major IOs engaging. While it is possible to follow certain tradi-
tions and the development and change of concepts, we particularly see the 
relationships and formation of global actors, specifically IOs, in processes 
of alteration. Therefore, the architecture of global social policy in this field 
is now significantly different from those of the past decades. The centrality 
of WHO might still be the same (both in terms of its key mandate and in 
terms of how and why it is challenged and questioned), however, the 
increasing number of IOs in the field, each coming with specific character-
istics and resources of power, has challenged this position on a repetitive 
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and increasingly complex basis. At the same time, regarding the content of 
ideas and character of discourses, we see an increasingly shared, but also 
broad set of concepts, principles and aims for health care systems among 
many of those actors. This is in some contrast to characterizations up until 
the early 2000s when the emphasis was more on different epistemic com-
munities and practices in health care systems.
More concretely, if we trace back the global health history of the past 
by at least 50 years or so, the Alma-Ata Declaration of the 1970s may be 
seen as a starting point and point of reference for emerging global health 
ideas and discourses—though merely for WHO and associated global 
actors. An important tension of the time was the different interpretations 
of key concepts between WHO and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the latter leaning more toward the World Bank’s basic safety 
net ideas of the time (see, e.g. Koivusalo and Ollila 1997). These frame-
works, namely ‘primary health care’ (PHC) and ‘health care for all’ (HFA), 
were introduced at that time and have guided WHO work ever since. In 
the 1990s, global ideas and discourses on health care systems were increas-
ingly also developed by and within the World Bank. These ideas were con-
nected to its engagement both in the transformation states in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Kaasch 2015) and in emerging economies such as 
Indonesia sidelining their economic development with expanding health 
care systems.
The ILO, in the meantime, has developed a somewhat independent but 
minor account of health care systems as part of their social protection 
work. It has, however, gained increasing importance in the context of 
increasingly collaborative activities in the 2000s (the social protection 
floor initiative). At the same time, and partly due to shortcomings of 
WHO, the OECD continuously expanded its health work in terms of 
ideas and engagement in the field.
It was partly in the context of the reaction to the global economic and 
financial crises that the IOs discussed in this chapter also provided pre-
scriptions for how to address the crisis through social policy measures. 
These contributions came rather quickly from 2008 onward and particu-
larly warned not to repeat any cutbacks in health and other social services 
as had happened in the 1990s in many crisis-affected countries. Given the 
nature of that crisis though, the initial focus was much more on ‘jobs’ than 
on other systems of social protection. Both WHO and the OECD, how-
ever, recommended counter-cyclical public spending and stressed the role 
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of health care systems as well as their function as automatic stabilizers 
(Kaasch 2014).
In sum, the inter-IO discourse has considerably changed through the 
developments described in the previous sections, and so has the architec-
ture of governance in the field: previously distinct agendas and activities 
are increasingly shared and merged, even though to some extent different 
‘languages’ are being used, strongly oppositional epistemic communities 
cannot be identified. The UHC agenda and the Social Protection Inter- 
Agency Collaboration Board (SPIAC-B) are the current settings within 
which all IOs discussed locate their ideational accounts. Accordingly, 
global social governance as the architecture of arguments on health care 
systems can be summarized as having developed into increasingly broad 
concepts and shared principles among the key IOs working in the field.
Global HealtH Governance 
In tHe covId-19 context
While finalizing this chapter, the COVID-19 outbreak has not only para-
lyzed national and global societies and generated massive political reac-
tions and measures, but even IOs in the field of health have been on 
demand and have had to adjust their activities to this new, dramatic situa-
tion. In this section, I illustrate their ‘reactions’ (in terms of their com-
ments on health care systems in the COVID-19 context) and discuss the 
question of whether or not there is an ante- and post-Corona architecture 
emerging in global social governance in the field of health care systems.
Unsurprisingly and in continuity with what has been illustrated in this 
chapter, WHO appeared as the central, first, and most significant actor 
from the very beginning—although this was more in terms of its role as 
the health agency responsible for alerting everyone to the fact that a pan-
demic disease was spreading, as well as its work on the medical side of 
things. In terms of its mandate on health care systems, WHO delivered by 
providing some ideas and guidelines as well. These have been linked to its 
common framework on health care systems (strengthening) and UHC, 
the critical points being well-financed health care systems following the 
principles of risk-sharing and UHC. The concept referred to and used 
here is ‘public financial management’. In a related document, Barroy et al. 
(2020) clarify that the COVID-19 response requires sufficient public 
funding and recommend a turn away from private toward public funding 
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modes. Funding, so the authors claim, needs to be made available and 
stocked up; furthermore, there is the need for balance between flexibility 
and accountability. Kutzin (2020) further argues that countries do not 
need to make a choice between health security and UHC, but rather that 
the two are dependent on each other. Accordingly, “investing in core 
health care system-functions is key to both, completed by public policy 
actions beyond the health care system”. In more concrete, technical guid-
ing notes though, WHO’s focus appears to be slightly different. Rather 
than drawing on the broader social protection network, WHO appears to 
be collaborating with UNICEF, specifically on ideas regarding health care 
systems and COVID-19. This also implies placing focus back on Primary 
Health Care (PHC) and the community level, albeit considered within 
national multilevel systems. The focus is on select essential services and 
prevention (WHO and UNICEF 2020). In another document, WHO 
highlights how, as a consequence of high numbers of COVID-19 cases, 
the need to limit and consciously direct resources may arise. This is in 
some inexplicit contrast to more comprehensive social protection recom-
mendations on health care systems; here, WHO is more situated in the 
older tradition and turns to postponing and suspending routine and elec-
tive services, to targeted immediate action, and at reorganization measures 
(for the recommendations see, e.g. WHO 2020b).
In terms of the World Bank, thus far it has not published a comprehen-
sive piece on COVID-19 and health care systems in particular, but instead 
on social protection more generally in relation to the SPIAC-B (Social 
Protection Interagency Cooperation Board) (2020). However, it has 
financially supported a number of countries in strengthening their health 
care systems in the current situation and issued  a factsheet on that. 
According to that factsheet, about $160 billion will be provided for assist-
ing countries (World Bank 2020). In some contrast to the above, how-
ever, the International Finance Cooperation (part of the World Bank 
Group) is a strong component in this support, as there is belief in the 
private sector being critical to mastering and overcoming the crisis.
At the same time, some more concrete recommendations come from 
first short publications on related issues, namely a brief that highlights the 
necessity of infection prevention as well as control policies and campaigns 
to draw attention to necessary hygiene measures (Bedoya and Dolinger 
2020); and Gillson and Muramatsu (2020) who recommend allowing 
cross-border movement of health personnel and goods, and exploration of 
tele-medicine. Thus, overall, more comprehensive and focused health care 
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system ideas have not yet been established and distributed. That is cer-
tainly more due to the complexity of the matter, as well as the urgency and 
depth of the COVID-19 crisis, than to dismissal of the World Bank from 
the critical role of health care systems in responding to global pandemic 
disease outbreaks.
The ILO’s COVID-19 contributions thus far reveal its typical focus on 
the world of work, in that it re-emphasizes the need for social protection 
systems—including floors—to prevent and meet crisis situations, and 
stresses that emergency crisis responses should ideally be executed with a 
longer-term perspective in mind. This would include guaranteed access to 
good health care by means of additional public funds (both for emergency 
response, safeguarding and extending coverage) (ILO 2020c). 
Furthermore, and more specifically related to its social protection man-
date, the ILO has focused on the meaning and role of sickness benefits as 
part of social health protection systems. This is not particularly an issue of 
the health care system, but the question of income security in the case of 
illness for the prevention of impoverishment (ILO 2020b). There are 
more specific ideas on entitlements to social sickness protection for this 
specific COVID-19 outbreak situation. The ILO paper argues that there 
is a risk of further disease spread if unprotected people continue working 
while contagious, and that there is a high risk of impoverishment if they 
are not covered by health insurance. This results in recommendations to 
extend coverage to all by mobilizing additional financial resources, expand-
ing the scope of sickness benefits (e.g. in cases of quarantine or care obli-
gations), increasing benefit levels and removing any waiting periods or 
other constraints to speedy delivery of sickness benefits (ILO 2020a).
As for the OECD, their work does address health care systems quite 
specifically, though with a common and typical focus on collecting and 
analyzing data as well as illustrating the variations in the first place. Their 
work shows how there are four key measures to respond to the COVID-19 
pandemic from the side of health care systems: ensuring access, improving 
health care system capacity to manage caseload increases, digital solutions 
and data for care and surveillance, as well as improving research and devel-
opment for improved diagnostics, treatments and vaccines (OECD 2020). 
In this case, however, the OECD report also draws rather clear conclu-
sions and recommendations from the data:
The current crisis demonstrates the importance of universal health cover-
age as a key element for the resilience of health care systems. High levels of 
 A. KAASCH
249
out-of-pocket payments may deter people from seeking early diagnosis and 
treatment, and thus contribute to acceleration in the rate of transmission. 
However, even in health care systems that have already achieved universal 
coverage, an epidemic caused by newly discovered pathogens requires an 
early response to clarify coverage for new diagnostic tests and treatments 
that were not previously included in the health benefit package. 
(OECD 2020, 6)
In a forum contribution, Francesca Colombo, Head of the OECD Health 
Division, additionally highlights the need for health care systems to be 
adaptable to health crises like this COVID-19 outbreak (Colombo 2020).
Thus, these accounts provide some picture of ‘back to the roots’ in 
global health governance as a COVID-19 response. At the point of writ-
ing this chapter, each of the organizations is re-focused on original man-
dates and defining foci of attention within that, rather than on all speaking 
on the same matter. Nevertheless, joint and collaborative work has also 
been happening, despite little of it being prominently placed on websites 
or elsewhere, and this does provide some evidence of continuity at the 
same time. In terms of the content of policy advice, it is somewhere 
between scaling up for meeting new health needs and focusing specifically 
on COVID-19 at the expense of some non-urgent health services.
conclusIon
This chapter aimed at characterizing global social governance in the field 
of health care systems. It focused on IOs and illustrated their key ideas, as 
well as their relationships with each other. Given the specific timing of 
writing this chapter, the more general account of global health governance 
has since extended beyond, and to some extent contrasted with, the first 
moves related to the 2020 COVID-19 crisis.
The important characteristics of global health governance as dealt with 
in this chapter are not to do with the global nature of social or health 
issues as such. Instead, the interest has been in global activities and on the 
subject of national competencies: the ideas of health care systems. IOs 
have been studied as knowledge and norm providers, not as potential reg-
ulators with legal power. So, what do these characterizations mean for the 
architecture of global social governance in the field of health? Due to the 
high number of actors, the complexities of their relationships and a frus-
trating degree of failing multilateralism and global solidarity when it 
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concerns addressing global health issues, some would claim “there is ‘no 
architecture of global health’” (Garrett 2007, 246). Others would put the 
World Bank and WHO in the center and others loosely around, or in con-
centric circles of actors (Ng and Prah Ruger 2011, 2–3). The picture gets 
clearer though when more carefully defining the specific meaning and 
focus of a health issue (though in the case of this chapter, it’s still a very 
broad one).
The population of IOs in this field has been characterized as multi- 
actored, even when it concerns the selection of the most important global 
actors. The presentation and discussion of WHO, the World Bank, the 
ILO and the OECD have revealed that the ongoing relationships have 
been increasingly marked by collaboration. However, the architecture of 
arguments is also shaped by a certain duplication of work, which demands 
a constant effort to justify such a role (with reference to, but also clearly 
beyond, original mandates) (see also, Kaasch 2015). While in the 
1970s–1990s the relationships were characterized more by competition 
and only short spots of collaboration on a non-stable basis, from the 2000s 
onward it has become much more common to join forces under specific 
global initiatives (particularly the UHC agenda and the social protection 
floor initiative). Global crises have also marked interruptions in the activi-
ties of IOs, but while following the global economic and financial crisis we 
saw a quick and rather concerted reaction, whereas the ‘initial reactions’ to 
the current COVID-19 crisis hint at more IO-mandate oriented, individ-
ual approaches on ideas regarding health care systems.
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CHAPTER 11




The introduction to this book stated that International Organizations 
(IOs) “provide forums for exchange, guide and supervise international 
treaties, which states sign and adhere to,” as well as “direct, finance and 
implement projects which affect people’s lives” (see Niemann et al. in this 
volume). This is undoubtedly the case for the plethora of IOs engaging 
with climate change as a cross-cutting concern. Although climate change 
has perhaps only taken off as a clear global problem in the last 50 years 
(and social policy framings of the issue even later), it is evident that we 
now live in an age where “self-sufficiency in social policy is no longer a 
realistic option” (George and Wilding 2002, 187).
Environmental changes and social policies are linked in several ways. 
On the one hand, climate change is a cause of social risk for individuals 
with specific vulnerabilities (health, social and others), and for populations 
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based in regions already affected by the more damaging consequences of 
climate change (such as rising sea levels or desertification). On the other 
hand, the typical measures and policies undertaken to tackle social and 
environmental problems are to a significant degree contradictory to one 
another; while social policy advancements are usually linked to economic 
development and growth, protecting the environment is better achieved 
by zero or even degrowth (Buch-Hansen and Koch 2019; Koch 2020). 
Furthermore, in the discussion of social policy and climate change, chal-
lenges converge in relation to social inequality and injustice. Questions 
abound regarding who is responsible for climate change and associated 
inequalities, especially as those countries and people causing the problem 
are typically the least affected. At the same time, global solidarity with 
respect to compensation for social problems related to climate change is of 
concern. This chapter discusses the role of international organizations in 
shaping global social policies in the field of climate change, also known as 
eco-social policies more broadly, and studies IOs in their function as 
forums for exchange and potential facilitators of international treaties, as 
laid out in the introduction to this volume.
This chapter proceeds in three steps. It first briefly highlights the tem-
poral shift in discourse on climate change and the subsequent expansion of 
IOs engaging with the issue as a global social policy concern. For a long 
time, climate change was conceptualized in a narrow manner; however, in 
the twenty-first century context it is understood as an underlying issue for 
global social policy writ large, especially as it relates to the global concept 
of sustainable development. As outlined in a second section, this has led to 
a wide variety of IOs from various policy fields engaging with climate 
change as a determinant of social well-being and as an issue to be addressed 
through social policies, with rapid historical developments in this area 
challenging the traditional roles and mandates of IOs. To illustrate this 
point, a third section explores the position of IOs in relation to climate 
insurance as a global social policy tool. This chapter argues that IOs occupy 
an important space as conveners and for exerting influence—particularly 
‘soft’ governance—when it comes to social policy dimensions of climate 
change, even if many IOs are not yet explicitly framing their work in such 
terms. A shift in global discourse on climate change—which has both 
given rise to the creation of IOs and been directly influenced by IO behav-
ior—is illustrative of this point.
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ShIftIng dIScourSe and expandIng Io engagement
In the field of climate change, there are numerous IOs exerting soft gov-
ernance, opening spaces for discussion, and dealing with the issue as a 
cross-cutting concern for social policy. Certain IOs have clearly demar-
cated authority on climate change, such as the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). At the same time, a wider population 
of IOs with diverse mandates and functions—especially those in the 
United Nations (UN) family—now see climate change as an omnipresent 
threat, understanding it as an intersecting issue that needs to be addressed 
if original mandates are to be responsibly fulfilled.
From a historical perspective, the global discourse on climate change 
has undergone considerable transformation, of which IOs have been part 
and parcel. In the post-World War II context, major IOs addressed envi-
ronmental change under the auspices of environmental conservation or 
climate science. In 1948, the UN established the International Union for 
the Protection of Nature and Human Resources (now the International 
Union Conservation of Nature and Human Resources, or IUCN) for 
environmental conservation, and in 1951 the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) to focus on climatic change. However, it was not 
until the 1960s and 1970s that a broader understanding of the global 
consequences of environmental degradation took hold in the international 
community, with climate change identified as a clear problem arising from 
industrialization in the Global North (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005, 
48–82). This conceptualization was central to the UN’s first global 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, which 
sparked the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) (Brisman 2011, 1039–1040). Given the rhetoric at the time, 
UNEP was mandated to contribute toward the development and imple-
mentation of policies which strike a balance between economic develop-
ment and overcoming environmental degradation (Clapp and Dauvergne 
2005, 57–58).
Further developments and events in the 1970s cemented both the rec-
ognition of climate change as a global issue, and the importance of IOs as 
collaborators and conveners in this domain. These included WMO’s first 
international assessment of the state of the ozone layer in 1976, which was 
associated with growing global health concerns and triggered a range of 
studies over the following decades between WMO and UNEP (Social 
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Learning Group 2001, 13), and the watershed World Climate Conference 
in 1979, which was a collaborative effort between WMO, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), UNEP, the International Council 
for Science (ICSU), and other partners (Zillman 2009). The World 
Climate Conference resulted in WMO and UNEP together establishing 
the IPCC—now one of the most trusted sources for scientific consensus 
on climate change. Subsequent watershed successes for global climate 
change policy, especially the Montreal Protocol, were at least in part due 
to the involvement of IOs in assisting and including developing countries 
in the discussion on the environment, especially via the Multilateral Fund 
for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, which is managed by an 
Executive Committee comprising UNEP, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), and the World Bank (Luken and Grof 2006).
In the 1980s, seeds were sown for current IO discourse and partnership 
on climate change with a focus on sustainable development. In 1980, 
IUCN partnered with UNEP, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), FAO, and 
UNESCO (IUCN et al. 1980) to create the “World conservation strategy: 
living resource conservation for sustainable development.” Although sus-
tainability in that report focused more on the environment itself than 
(economic) development, by 1984, the UN General Assembly had estab-
lished the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
(Clapp and Dauvergne 2005, 59–60). Providing a new definition for eco-
nomic development with the environment at its core, the Brundtland 
Commission’s 1987 report “Our Common Future” proposed a global 
development and environment strategy designed to be acceptable to all, 
popularizing the mainstream term ‘sustainable development’ as we know 
it today—development that “meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).
Following this report, multiple keystone conferences took place which 
have ultimately shaped current discourse on social policy and climate 
change. In 1990, a second World Climate Conference took place, and 
while its predecessor had led to the creation of the IPCC, the second pre-
sented the IPCC’s first assessment report, which highlighted the risks of 
global climate change (IPCC and Houghton 1990). This event, coupled 
with the UN Conference on the Environment and Development 
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(UNCED) in 1992  in Rio de Janeiro (the Earth Summit), led to the 
establishment of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC would go on to dominate 
global discourse and act as the primary convening body for states looking 
to address climate change (Kuyper et al. 2018), as well as to play a direct 
role in the exploration of how to address some of the social consequences 
of climate change via social policy. More importantly, the Earth Summit 
cemented the notion of sustainable development as a vector for social pol-
icy, combined with the promotion of environmental protection (Clapp 
and Dauvergne 2005, 64).
Discursive focus on sustainable development dominated at the turn of 
the twenty-first century, as all UN Member States and a variety of associ-
ated IOs committed to eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
measured by targets in a variety of social issue areas. Although only the 
seventh goal explicitly relates to climate change (“to ensure environmental 
sustainability”), the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a whole 
are considered far more interdependent, bringing together socio- 
economic, political, and environmental sectors (Nilsson et  al. 2016). 
Climate change and social policies both belong to the objectives to be 
achieved through the collective action model of the SDGs, and following 
decades of incremental developments, IOs now view climate change as a 
social policy concern. IOs which may not have originally or directly 
addressed climate change now do so anyway, with a common set of terms 
comprising the new discourse on IO involvement in this area; this notably 
includes the identification of vulnerable groups in the context of climate 
change and enhancing global resilience via mitigation, disaster risk reduc-
tion, and adaptation.
Interconnected polIcy and actIon at the Io level
Following on from these developments, global social governance as the 
intersecting field of climate change and social policy (or eco-social policy) 
has evolved from a body of core IOs working on climate change and the 
environment (such as IUCN, UNEP, WMO, the IPCC, and the 
UNFCCC) to a wide variety of IOs with diverse mandates in the fields of 
migration, urbanization and population dynamics, livelihoods, health, 
WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene), and poverty reduction, to name 
but a few. Nowadays, many UN specialized agencies, the World Bank, 
regional IOs, and the OECD may be considered global eco-social policy 
actors since they recognize climate change either as a direct or 
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compounding issue for global social policy and integrate it into their work 
portfolios. In this section, a ‘chain of connection’ between climate change 
and various social policy areas is outlined as visible in the activities of major 
IOs; the starting and reference point being climate-change-induced 
migration.
Climate change has been recognized as early as the 1990s (including by 
the IPCC) as not only directly contributing toward migration and dis-
placement (Martin 2010, 397), but also as a contributing factor in major 
conflicts where migration and displacement are an outcome (Perch- 
Nielsen et  al. 2008). Climate change is therefore of major concern for 
well-established and authoritative IOs in this area, such as the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In recent decades, IOM and 
UNHCR have lobbied for the inclusion of language that recognizes the 
link between climate change and human mobility in policy, including: the 
Hyogo Framework for Action and its successor, the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR 2019); the state-led Nansen Initiative 
and its successor, the Platform on Disaster Displacement (McAdam 2016); 
and the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement, established following the 
UNFCCC’s twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP21) meeting in 
Paris in 2015 “to develop recommendations to avert, minimize and 
address displacement in the context of the adverse effects of climate 
change” (UNFCCC 2020b). More recently, these agencies have also 
played a direct role in the formation and early implementation of the non- 
binding Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) 
and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), which include direct recog-
nition of the impacts of climate change on global human mobility 
(UNHCR 2020; UNHCR and IOM 2019; United Nations 2019).
Such increased movements of people due to environmental stress and 
disaster may place strain on several other intersecting social policy areas. 
Climate-related factors such as increased drought and flooding speed up 
the process of urbanization, as community centers shift from rural to 
urban spaces. This in turn affects livelihoods, as people shift from agrarian 
practices in search of new types of work in urban centers. Although such 
shifts may represent opportunity, they can also equate to exacerbated soci-
etal inequality if poorly managed. Several IOs are working to address cli-
mate change in this context. The United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), the International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED), and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme 
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(UN-Habitat) regularly partner in a research and advisory capacity, for 
example, to support the implementation of the New Urban Agenda 
(NUA), which was adopted in 2016 (UN Habitat 2020; UNFPA 2020b). 
Likewise, the World Food Programme (WFP) has placed an emphasis on 
the need for sustainable livelihoods and ecosystems, as “every new drought 
or flood further depletes people’s assets, trapping them in a spiral of 
diminishing resilience and environmental misery” (World Food Programme 
2020b). This has also resulted in climate change having ultimately con-
tributed to WFP’s overwhelming spending on emergency and recovery 
operations following climate-related disasters in recent years (World Food 
Programme 2020a). Further at the heart of addressing threats to liveli-
hoods, IOs exert influence via policy recommendations, as the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) has done in relation to promoting the use of 
social protection schemes to tackle unemployment in industries where 
activity must necessarily be reduced or phased out in the face of climate 
change, such as forestry and fossil fuel industries (Montt et al. 2018, 27). 
Meanwhile, other IOs have worked directly with local authorities to intro-
duce schemes for improving livelihood opportunities for vulnerable 
groups. One example of this has been the introduction of hydroponic 
farming in flood prone areas as part of the trend toward community-based 
adaptation projects; in Bangladesh, pilot farming projects have been sup-
ported by UNDP (UNDP 2019), and farms for Bangladeshi returnee 
migrants have been supported by IOM alongside national authorities as 
part of a sustainable economic reintegration project (IOM 2018).
Shifting dynamics among populations and means of work in turn place 
a strain on urban capacities and housing as more people inhabit smaller 
spaces and strain existing services. UN-Habitat finds itself working at the 
intersection of these concerns, as it seeks to address bottle-neck issues 
affecting resilience and risk reduction, sustainable cities, and human 
mobility issues, among others (UN-Habitat 2020). Similarly, UNFPA has 
worked on hazard mapping in populated areas for climate change adapta-
tion policy (POPClimate 2020), and has promoted policy practices for 
sustainable development and planning that set those most vulnerable to 
climate change on the path to a better life without contributing further to 
emissions and worsening climate change (UNFPA 2020a). Population 
shifts and ensuing challenges are in turn of direct concern for the domains 
of WASH, as well as health more generally, as they place societies at greater 
risk for a range of health implications often directly attributable to climate 
change, such as increased heat stress (Harlan et al. 2006), the spread of 
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infectious disease such as malaria and cholera, malnutrition, and lack of 
access to clean drinking water, not to mention the mental health risks 
associated with livelihood and migratory-related stress. WHO has to that 
end emphasized the need for a continual flow of information between sci-
ence, research, and policy, with their language emphasizing sustainability 
and measures for adaptation and reducing vulnerability (McMichael et al. 
2003). Although a core authority on health, WHO is not the only viable 
IO considering health in the context of climate change and exerting soft 
governance—the aforementioned Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015–2030 has included health as a key outcome, with actions 
for public health outlined and prioritized by the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), WHO, and others in the UN system 
(Aitsi-Selmi and Murray 2016). Health is also a key area under the 
UNFCCC’s Nairobi Work Programme, established at COP11 to convene 
“knowledge for action” for climate adaptation and resilience (UNFCCC 
2020c), and WHO was contributing to health aspects of the Inter-Agency 
Committee on the Climate Agenda (IACCA)—in partnership with WMO, 
UNESCO, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), FAO, and 
ICSU—as early as 1998 (WMO et al. 1998).
In considering how interconnected such issues are, other IOs are in 
turn forced to address climate change in their policy work regarding vul-
nerable groups—such as women and children—who have been identified 
as disproportionately affected, particularly in areas such as health and live-
lihoods (Huyer et  al. 2015, 4; Preet et  al. 2010, 5). IOs such as UN 
Women (created in 2010) are addressing climate change and exerting soft 
power in this area by facilitating platforms for the participation of women 
in decision-making, with the goal to achieve more gender-sensitive policy 
outcomes. This is clear in their disaster risk reduction work, where they 
have been active in supporting disaster management bodies at the national 
level in countries such as Nepal, Myanmar, Vanuatu, Bangladesh, and 
Kenya, and at the regional and global level alongside IO partners such as 
UNDRR as well as Member States to develop ‘gender responsive’ imple-
mentation plans and programs for the Sendai Framework (UN Women 
2020b). More broadly, UN Women also focuses on economic empower-
ment for women within the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda, spe-
cifically seeking combatant or adaptive solutions to climate change (UN 
Women 2020c). A directly observable outcome of this is the IO’s facilita-
tion of training seminars for those looking to diversify their livelihoods as 
part of adaptation measures (UN Women 2020a). Similarly, the United 
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Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has restructured its climate change 
policy around children as central actors, visible through their facilitation of 
projects in Bolivia and Papua New Guinea for youth leadership in water 
resources management and disaster response plans for schools, and more 
broadly in their provision of a platform for children and young people at 
United Nations events (UNICEF 2020). As part of efforts to enhance 
resilience in the face of climatic and environmental shocks, UNICEF and 
FAO have for many years engaged in and evaluated the potential for social 
policy schemes such as cash transfer programs to enhance the resilience of 
vulnerable groups in the face of climate change (Davis et al. 2016; FAO 
2018; Lawlor et al. 2015).
The notion of global social governance as developed in this chapter 
suggests an increasing contextualization of global social policies in relation 
to the global threat of climate change. In other words, in the description 
of the causes or determinants of social problems and challenges, climate 
change takes an increasingly prominent role. Furthermore, as climate 
change plays out in multiple ways for the well-being and livelihoods of 
people, IOs that previously had clearly assigned mandates, roles, and 
responsibilities are crossing (social) policy fields in response to the global 
threat of climate change. In this sense, global social policy is increasingly 
evolving into global eco-social policy, with actors forming interconnected 
governance structures that merge social policy with environmental policy 
agendas and prescriptions. To illustrate this argument, the following sec-
tion will describe climate change/risk insurance as one potential option 
for merging traditional social policy tools with climate change policies, 
highlighting the activity of and between various IOs in this area.
‘clImate rISk InSurance’ for global eco-SocIal 
polIcy? a caSe Study
Climate change is bringing IOs and other relevant partners together in 
new, exciting, and—as this section will show—sometimes questionable 
ways. Climate risk insurance, or climate (change) insurance, is both repre-
sentative of emerging social policy solutions and an opportunity to reflect 
upon the extent to which IOs are moving beyond the realm of their ‘regu-
lar’ work in research, advising, and assessment. Climate insurance is an 
example of the economization of climate change and is rather unique in its 
ability to bring together a wide range of actors from the public and private 
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spheres. The proliferation of work in this area is not so surprising when 
considering that economic language and doctrines satisfy the liberal gov-
ernance model, especially where action at the national level may be deemed 
insufficient, thus opening space for IOs to exert soft power (Palmujoki 
2010). Extreme weather events have been typically financed by a mixture 
of public and international disaster relief, however, as climate change 
increases the intensity and frequency of both sudden and slow-onset cli-
matic events, the international community—including IOs—have been 
forced to question existing tools for tackling the economic consequences 
of climate change (Miller and Swann 2016, 81). As a result, IOs, govern-
ments, and private enterprises are all considering the potential for insur-
ance as a tool for both adapting to and addressing potential losses and 
damages due to climate change. From the perspective of IOs concerned 
with the more wide-reaching effects of climate change on the future of 
sustainable development, the potential of climate insurance is arguably 
even more important; according to Kofi Annan, former United Nations 
Secretary General, climate insurance “may hold answers for some of the 
more obstinate problems faced by the poor and the vulnerable” (Hellmuth 
et al. 2009, iii).
There are two major points of consensus stemming from this field: 
First, that dependent on its use, climate insurance represents an option or 
tool for combatting the more drastic effects of climate change and for 
adapting to future risks and losses (International Finance Corporation 
2016, 1; Montt et al. 2018, 12); and second, climate insurance must be 
planned, funded, and carried out by a range of actors from the public, 
private, and international spheres. This is in recognition of the fact that 
better coordination of shared approaches may result in better climate 
adaptation tools (Wilby et al. 2009, 1197). In other words, polycentric 
governance is a requirement, and this definitively requires the involvement 
of IOs (Kreft et al. 2017, 24; Miller and Swann 2016, 70). Although the 
pervasive nature of climate change as regards wider social policy was illus-
trated in the last section, climate change insurance as a potential solution 
to many of the ills caused by climate change deserves stand-alone consid-
eration. This is due to its ability to both bring together a unique array of 
actors from public, private, and international sectors, and present unique 
challenges that are equal parts practical, theoretical, and ethical.
The last decade has seen a proliferation of work in the field of climate 
risk insurance and climate finance more broadly, with IOs playing no small 
role in both establishing the concept and paving the way for future work 
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in this area. The UNFCCC is considered the leading organization in this 
regard. As part of ‘Cancun Agreements’ at COP16 in 2010, the Green 
Climate Fund and ‘fast-start finance’ were established, where developed 
countries pledged to mobilize funding which would go through IOs in 
the hopes of reaching populations most vulnerable to climate change 
(UNFCCC 2020a). The Green Climate Fund (of which the World Bank 
is trustee, although the Fund is subject to the COP) aims to tap into both 
public and private finances in order to bankroll projects in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation (Green Climate Fund 2020). By 2015, the 
Fund had obtained over US $10 billion in pledges and had begun approv-
ing investments (Kreft et al. 2017, 36), and despite a lack of new contribu-
tions from the United States, in the latest fundraising round (2019) 
developed countries pledged an additional US $9.8 billion (Yeo 2019).
The Cancun Adaptation Framework (another result of COP16) also 
promoted “risk assessment and management as well as risk sharing and 
transfer mechanisms such as insurance at local, national, sub-regional and 
regional levels,” and suggested the creation of a climate risk insurance 
facility “to address impacts associated with severe weather events” (Warner 
et al. 2013, 39). Perhaps most consequential for current work in this area 
is the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (commonly 
referred to as the WIM), which was established in 2013 during UNFCCC 
climate negotiations to look into insurance scheme options that may 
address climate change problems (Spreng et al. 2016, 130). States party to 
the UNFCCC are fully aware of the potential of climate risk insurance, 
with some 38 countries (representative of over four billion people and 
“approximately half of the world’s extreme poor”) privy to the 2015 Paris 
Agreement including climate risk insurance approaches (or at least some 
mention of the issue) in their Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) (Kreft et al. 2017, 10). There is also a consensus at the interna-
tional governance level that differentiation between developed and devel-
oping countries plays an important role for future work in this area, with 
the G7 calling for climate change insurance schemes (Spreng et al. 2016, 
130) and the UNFCCC Article 3.1.1. explicitly recognizing “differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities,” with developed countries 
responsible for taking the lead “in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof”’ (United Nations 1992, 9).
The intensive work of the UNFCCC in this area is more easily under-
standable when considered in relation to the bigger UN Agenda on 
Sustainable Development, where climate insurance holds plenty of 
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promise. Historically, those vulnerable to risks such as environmental 
disasters have typically financed their recovery by way of “savings and 
credit, informal kinship arrangements, government relief and international 
donor support” (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2019, 489). Insurance options 
may therefore relieve IOs from many of the associated costs of climate 
change, such as humanitarian aid. Multiple IOs have unsurprisingly begun 
investigative work, with the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and WFP establishing a Weather Risk Management 
Facility in 2008 to test the feasibility of index-insurance (IFAD 2020). 
Nonetheless, the potential for climate insurance to pave the way for an 
increase in the rich-poor divide remains a concern, particularly given that 
climate change itself “raises awareness and willingness in populations to 
insure but threatens the affordability and availability of cover” (Lamond 
and Penning-Rowsell 2014, 2). This is something that IOs which are 
involved in developing policies and schemes, and for which fair and equi-
table sustainable development is a major reason for investing in insurance 
options, are concerned about. A potential issue may be increased engage-
ment between the private sector and developed countries, at the expense 
of, or as a substitute for, continued official development assistance (ODA).
Not only is the prospect of reduced costs of interest for IOs, but wider 
work on climate insurance nominates IOs as middlemen for financing 
projects. For example, one study has proposed a regional financial mecha-
nism funded by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and developed 
countries for tackling rising sea levels in Small Island Developing States 
based on the success of existing financial contributions to the African Risk 
Capacity (ARC), which has provided insurance to African countries 
affected by drought (Wenta et  al. 2016). Similarly, the United Nations 
University (UNU) has outlined that IOs are well positioned to provide 
both technical and financial assistance, and occupy a unique position for 
facilitating regional and international dialogue on insurance options 
(Warner et al. 2013, 40). It is therefore in the interest of IOs that any 
mechanisms they fund be professionally researched; the Munich Climate 
Insurance Initiative (MCII) is an example of an arrangement for research 
on insurance options between Munich Re and UNU (Kreft et al. 2017). 
Other IOs that have in the past partnered to investigate the prospects of 
insurance for development include Oxfam America, UNDP, WFP, the 




While it has been argued that State-backed schemes provide social ben-
efits and protection measures for vulnerable populations that purely pri-
vate enterprises ‘struggle to emulate,’ the inclusion of IOs with specific 
goals to improve the lives of target populations offers an opportunity to 
balance the scales against exploitation (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell 
2014, 5). Conversely, partnering with IOs under the auspices of sustain-
able development for climate change provides an access route for insurers 
who are keen to exhibit altruistic qualities, as the International Finance 
Corporation (2016, 1), a member of the World Bank Group, has argued. 
To date, partnerships between private or profit-driven insurers and IOs 
have resulted in hybrid schemes such as the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility (CCRIF), a partnership where “World Bank instru-
ments and donor funds are accessed by a private company owned and 
operated by its regional members to support its not-for-profit goals” 
(Warner et al. 2013, 30). Another example is WFP and Oxfam America’s 
R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, which relies on donations from a range of 
other IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, and 
insurance firms interested in extending their humanitarian work to reach 
hundreds of thousands of farmers in Africa to improve “resource manage-
ment through asset creation,” provide insurance, allow for livelihoods 
diversification, micro crediting, and improvements in savings (World Food 
Programme and Oxfam America 2018). Whether or not such arrange-
ments result in pushing the Sustainable Development Agenda and tackling 
social problems caused by climate change, or merely facilitate access to 
‘emerging markets’ for foreign insurance companies (potentially limiting 
the ability of national governments to determine their own social protec-
tion measures) remains a critical and serious question.
concluSIon
This chapter has traced the development of global social governance as 
eco-social policy with a focus on the links between climate change and 
social policies. It has described the temporal shift within the global dis-
course on climate change with an emphasis on the roles of, and collabora-
tions between, an increasing number of IOs. It has explored some 
interconnected issues of social and climate change policies and highlighted 
how many IOs are engaged in the field. In a third step, it was shown using 
the example of climate risk insurance how an insurance mechanism brings 
actors and efforts together within multi-actored and multi-level processes 
11 IOS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: TOWARD GLOBAL ECO-SOCIAL POLICY 
268
to facilitate tackling individual social shocks caused by climate change, as 
well as how such a tool may bundle the resources and capacities of IOs 
involved.
More specifically, this chapter has outlined advancements in discourse 
at the IO level on climate change and how this connects to global social 
policies. It has illustrated how a shift toward framing climate change in the 
context of sustainable development has led to a ballooning of IOs engaged 
in this area. The argument that IOs occupy an important space as conve-
ners and for exerting influence—particularly ‘soft’ governance—when it 
comes to social policy and climate change, has been shown with the exam-
ple of climate risk insurance.
This argument is, however, specific to the perspective on global eco- 
social governance employed: Gough (2014) has, for example, considered 
green growth and how economic and social policies come together with 
reference to that perspective. Here, a lot of questions remain concerning 
the ability of IOs to counter the interests of powerful, economically ori-
ented states or big business. Nonetheless, eco-social policies, the links 
between climate change and social policies, and the specific roles of IOs 
(and other actors) is still highly underexplored, and considering global 
social governance as global eco-social policy is a perspective in need of 
further consideration in the years and decades to come.
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CHAPTER 12
Water as Global Social Policy—International 




If you pick up a book on water politics—practically any book on the 
topic – you are almost certain to find a claim like this: water doesn’t obey 
political boundaries. Usually, the quick inference is that water conflicts are 
likely; a logical step that combines the fact that water began flowing eons 
before politics were around to be obeyed with the political reality that 
many international borders operate with varying degrees of reference to 
scarce water resources. An arguably more interesting point, however, is 
the leitmotif such claims convey. Namely, that global water policy requires 
an effective combination of space and politics. Among the potential com-
binations, several leading contenders populate a wide literature. There are 
spaces of empires, nations, states, mega-cities, agricultural regions, water-
sheds (or river basins), local communities, Indigenous peoples and, 
increasingly, aquatic ecosystems themselves. Opposite these, politics 
J. J. Schmidt (*) 
Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, UK
e-mail: jeremy.schmidt@durham.ac.uk
276
crisscross state sovereignty, treaties, rights, customs, Indigenous laws, 
technical criteria, infrastructure, economics, guesswork, and in some cases, 
equity. Intersections of space and politics anchor two aims of this chapter. 
The first is to map how International Organizations (IOs) have shaped, 
and continue to shape, global water policy. The second is to consider how 
IOs have influenced global discourses. These two aims support a more 
ambitious argument: that water be treated as global social policy – not as 
merely instrumental to the public management of social risks in other 
domains.
This chapter has four sections: The first defends a key premise of the 
argument that water is social and not only natural. The second maps the 
historical role IOs have played in colonial and state hydrological programs. 
Here, IOs actively shaped key parameters of what it meant to act interna-
tionally on water policy. This affected the subsequent rise of global water 
policy. The third identifies the role of IOs in driving discourses of global 
water policy, particularly those of scarcity and security that link the envi-
ronmental, economic, and political risks connected to water. Here, there 
are similarities with other environmental areas where Cold War scientific 
networks collaborated with IOs to forge global approaches to social policy 
through hybrid networks of epistemic authority. But there are also impor-
tant differences owing to how IOs critiqued early approaches to sustain-
able development for inadequate attention to water. This catalyzed efforts 
to make water central to social and industrial policy, largely through what 
is known as integrated water resources management (IWRM). That proj-
ect reached its height in the 1990s. The fourth section focuses on how, as 
IWRM waned, IOs redeployed their influence to govern considerations of 
risk and security in response to global environmental change and eco-
nomic crises. This approach now dominates global water discourse and 
demands critique regarding for whom water has become a domain of global 
social policy.
SocIal Water
Water is not taught as something that is social. In fact, only a small fraction 
of the diagrams used to represent Earth’s water cycle in textbooks include 
humans (15%) and even fewer (2%) identify human impacts on the global 
water system (Abbott et al. 2019). This is a serious oversight. Humans 
have been appropriating more than half of the annual available freshwater 
since 1995 and have pushed the hydrological cycle so far off balance that 
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it no longer operates within the normal bounds of variability (Postel et al. 
1996; Milly et al. 2008). The upshot is that the image most people have 
in their heads of the global water cycle – implicit in much of water policy – 
is deeply flawed. Water does not flow carefree through an eternal, stable 
cycle of evaporation, condensation, and precipitation from the oceans 
through the atmosphere and back to earth. To that image, we must add a 
growing litany of ways in which humans short-circuit water systems: 
microplastics in raindrops, pharmaceutical loading in rivers, tens of thou-
sands of mega-dams, increased water vapor from climate change, glaciers 
and ice sheets in rapid retreat, a warming and increasingly acidic ocean, 
severe droughts, and monsoons that by turns fail to materialize or intensely 
burst in ways not previously experienced.
How can we think of water in social terms? Anthropologists have 
described water as a “total social fact” owing to how it is not only bio-
physically necessary for social life, but also constitutive of multiple institu-
tions of social life (economic, religious, health) such that decisions in one 
domain cannot be cleanly parsed from others (Orlove and Caton 2010, 
402). Part of this has to do with the materiality of water itself and the fact 
that it is shared by upstream and downstream communities, cities, and 
nations. Another aspect, however, is water’s position amid social norms. 
For instance, access to water, such as for household connections, often 
functions as the material and social site for making demands on the state 
for public goods, and even for citizenship itself (von Schnitzler 2016; 
Anand 2017). Anthropologists are not alone in their assessment of water 
as not wholly social but not only natural. Geographers and many others 
have similarly studied the constitutive role of water in social relations. 
Recently, this approach has also been extended to connect the practices of 
scientists and hydrologists to global discourses (Schmidt 2017; Dry 2019). 
This provides a route to think about water both socially and globally and, 
I argue here, to consider the historic role of IOs in forging these links. 
Among the earliest attempts to think of water globally and socially was by 
Julian Huxley (1935, 1943), the enthusiastic eugenicist and United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) 
first Director-General, who lauded the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
in the United States for its model of integrating water control and social 
policy across education, health, and rural development. Huxley thought 
the TVA a model for UNESCO itself. The most influential instance of 
water as social policy, however, is surely cost-benefit analysis, which was 
given its original expression in the 1936 Flood Control Act in the United 
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States before it went on to become virtually ubiquitous in social, eco-
nomic, and environmental policy (Porter 1995; Kysar 2010).
Understanding water socially also provides resources for examining 
contests and conflicts. It does so by virtue of identifying how different 
social practices – legal, economic, scientific, religious – are themselves not 
free of the material constraints water sets: it evaporates, it gets polluted, it 
flows, it floods, it erodes infrastructure, it squirrels away across property 
boundaries, and it is variable in its distribution over space and time. As a 
result, politics are not external to the practices that give an account of 
where water is and when. That we can think of water socially, however, still 
requires an approach to doing so. Mine will become evident throughout 
the chapter (see Schmidt 2017) as one set against popular versions of 
social constructivists in which water is wholly social; a hydrosocial cycle 
such as Linton (2010, 3) proposes when he argues that “Water is what we 
make of it.” Water can be many things, but a flouter of physics is not 
among them. As a result, centering the material account of water is key. 
Where does this leave us with respect to the politics of international orga-
nizations? First, we can follow others who have laid the groundwork for 
thinking of IOs in the water sector as entangled with social conflict, con-
tests, and discourses not sufficiently captured by theories of rational deci-
sion making (Conca 2006; cf. Murphy 1994). Second, we can recognize 
that, like other domains of global social policy, changes in the water sector 
frequently pace changes in global governance generally. Here, we can 
extend Abbott et al.’s (2016) analysis of how structures of global gover-
nance shift to also think about their material undercurrents. To do so, this 
chapter contests the premise of historically powerful actors that water be 
treated non-socially  – as merely a ‘natural resource’—in the first place 
(Schmidt 2017; Scott 1998).
From rIver BaSIn organIzatIonS to gloBal IoS: 
HIStorIcal context
Historically, water IOs are of two main types. One is populated by inter-
national river basin organizations (RBOs) that are spatially oriented to 
transboundary waters shared by two or more countries. Often, though not 
always, these are organized according to the physical space that directs 
water flows – the river basin or watershed. Owing to the diversity of these 
political and spatial environments, RBOs exhibit considerable variety, 
 J. J. SCHMIDT
279
diversity, and levels of authority (see Schmeier 2012; Lautze et al. 2013). 
Some operate at the level of treaties, others advise (officially or unoffi-
cially) on technical or economic concerns, some are imposed, still others 
limp along. RBOs often reflect regional and transnational power relations 
that establish discursive and material hegemony – hydro-hegemony – over 
transboundary waters (Mirumachi 2015; Warner et al. 2017). There are 
presently over 120 RBOs that operate on 110 international watercourses 
worldwide; a tally dutifully kept in an open-access database by Oregon 
State University’s Program in Water Conflict Management and 
Transformation.1 In 1997, the UN Watercourses Convention was adopted 
to provide international norms regarding the use and conservation of 
water crossing international borders. This was accomplished largely by 
codifying existing utilitarian norms as the basis for pursuing equitable 
water sharing arrangements (Blatter and Ingram 2001). Where did these 
norms come from? A second group of IOs played a key role. This group 
includes actors more familiar to other domains of global social policy and 
which also influenced RBOs, such as the World Bank. These IOs are not 
constrained to watersheds or state territories, and often are explicitly ori-
ented to projects advantageous to global industry, agricultural trade, and 
finance. In this section, and as Fig. 12.1 illustrates, I provide a snapshot of 
how RBO experiences and IO interactions influenced one another and 
how both began to shift when ‘global’ water policy began to take shape 
with the launch of UNESCO’s International Hydrological Decade.
Projects of state-making often exercised control over water as a consti-
tutive aspect of spatial rule. These projects could have international dimen-
sions if either water itself crossed existing borders between states or when 
colonial powers appropriated water elsewhere. Mitchell (2002) argues 
that colonial thinking about water, space, and politics continues to exert 
contemporary influence. He’s correct. The draining of marshes for farm-
land and cities, the damming and straightening of rivers, and the establish-
ment and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure all provide the material 
evidence for the moral ordering of water under different state-making 
projects (Scott 1998; Pisani 2002; Blackbourn 2006; Pritchard 2011; 
Gilmartin 2015; Pietz 2015). When these state-making projects were 
exported to colonies they remade landscapes and social relationships 
(Mitchell 2002; D’Souza 2006; Bhattacharyya 2018). In so doing, 
1 See: https://transboundarywaters.science.oregonstate.edu/content/international-river-
basin-organization-rbo-database. Accessed March 21, 2020.
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colonialism exported not only techniques for controlling water, but also 
an approach to water politics aligned to Eurocentric, racialized notions of 
the ‘international’ constituted by recognition and reciprocity among sov-
ereign nations (Pitts 2018).
For instance, as Yao (2019) shows, ‘control over nature’ was central to 
how the ‘international’ was constituted in nineteenth century debates over 
civilization and progress. These debates stem from the first international 
RBO: the Danube Commission established in 1856. The Danube 
Commission was especially occupied with whether Russia’s lack of territo-
rial control over the Danube River met (or did not meet) the Eurocentric 
‘standard of civilization’ (Yao 2019). A peculiar, if not quite universal 
Fig. 12.1 Global water policy IOs: scale and discourse
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feature of applying the so-called ‘standard of civilization’ was the pre-
dominance of engineering as both a practice and disposition to reconciling 
water with political boundaries. One can only control nature with the 
right tools, and engineering was a main one. There were many complicat-
ing factors to using engineering as a kind of social test, especially owing to 
the challenges that arose when water control required technical feats that 
engineering hadn’t yet mastered (Mukerji 2009). But there were advan-
tages to using engineering for social ends because it was the kind of exper-
tise that could travel. Facilitated by colonial networks like those of the 
Dutch and British, engineers shaped and reshaped landscapes across the 
Middle East, and South and South East Asia (Fasseur 1992; Amrith 2018). 
Beyond overt colonialism, engineering became a key practice for harness-
ing water in ways that aligned standards of civilization premised on the 
‘control of nature’ with the spatialization of ‘international’ water politics. 
In short, to qualify for reciprocal international agreements was to be able 
to engineer control over water.
The emergence of transnational water engineering expertise in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gave rise to a diverse set of discur-
sive and technical practices for states and for RBOs (Teisch 2011). Owing 
to considerable diversity across RBOs (see Mukhtarov and Gerlak 2013), 
I focus not on the historical contingencies of individual RBOs but rather 
on how state-making projects began to intersect with the IOs that act 
globally. The Indian case provides an excellent example: The first major 
hydrological project after India gained independence from Britain was a 
multi-purpose river basin development scheme for irrigation, electricity, 
and flood control in West Bengal. The Damodar Valley Corporation (still 
in operation today) established the idea of a ‘nationalist engineer’ as one 
who controlled water in lockstep with advancing national Indian identity 
(Klingensmith 2007). The explicit organizational model for the Damodar 
Valley Corporation was the TVA of the United States, a factor that mat-
tered critically in a conflict over the Indus River on the eastern side of 
India with neighboring Pakistan in 1951. In that case, tensions over how 
to share the Indus river were at fever pitch after the World Bank struggled 
to broker a deal between the two nations. Then, the second director of the 
TVA, David Lilienthal, managed to get both parties to the table, in part by 
appealing to the American model of development as a common discourse 
for multi-purpose river basin planning (Mason and Asher 1973; Ekbladh 
2010; Gilmartin 2015).
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In the Indus case, a shared ethos of water control and state identity 
helped shoulder the burden of international negotiation that allowed 
expertise from the TVA to first shape ‘nationalist’ engineers in India and 
then broker an RBO mediated by the World Bank. The Indian case was 
not entirely unique. Post-WWII, America’s TVA was exported to dozens 
of countries as the quintessential model of ‘international development’ 
promoted by UN agencies, such as UNESCO (see Scott 2006; Ekbladh 
2010). Notably in the Mekong River in Southeast Asia, the TVA provided 
a key organizational model (Biggs 2006; Ekbladh 2010). In 1957, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East backed 
the creation of the Mekong Committee (later the Interim Mekong 
Committee) following the independence of Cambodia, Laos PDR, and 
Vietnam from France (Matthews and Schmidt 2014). The creation of an 
RBO on the Mekong subsequently went through different permutations 
as the seven countries making claims to the river sought – or were com-
pelled to seek  – an international coordinating organization (Gardner 
1997; Biggs 2011). The cases of the Indus and Mekong also speak to a 
larger dynamic in which the control of water was increasingly connected 
to broader, global discourses about international coordination for 
development.
One effect of using the river basin, or watershed, as the spatial scale for 
RBOs was the emergence of a discourse on integrated river basin planning 
by the United Nations (1958; White 1957). Driven by the insight that it 
is better to coordinate the use of shared waters than not to, RBOs and IOs 
soon developed a shared discourse of integration. However, and as even a 
quick perusal of the University of Oregon’s RBO database reveals, the 
organizational structure, funding mechanisms, and economic and data- 
sharing agreements among RBOs vary widely and do not easily reveal a 
straightforward model of ‘integration’ (cf. Schmeier 2012). This diversity 
posed challenges for fostering international norms of integration for 
RBOs, exemplified by the fact that it took four decades until the UN con-
vention on watercourses was adopted in 1997. It may be too strong to 
draw direct causal links, but that convention was made more likely as the 
result of IOs who moved RBO discourses on ‘integration’ from the inter-
national sphere to the global.
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IoS and gloBal Water PolIcy
The shift from international to global water politics officially  began in 
1977 with the United Nations Conference on Water in Mar del Plata, 
Argentina. The impetus for the 1977 conference was not water control per 
se, but rather an integrated global approach to water that individual states 
had no prospect of controlling. Namely, the cumulative effects of water 
use that could affect the global water cycle itself. A decade earlier, that 
concern had been the catalyst for hydrologists in the United States to 
propose an International Hydrological Decade (IHD), which was con-
vened by UNESCO from 1965–74. The IHD operated, like many inter-
national scientific networks during the Cold War, by appealing to – indeed 
establishing notions of  – scientific objectivity presumed independent of 
national interests (cf. Reisch 2005; Wolfe 2018). Directed by the American 
Raymond Nace, the IHD combined Russian hydrological expertise with 
an expansive network of international engineers and scientists. It was 
through the IHD, in fact, that hydrology ‘came of age’ as a science, as 
Nace (1980) would later put it. In this section, I outline how, as the search 
for ‘integration’ moved from the international to the global, existing IOs 
evolved and new IOs began to populate global water policy.
Although UNESCO formally convened the IHD, it also reached out to 
the World Meteorological Organization (previously known as the 
International Meteorological Organization). Again, space and politics 
combined to socially affect water as international scientific collaborations 
established and standardized the field of global hydrology. This time, as 
Nace (1967, 550) captured at the outset of the IHD, the issue was that 
water challenges were “a global problem with local roots.” That is, a chal-
lenge of linking local temporal and spatial variability at the scale of indi-
vidual watersheds to the global water cycle. The task of IHD scientists was 
to link these scales objectively. Indeed, the goal was to fit scientific hydrol-
ogy with universal categories, such as those implied by Nace’s (1969) 
interim report entitled Water and Man: A World View. Supporting this 
project, a raft of reports told similar stories of ‘water and man’ and the 
universal co-evolution of hydrology and societies. These did not displace 
the racial categories entrained in the ‘international’ and instead universal-
ized human-water histories in more teleological fashion, where evolution 
toward global water politics naturally reflected social progress (e.g. Biswas 
1970; Fitzsimmons and Salama 1977).
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At the mid-point of the IHD, in 1971, a new expert IO was created. 
The International Water Resources Association (IWRA) evolved out of 
the American Water Resources Association and held its first World Water 
Congress in 1973  in Chicago. The IWRA quickly became a key global 
knowledge broker as its epistemic community helped forge the emerging 
discourse of global water policy through meetings and its journal, Water 
International, which it launched in 1975. By the end of the IHD, in 
1974, the familiar empirical picture of the hydrological cycle critiqued 
above – lacking people – had quantified the global water system. After the 
IHD ended, a series of international events and actors began to prepare 
for the 1977 UN Conference on Water in Mar del Plata. The IWRA, as 
well as the International Institute of Environment and Development (also 
founded in 1971) began to partner with global organizations such as 
UNESCO, HABITAT, and the World Bank to orient global water gover-
nance toward a dual assessment of water’s global distribution as mapped 
against human needs. At Mar del Plata, these two pillars provided the basis 
for a new discourse of water scarcity that ported the scientific objectivity 
of global hydrology over to social policy. The putatively objective basis of 
the new discourse on water scarcity provided a way to incorporate the 
engineering of water control with social policy in what was known as 
Rational Planning (Biswas 1978). Rational Planning was not unique to 
water (see Lindblom 1999), but in this sector it used water’s statistical 
variability in any particular state as the basis for decision making. These 
statistical distributions continue to travel widely and have been rehearsed 
innumerable times in descriptions of the Earth’s water, in which oceans 
account for around 97% of the total water on the planet, freshwater only 
3%. Of the latter, most is locked in ice or deep underground, with the 
remaining freshwater comprising a scarce reservoir that ought to be man-
aged rationally to achieve utilitarian ends of maximum well-being. This 
empirical account was bolstered by the water atlas published by UNESCO 
just after the IHD ended (Korzoun et al. 1978).
Discourses of water scarcity established in Mar del Plata arrived just 
prior to the widespread adoption of neoliberal policies that sought an 
enhanced – in some versions exclusive – role for free markets in environ-
mental sectors. At Mar del Plata, similar ideas were in circulation as the 
idea of water scarcity was interpreted by the World Bank as requiring forms 
of water pricing to enhance conservation (Warford 1978). As neoliberal 
policies were applied in structural adjustment programs in Chile and else-
where in the 1980s (often supported by the World Bank and other parties 
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to the ‘Washington Consensus’) they became a live testing ground that 
produced mixed results not only for privatization but also for discourses of 
global water policy (Bauer 2004; Goldman 2005; Boelens et al. 2010). 
Through discourses of water scarcity, however, an emerging role for water 
specific IOs arose. By this time, the International Water Resources 
Association had convened its World Water Congress several times since its 
inaugural launch in the 1970s, and routinized meetings involving scien-
tists, government officials, and non-governmental organizations met every 
2 or 3 years. This meant that when neoliberalism hit the ground there was 
already an established global network of water expertise intersecting with 
other IOs such as the World Bank or the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (see Schmidt 2017).
The IWRA proved a critical IO in the 1980s, especially in its response 
to the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development 
report, Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Report on 
sustainable development. Members of the IWRA (1991) critiqued Our 
Common Future for what they perceived as insufficient attention to water 
issues. Then, determined not to let the upcoming opportunity to put 
water on the sustainable development agenda at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
pass, they organized a preliminary meeting in Dublin. The conference 
produced what are known as the “Dublin Principles,” which concretized 
neoliberal policies in many respects by declaring that water “has an eco-
nomic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an eco-
nomic good” (Dublin Statement 1992, np). The principle came fourth in 
a list, and as a way to integrate water’s environmental importance, the 
need for participatory forms of management, and the unique role of 
women in provisioning and safeguarding water under conditions of scar-
city. It also became a flashpoint of conflict and contest as IOs began to 
push the idea of integrated water resources management, or IWRM, based 
on the Dublin Principles into global sustainability agendas.
Through IOs like the World Bank, UNESCO, and the IWRA, the idea 
of IWRM became virtually hegemonic in the 1990s as a way to integrate 
human and environmental water uses while maximizing human well-being 
(Conca 2006). The upshot of IWRM’s ‘integration’ of global hydrology 
and water pricing was congruent with what Bernstein (2001) described as 
the “liberal compromise” of sustainable development: the promotion of 
markets as the most effective instrument for environmental relief. This 
compromise solidified further in the 1990s through the creation of new 
IOs that carried both a technical and social remit, such as the Global Water 
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Partnership (GWP) in 1996. The Global Water Partnership (2000) soon 
established itself as a key knowledge broker through a series of influential 
Technical Reports on IWRM that argued water was both a social and eco-
nomic good (Rogers et al. 1998). The GWP continues to play a key role 
in promoting IWRM worldwide as it has expanded to include over 3000 
partner organizations in 183 countries. The same year, the World Water 
Council was launched. An outcome of a special session at the IWRA World 
Water Congress in 1994, this new IO sought more direct political influ-
ence for the water sector in global economic and environmental policy. It 
quickly launched its own journal, Water Policy, to help establish credibility 
as a multi-stakeholder convenor and also began to convene triennial World 
Water Forums. Its editor-in-chief, Jerome Delli Priscoli (2000), explicitly 
sought to naturalize ‘integration’ in the water sector; he claimed it arose 
from a universal human longing to return to the comfort of the womb.
Water IoS: From IWrm to gloBal SocIal rISkS
At the turn of the new millennium, water IOs took stock. Many of the 
projects promoting IWRM were faltering, often critiqued for weighting 
technical criteria of water control too heavily and not paying sufficient 
attention to social contexts or institutions (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; 
Dellapenna and Gupta 2008). Even for the World Bank (2004) IWRM 
had lost its luster, not least owing to backlash against water privatization 
and social resistance to neoliberalism (see Olivera 2004). Adding further 
urgency was the 2006 United Nations Development Program (2006) 
report on the inequitable connections of water scarcity, social power, and 
poverty. The ensuing reappraisal of IWRM, however, also took place in a 
context where humans were altering the global water system (Schmidt 
2013). The rational approach to water scarcity soon incorporated emerg-
ing, adaptive approaches to resource management and governance as well 
as emerging discourses of water security to bridge from existing IWRM 
programs to structural governance changes (Cook and Bakker 2012). 
Here, water’s materiality once again constrained and compelled policy 
responses.
Established IOs and new intervenors navigated the challenge of institu-
tional inertia around IWRM – including development and financing com-
mitments – and efforts to reckon with new social and biophysical realities. 
The IWRA continued convening the World Water Congress while the 
World Water Council hosted its World Water Forum. The World Water 
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Forums in the Hague (2000) and Kyoto/Shiga/Osaka (2003) brought 
together experts and government ministers to align the water sector with 
the sustainability agenda then taking shape around the Millennium 
Development Goals. Experts in the water sector, however, were beginning 
to wonder openly whether the discursive consensus of IWRM and water 
scarcity were enough, or effective (Biswas 2004; Gleick and Lane 2005). 
A significant element of the discontent was unease about the conceptual 
lock-in of IWRM at a time when evidence was mounting that humans 
were increasingly driving the global hydrological cycle  – both through 
direct, large-scale appropriation of water and through indirect changes to 
land cover and the global climate system (see Vörösmarty et  al. 2004). 
Several factors led, in fairly rapid succession, to a decade of intense trans-
formation in how IOs affected global water policy: (1) The World 
Economic Forum established itself as an independent assessor of progress 
toward the Millennium Development Goals in 2004, and soon began 
publishing annual risk reports on the state of “global risks” (Schmidt and 
Matthews 2018). (2) Energy and food price shocks in the years preceding 
the 2008 global financial crisis led Ban Ki-moon to ask the World Economic 
Forum to focus on water security at the 2009 meeting in Davos. (3) This 
led to the World Economic Forum (2011) using its discursive influence to 
establish water security as linked to shared structural risks linking across 
what is now known as the water-energy-food nexus (Schmidt and 
Matthews 2018; cf. Pigman 2007). Together, these changes added to 
notions of water scarcity a growing recognition of water security that 
prompted IOs in global water policy to shift away from efforts to use 
water as the material basis for ‘integrating’ various domains of social pol-
icy. Instead, the water-energy-food nexus established a different normative 
basis; water was already integrated across multiple social policy domains 
that produced systemic risks to the global water cycle and to the global 
economy. As such, the task of policy was to govern this form of integra-
tion; or what the World Economic Forum (2011) described as the struc-
tural undervaluation of water in the global economy.
Established IOs such as the Global Water Partnership responded to 
these changes by renovating existing institutional stances. For instance, 
the GWP built on its earlier report on Water as a Social and Economic 
Good and its defense of the Dublin Principles in 1998 through a new tech-
nical report on Water Financing and Governance amid the 2008 global 
financial crisis (Rogers et al. 1998; Rees et al. 2008). Indeed, paralleling 
the broader financialization of the global economy (see Krippner 2012), 
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the water sector turned to financial tools for global water policy, such as 
the use of credit risk ratings, debt-for-water swaps, microcredit schemes 
and infrastructure financing to address issues of water security across the 
water-energy-food nexus (see Kolker et al. 2016; Schmidt and Matthews 
2018). The Global Water Partnership (2012) made special use of resil-
ience to link the systemic risks to water-energy-food nexus and the global 
economy. Here, the water sector paced broader policy discourses that had 
adopted the language resilience after the 2008 financial crisis to bridge 
environmental and economic risks (Cooper 2011). Responses to energy, 
food, climate and financial crises, however, were not sufficient: The 
Millennium Development Goal for water and sanitation was not met. 
Worldwide, billions of people still lack basic sanitation infrastructure and 
hundreds of millions lack access to clean, reliable drinking water.
In 2010, the United Nations passed the Human Right to Water and 
Sanitation. The landmark agreement created a key moment for IOs and 
for states, many of whom had drifted toward (if they had not already 
embraced) enhanced uses of market mechanisms in the water sector. The 
response of IOs created new contests, particularly as new networks like the 
World Economic Forum engaged with large corporate actors (PepsiCo, 
Coca-Cola, Nestlé) to forge new working groups, such as the 2030 
Working Group, that sought input into the Sustainable Development 
Goals. While civil society organizations interpreted the Human Right to 
Water and Sanitation as a clear victory over privatization and other neolib-
eral agendas, many global IOs took the view that the best way to deliver 
on the right to water was through the market. Here, World Bank pro-
grams on “water for all” that had established transnational policy expertise 
sought to capture the right to water and to channel it into existing struc-
tures of political economy (Goldman 2009). Debates over the right to 
water continue, especially as different approaches to utilizing the right are 
mobilized across different legal and social contexts (see Langford and 
Russell 2017; Sultana and Loftus 2020).
A final, further twist was added to the field of IOs as the OECD (2013, 
2017) began to position itself with respect to water security, global gover-
nance, and the nexus of land, water, and energy. The OECD had long had 
an interest in water and governance, and its increased attention to the 
portfolio came just as the UN created the High-Level Panel on Water as 
part of its efforts to develop political momentum to deliver on the 2015 
Sustainable Development Goals. Here, water policy reflected shifts in 
global governance that increasingly use ‘goals’ or targets to steer both 
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states and markets (see Kanie and Biermann 2017). The UN High-Level 
Panel likewise used the language of resilience to describe complex systems 
in terms of responses to disturbance, and as being subject to critical thresh-
olds, shocks, and tipping-points. These descriptions of interconnected 
economic and environmental systems mirrored the discourse of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, where resilience was increasingly used to 
link global environmental risks to the sustainability agendas (e.g. Sachs 
2015). From 2016 to 2018, the UN High-Level Panel on Water com-
pleted its first major initiative on “valuing water” and committed to the 
human right to water while positioning that right amid discourses of 
enhancing resilience across economic and environmental systems (Schmidt 
2020). In so doing, the High-Level Panel did not, as originally hoped, get 
through the bricolage of global water contests. Instead, it has reaffirmed 
the central discourses IOs have developed and employed by naturalizing 
the form of ‘integration’ achieved under neoliberal programs through 
which human impacts on the global water cycle, and the Earth system in 
general, have been amplified (see also Schmidt 2019).
concluSIon
IOs have played multiple, critical roles in global water policy. There is 
much more to be researched and examined about them – water continues 
to disobey political boundaries. The aim of this chapter has been to argue 
for a treatment of water as global social policy. To do so requires tracking 
the architecture of arguments through which a particular and powerful 
social view of water has come to dominate global water governance 
through discourses of control, integration, scarcity, and security. This has 
involved IOs working in multiple ways to: negotiate international agree-
ments, facilitate international scientific collaborations, define integrated 
approaches to water management, and to align water with emerging 
development agendas in the context of economic and environmental crises.
There are many dissenting narratives occluded from, and deliberately 
excluded by, the current architecture of global water governance. The 
upshot is that the water risks faced by those marginalized in intersectional 
ways across both urban and rural areas, and in view of colonial histories 
and ongoing settler colonial structures, remain unaddressed. And this is 
only to constrain the explication of risks to our own species. One implica-
tion of the foregoing argument is that further, critical study of water as 
global social policy is paramount to reckoning with the social power that 
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continues to be wielded through control over it. A second is that, in order 
to follow through on not treating water as merely instrumental to other 
policy domains, it is essential to confront the material reality that multiple 
other domains – such as health, education, and industry – are interdepen-
dent with water. So, it will not do to think of water non-socially, nor to 
hope we can make whatever we like out of water. Rather, it is imperative 
to treat water as not only natural and not wholly social, and to develop an 
architecture for global social policy capacious enough to govern water 
equitably.
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CHAPTER 13
International Organizations and Food: 
Nearing the End of the Lean Season?
Anna Wolkenhauer
IntroductIon
Food is many things. Most essentially, it is a source of nutrition—a source 
of life. Food is also culture, identity, and history. It provides autonomy 
and independence. And food embodies humans’ relationship to the land. 
It is a source of income; a tradeable product and a global commodity. 
Food is a precious good and a vulnerable one too. Given its diversity of 
qualities and functions, how can food be delineated as an object of global 
social policy? If social policy is not only taken to include redistributive and 
protective interventions, but likewise those that aim to improve individu-
als’ productive capacities and ability to earn an income (Mkandawire 
2010), then food security comprises not only the “access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food that meets [people’s] dietary needs and food 
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preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO et al. 2019, 186), but also 
access to the means of production.
At least since the food price hikes and subsequent crises of 2008 and 
2011, food security has become a global concern. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations estimated at the 
time that “the number of undernourished people in the world in 2008 
[was] 915 million […], the highest [absolute] number estimated over the 
past 3–4 decades” (FAO 2009, 104). Four famines were recorded between 
2000 and 2011, all of them in Africa (Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, and 
Somalia) (Devereux 2018a, 195). In 2019, the FAO found that the num-
ber of people who suffered from hunger was again on the rise, reaching 
over 820 million, with the largest share of undernourishment (almost 20 
percent of the population) in Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO et al. 2019, 3). 
Achieving food security and the reduction of hunger are key aims in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), they remain far from reached ten 
years out from the target year 2030.
International policies on food have historically been marked by a ten-
sion between visions of a global regulatory agency mandated to ensure 
equitable food supplies across the world and concerns about trade inter-
ests. While the more radical vision drove the initial post-war formation of 
the FAO, it was soon undermined by the widespread reliance on market 
forces, as promoted especially by the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs). In the course of time, food policy became enmeshed with broader 
agendas of poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, while structural 
adjustment undercut productive capacities in the Global South. This his-
tory is important to understand not only the lack of success of interna-
tional efforts at reducing global hunger, but also the current architecture 
of arguments in global food policy.
At present, the field of global food policy is marked by the reemergence 
of productive concerns, however, the realization of these concerns is 
somewhat constrained by the international free trade system institutional-
ized through the World Trade Organization (WTO). Within these bound-
aries, international agricultural institutions provide technical research, 
humanitarian relief, and linkages between food and other social policy 
programs, while the underlying structural causes for food insecurity largely 
remain in place. Thus, large parts of the populations in the Global South 
remain unable to secure sufficient food, despite working in agriculture.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section traces the 
history of the major international organizations (IOs) since their 
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respective founding dates and discusses discursive and policy shifts up until 
the turn of the millennium. The third section then looks at contemporary 
debates around food and revisits the major IOs that were previously intro-
duced. The chapter concludes that despite the narrowing of the discourse 
about food security, new movements can be distilled that promise to 
reopen some of the neglected debates about food and its production.
HIstory: Ios and Food PolIcy 
In tHe twentIetH century
Constituting the Post-Colonial Order
Food has been a global issue long before it became institutionalized as a 
policy field of international organizations after the Second World War 
(WWII). Questions of international trade and agricultural policies have 
long been interlinked, and during the colonial era, the securing of agricul-
tural products was a central motivation for the European conquest of 
countries in the Global South (Orford 2015, 9). The International 
Institute of Agriculture (IIA) was founded in 1905 and was the first for-
mal initiative to create a global mechanism for exchanging information on 
commodities. Based in Rome, the IIA conducted a number of conferences 
between 1920 and 1934 and would later be integrated into the  FAO 
(Staples 2006, 69; Liese 2012, 114). In 1937, the Permanent Agricultural 
Committee of the International Labour Organization (ILO) was set up to 
deal with problems related to agricultural labor (Nelson 1949, 525). In 
the interwar period, hunger came to be seen as a major global problem 
(Jachertz and Nützenadel 2011, 102), urban-rural disparities came to the 
fore (Forclaz 2019, 354), and knowledge about the importance of ade-
quate nutrition grew (Staples 2006, 68–69).
Connecting nutrition and production, the FAO of the United Nations 
was conceived during the last years of WWII and officially founded 
through the approval of its constitution by representatives of 44 member 
states in October 1945 (Shaw 2007, 9). The preamble of the FAO’s con-
stitution described its mandate as raising nutrition levels, improving the 
efficiency of food production, contributing to rural development, and 
expanding the world economy overall (Phillips 1981, 9).
In 1946, a Rural Welfare Division was set up to act as an overarching 
unit that would connect the various technical divisions of the FAO, which 
13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND FOOD: NEARING THE END… 
300
were in turn responsible for fisheries, forestry, and other specialized fields 
(Forclaz 2019, 355). The Division was directed by Horace Belshaw, who 
adopted a holistic approach to rural development, attributed key impor-
tance to local knowledge and subjective measures of well-being, and was 
skeptical of overly top-down, expert-driven development programs 
(Forclaz 2019, 352–53, 359). The Division acted like the “conscience of 
FAO in rural welfare matters” (Phillips 1981, 128). In these early years, 
the FAO aimed to strengthen smallholder agriculture, as increasing their 
production would improve health and living standards as well as food 
availability (Forclaz 2019, 356). The approach taken by the FAO experts 
was informed by historical lessons, such as from Denmark’s redistributive 
land reform and support to smallholders (Forclaz 2019, 358).
The FAO formulated a vision for a global food system which reflected 
the wider post-war optimism that global problems could be resolved 
through international cooperation (Jachertz and Nützenadel 2011, 
99–100). One of the early propositions came from its first Director 
General, John Boyd Orr. He presented to the FAO’s 1946 conference the 
idea of setting up a World Food Board for holding buffer stocks and for 
providing credit to developing countries (Jachertz and Nützenadel 2011, 
109). The food held by the Board was supposed to be used for famine 
relief and sold at reduced prices to countries in need (Jachertz and 
Nützenadel 2011). It would also use its stockholding to prevent a fall in 
prices that might discourage food production (Staples 2006, 85–86). At 
the same time, it was hoped that the Board would thereby contribute to 
peace between nations (Staples 2006, 87).
While the conference initially approved of Orr’s suggestion and set up 
a commission tasked with thinking out the details, the idea was eventually 
buried upon opposition from the US and the UK, who feared losing 
autonomy over trade policies (Jachertz and Nützenadel 2011, 110). Both 
were opposed to a strong FAO with regulatory powers and preferred an 
organizationally weak institution that would concentrate on offering tech-
nical advice, like the IIA had done previously (Jachertz and Nützenadel 
2011, 107–08). Others, notably Latin American countries would have 
preferred an FAO with more far-reaching powers (Jachertz and Nützenadel 
2011). Ultimately, instead of creating a World Food Board, it became a 
national undertaking for many countries to hold food buffer stocks, while 
international policies revolved around economic growth with the belief 
that this would eventually enable everyone to buy sufficient food (Staples 
2006, 92–93). The 1950s were the height of modernization theories, 
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which were focused on industrialization more than on agricultural devel-
opment (Frey and Unger 2017, 11–12; Maxwell 2001, 39).
The FAO’s second Director General, Norris E.  Dodd, who was in 
office from 1948 until 1953, again tried to endow the FAO with powers 
to balance out price fluctuations in food commodities, but his proposal 
was equally rejected (Jachertz and Nützenadel 2011, 112). In the 1950s, 
the FAO then slowly gave up on its grand visions and resorted to focusing 
on technical assistance (Staples 2006, 99). Parallel to reducing its ambi-
tions, the FAO’s budget on the contrary grew. Supplementing its own 
small budget, the rapidly growing UN Expanded Program of Technical 
Assistance (EPTA, later to become the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP)) doubled its funds to the FAO as part of its increased 
rural development aid (Forclaz 2019, 361). Consequently, the FAO’s 
ability to undertake short-term technical assignments upon request by 
member governments grew (Forclaz 2019). The largest number of experts 
deployed came from the US and other Western countries and the way in 
which these technical missions worked was short-term, without much 
familiarity with the broader socio-economic contexts of receiving coun-
tries (Forclaz 2019, 363). The shift toward “piece-meal” technical tasks 
was further underlined in 1951, when the Rural Welfare Division was dis-
mantled and reduced to a sub-division of the agriculture division in con-
junction with the FAO headquarters moving from Washington to Rome 
(Forclaz 2019, 361; Phillips 1981, 128).
Food deficits gained renewed attention in the 1960s. Under the frame-
work of its “Freedom from Hunger” campaign, the FAO increased its 
budget by 350 percent and further expanded its technical assistance pro-
grams in developing countries (Jachertz and Nützenadel 2011, 114; 
Phillips 1981, 72). In the same year, the United Nations adopted a resolu-
tion to distribute food through the UN system to “food-deficit” popula-
tions (Shaw 2009, 59). At the time, the US had been accumulating large 
food surpluses and had created its own “Office of Food for Peace” in the 
Executive Office of the president (Shaw 2009). The FAO warned that 
“dumping” large amounts of food could have negative consequences on 
receiving countries, and led the initiative to develop a system through 
which food aid could be used as part of the larger global developmental 
effort rather than as a political tool (Shaw 2009, 60; Shaw 2001, 3). This 
became the rationale for the creation of the World Food Program (WFP) 
in 1961 (Shaw 2009, 62–63). The US, however, made sure that this 
would coexist with, rather than replace, bilateral food aid programs (Shaw 
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2009). The WFP was created with a dual mandate: to provide long-term 
developmental, and short-term humanitarian assistance (Shaw 2001, 2), 
with the relative weight between the two shifting back and forth over 
time.1 In the first three decades after its creation, the WFP directed two- 
thirds of its resources toward developmental interventions, mainly through 
“food for work” and school feeding programs, and one-third toward 
emergencies (Shaw 2009, 76). This would reverse in the 1990s (Shaw 
2009). Another important change concerned the sourcing of the food. 
The WFP shifted from using donated food from donor countries toward 
tapping into local and regional food markets (Maxwell 2008).
Last, the World Bank (WB) was one of the early organizations engaged 
in food policies after WWII. Under the World Bank Group, the 
International Development Association (IDA) was created in 1960 to 
offer loans on concessional terms, and the World Bank’s overall aim turned 
toward poverty reduction (Shaw 2009, 71–76). The share of credit it pro-
vided to agricultural projects grew during the 1960s, not least due to the 
so-called Green Revolution during which crop yields in Latin America and 
Asia significantly increased between the 1950s and 1970s and thus 
required major investments in irrigation, drainage, and other related ser-
vices (Pincus 2001).
In 1964, the World Bank decided to work together with UN special-
ized agencies, and a deal was made that the FAO would prepare agricul-
tural projects for World Bank lending (Shaw 2009, 114). The World Bank 
itself increased the number of staff in its agriculture department too (Shaw 
2009). After an initial period of mainly providing loans for large infra-
structure projects (roads, harbors, airports, dams), the World Bank’s 
investment portfolio broadened from the mid-1960s, and agriculture 
became one of the main foci (Stryker 1979, 326–27), “designed to benefit 
‘the poorest 40 percent’” (Mkandawire 2010, 42). The IDA invested 
heavily in small farmers, supplying them with seed and fertilizer to foster 
cash crop production, which happened at the expense of the growth of 
local staple foods (Tetzlaff 2012, 266). Especially under the leadership of 
World Bank president McNamara (in office from 1968–1981), small farm 
development was seen as crucial for combining growth with poverty 
reduction (Pincus 2001).
The “Green Revolution” gave rise to high hopes in technology and 
science for resolving the world’s hunger problem. While progress in 
1 https://www.wfp.org/history. Accessed May 16, 2020.
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natural sciences and technology had also been key for earlier agricultural 
revolutions (see Mingay 1977 on the UK), this marked the first large-scale 
and global “diffusion” of agricultural knowledge, such as that on high-
yielding crop varieties. The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations were at the 
forefront of developing an international agricultural research program, 
beginning with research on rice and wheat improvements (Hazell 2009, 
1). Even though many of the technological solutions of the time were not 
appropriate for smallholder production (Harwood 2009), the “Green 
Revolution” was perceived as a success story of science, thereby laying the 
foundations for the significant role that global research organizations 
would come to play in food policy. Besides the two foundations, there was 
also the FAO, the UNDP, and the World Bank that began to lobby for 
donors to invest more funds into agricultural research (Shaw 2009, 66). 
This led to the creation of the Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in 1971, an umbrella body for research 
institutes that was initially tasked with studying possibilities of increasing 
output in staple foods (Shaw 2009, 66, 88, 154). The FAO, however, only 
reluctantly became a co-sponsor of CGIAR, as it meant giving away the 
lead it had in providing agricultural research by doing so (Shaw 2009, 96).
The 1970s: High Time for Food Security
In the early 1970s, the world’s worst food crisis “in modern history” 
(Shaw 2010, 664), which included famines in the Sahel, Bangladesh, and 
Ethiopia (Devereux 2000, 6), led the FAO to propose an international 
initiative for world food security and for setting up an early warning sys-
tem (Phillips 1981, 74). At this time, the FAO was roughly half financed 
through the UNDP and half financed through extra-budgetary sources 
like trust funds (earmarked funds from donors for specific countries) 
(Phillips 1981). In 1974, a World Food Conference (WFC) was convened 
in Rome, though not on the FAO’s premises (Shaw 2009, 96). Nonetheless, 
it still organized much of the program and managed to gain political sup-
port for many of its proposed activities. These included setting up a Global 
Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) and strengthening its 
work on pesticides, seeds, plant and animal diseases, nutrition, extension, 
research, and training (Phillips 1981, 75). One of the goals defined at the 
WFC was the eradication of hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity 
within a span of ten years (Martha 2009, 451). In the subsequent years, 
member governments agreed to increase the FAO’s budget, though 
13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND FOOD: NEARING THE END… 
304
simultaneously suggested that it divert some of its resources away from 
headquarters (which was perceived to be overstaffed) into country offices 
(Phillips 1981, 75). After a review, some areas of the FAO’s work were 
scaled down, including activities related to economic policies and world 
agricultural development, while the new short-term Technical Cooperation 
Program was initiated (Phillips 1981).
The 1974 conference also led to the establishment of various new insti-
tutional bodies. One of them was the Committee on World Food Security 
(CFS), an intergovernmental committee within the FAO tasked with serv-
ing as a forum for reviewing and following up on the decisions made at the 
conference (CFS 2015, 1). Another one was the shorter-lived World Food 
Council. Created in 1974, it was meant to function as “a political over-
view body and was to serve as the eyes, ears, and conscience of the UN 
system regarding world food security issues” (Shaw 2010, 664). Its coor-
dination mandate allowed the president of the WFC to attend meetings of 
the governing bodies of the relevant UN agencies, in addition to holding 
meetings with their executive heads individually and collectively (Shaw 
2010, 676). However, while given huge responsibilities, the WFC never 
received enough resources or authority and was dissolved in 1993 (Shaw 
2010, 690).
Finally, a new international financial institution was created in 1977 
following the recognition during the 1974 conference that investments in 
food and agricultural production needed to be significantly increased 
(Martha 2009, 451). The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) was to be funded by voluntary contributions, a large share of 
which was to come from OPEC countries. It initially focused on funding 
food production in the poorest developing countries (Martha 2009, 453), 
and later diversified into other areas, such as rural finance, fisheries and 
livestock, irrigation, and rural poverty reduction more generally (Shaw 
2009, 143–45). As contributions remained behind commitments, IFAD 
became a small provider of grants and loans when compared to the World 
Bank and regional development banks (Shaw 2009, 63, 87).2 Nonetheless, 
it is the only IFI that has the mandate to invest its resources exclusively 
into agriculture in developing countries (Martha 2009: 457).
Throughout this period, the relative weight of the World Bank grew. 
Against an overall rise in World Bank lending and a growing number of 
World Bank staff, the increase in the share of agriculture in its lending 
2 https://www.ifad.org/en/history. Accessed May 16, 2020.
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portfolio from 18 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1981 was considerable 
(Pincus 2001). By the late 1970s, the World Bank had become the most 
powerful international financial institution for development (Stryker 
1979, 325), and debt owed by countries in the Global South started to 
accumulate (Tetzlaff 2012, 266). Apart from being the largest lender, the 
World Bank also began to dominate in terms of defining global develop-
ment paradigms, based on the expertise of its economists from around the 
world (Tetzlaff 2012, 262–63). As a “knowledge bank”, it has since had 
significant influence on the global development discourse (Van 
Waeyenberge and Fine 2011). It further increased its influence over 
CGIAR by increasing its funding and by persuading the CGIAR members 
to accept that their chairperson would be the vice-president of the World 
Bank (Shaw 2009, 114–15). Meanwhile, the FAO declined in relative 
importance and power (Unger 2019, 456).
The 1960s and 1970s were marked by governmental support for 
agriculture in the Global South. As in industrialized countries in the 
past, the strategies employed by states included land reforms, the pro-
vision of inputs and extension, national marketing agencies, govern-
mental price setting, and stockpile management (Chang 2009). By 
taking account of and countering smallholder vulnerability, these 
could be classified as social protection policies (Devereux 2009, 6). 
While the FAO was supportive of such measures, it could not prevent 
them from becoming discredited during the neoliberal era of struc-
tural adjustment and agricultural liberalization.
Neoliberal Shifts
In the 1980s, after a short period of prioritizing rural poverty reduction, 
the World Bank shifted instead to concentrating on “eliminating all obsta-
cles to a ‘perfect market’ as the presumed optimal path to growth” (Van 
Waeyenberge et al. 2011, 6). The bundle of neoliberal economic policy 
prescriptions commonly summarized as the “Washington Consensus” 
included the removal of subsidies, the deregulation and liberalization of 
trade, and the elimination of parastatal agencies (Oya 2004, 129). The 
national food security policies referred to above fell victim to these reforms, 
being perceived as largely inefficient and too costly. For Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the World Bank’s “Berg Report”, published in 1981, found that 
domestic pricing policies had been biased against agriculture, disrupted 
market mechanisms, and crowded out the private sector (World Bank 
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1981; Loxley 1983; Devereux 2009, 6). The FAO underwent a policy 
shift too: from approaching food security at the national level (thus pro-
moting grain-stockholding and self-sufficiency) to defining it at the indi-
vidual and household level (for which imports were deemed more efficient) 
(Jarosz 2011). How and why this shift within the FAO occurred would 
merit further scrutiny.
During the 1980s, the World Bank provided so-called agricultural sec-
toral adjustment loans (ASALs) to countries of the Global South that were 
linked to the elimination of subsidies and the liberalization of prices for 
agricultural inputs and outputs (Pincus 2001). The envisaged solution was 
that by lifting price “distortions” imposed by the state, smallholders would 
be enabled to prosper freely (Oya 2004, 128). Having been identified as 
the problem, governing elites were now circumvented by donors, who 
preferred working through NGOs (Mkandawire 2010, 42–44). Overall, 
the reforms effectively dismantled the capacities of states to promote social 
and economic well-being. Their reduced investment in public goods for 
the agricultural sector coupled with trade liberalization threatened the 
survival of many farmers (Chang 2009, 2). Moreover, the wide-reaching 
financial market deregulation that began in this period enabled specula-
tions on food, which eventually became one of the main drivers of the 
food price crises of 2008 and 2011 (Sonkin 2020).
During the height of structural adjustment, food security was recon-
ceptualized. While it was still a concern to IOs in this period, it was largely 
decoupled from the production of food. As agricultural interventions by 
states had been discredited, structural adjustment reforms aiming at mac-
roeconomic stability and economic growth were believed to ultimately 
also benefit poor people’s ability to purchase food in the (globally con-
nected) marketplace. According to the World Bank in the 1980s, the solu-
tion was “raising the real incomes of households so that they can afford to 
acquire enough food” (World Bank 1986, 5). Food security hence became 
mainly an issue of how to access it for consumption (Maxwell 2001, 
24–25; Orford 2015, 6).
A critical juncture originated in the academic debate about famines. In 
1981, Amartya Sen published his seminal work “Poverty and Famines” in 
which he pointed out that food crises were often not the outcome of 
insufficient food availability, but of insufficient access to food (Sen 1981). 
He suggested the framework of entitlements to make the case for paying 
more attention to individuals’ and households’ unequally distributed abil-
ity to access food, either through one’s own production, by purchasing it 
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from labor investment, or through food assistance (Sen; Devereux 2000, 
19). With his intervention, Sen aimed to counter what had been received 
wisdom until then, including within the FAO: that food security was 
mainly a supply-side issue. Instead, he argued, one also needed to consider 
the inequalities and political dynamics within countries that accounted for 
people suffering from famines even in cases where food was available. 
While constituting an important intervention into an apolitical, technical 
discourse about food security, this work was simultaneously compatible 
with the interpretation that food security was achievable through a reduc-
tion of poverty and improved access to markets for the poor (Devereux 
2000, 20).
As access to food became a priority in the World Bank’s food policy 
discourse, its lending to agriculture decreased. In its influential 1986 
report entitled “Poverty and Hunger”, the World Bank cited Sen’s 1981 
work to make the point that “[…] the loss of real income better explains 
why famines occur and who gets hurt” (World Bank 1986, 27). The focus 
in the international discourse shifted from supply to demand, and “entitle-
ment, vulnerability and risk became the new watchwords” (Maxwell and 
Slater 2003, 532). It was only another four years until the World Bank 
began to promote targeted safety nets, perfecting an individualized per-
spective on poverty (World Bank 1990). The share of the World Bank’s 
lending to agriculture dropped from 30 percent in the early 1980s to 
around 8 percent by the end of the millennium (Shaw 2009, 115).3 The 
resulting gap in lending to agriculture could not be compensated by 
IFAD, either, which had limited resources at its disposal (Martha 
2009, 459).
The subordination of food security under the free trade paradigm was 
reinforced in 1995 by the formation of the WTO. Having previously been 
excluded from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), agri-
culture became part of the agreement for the first time (FAO 1998). More 
than just regulating the international system, domestic policies also became 
the target of the rules due to their influence on trade (FAO 1998). While 
the arguments underlying these agreements were similar to those of the 
structural adjustment reforms, the WTO had longer-lasting effects on 
governments’ ability to foster production by permanently enshrining rules 
3 The World Bank explains the decline with reference to the falling profitability of agricul-
ture, the increased competition for aid from other sectors, and the opposition from devel-
oped country farmers as well as environmental groups (World Bank 2007, 42).
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about what types of interventions were permitted and which were not 
(FAO 1998; Margulis 2017, 50–51).
The FAO, meanwhile, reaffirmed food security and fighting hunger as 
their top priorities (Shaw 2009, 103). Because the long-term social effects 
of structural adjustment measures had proven disastrous for many coun-
tries in the Global South and had hit poorer farmers particularly hard (Oya 
2004, 129–30), the awareness of poverty, undernourishment, and food 
insecurity began to rise again during the 1990s. A Summit on World Food 
Security was called by the FAO with the aim to renew international com-
mitments.4 The Summit took place in November 1996 and a target was 
set to halve the number of people who were undernourished by 2015, 
measured against the year 1990 (Devereux 2018a, 185). The definition of 
food security cited in the introduction of this chapter was also born at that 
summit, and has since become widely accepted (Margulis 2017, 29–30).
Ios and Food PolIcy sInce tHe turn 
oF tHe new MIllennIuM
Consensus and Critique
In 2003, Maxwell and Slater nostalgically asked: “Remember ‘food pol-
icy’? It is what some of us used to do before we discovered ‘food security’” 
(Maxwell and Slater 2003, 531). Food security has become the core con-
cept and rallying point in international food policy discourse. The above 
historical account shows how food security has evolved into a central, yet 
unsuccessfully resolved global problem. This section is concerned with the 
period since the turn of the new millennium. Architecturally, there has 
emerged an apparent consensus among the main international organiza-
tions that has culminated in two sets of developmental goals. Shortly fol-
lowing the 1996 World Food Summit, the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) were adopted, in which goal number one was to “eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger”, or more precisely, to “halve, between 1990 
and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger”.5 And in the 
SDGs that replaced the MDGs in 2015, goal number two was to “end 
hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
4 http://www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm. Accessed May 16, 2020.
5 https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml. Accessed May 16, 2020.
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sustainable agriculture”.6 Both have contributed to a common framework 
for international organizations working in food (Devereux 2018a, 185), 
including the FAO, the WFP, and the World Bank.7
Especially since 2008, global food policy initiatives have proliferated, 
and several international organizations have forged connections within 
this field (Fouilleux et al. 2017, 1660). Since 2017, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
have joined the FAO, the WFP, and IFAD in publishing their annual flag-
ship publication “The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World”, 
which serves to monitor the progress made on SDG number two (FAO 
et al. 2019, xvi). As a new body, the Global Agriculture and Food Security 
Program (GAFSP) was launched in 2010 by the G20, as a “global partner-
ship” for channeling donor funds (from rich countries and the Gates 
Foundation) to “public and private actors along the entire agriculture 
value chain”.8 It is administered by the World Bank (FAO et  al. 2019, 
1665) and its steering committee includes not only representatives of 
international organizations but also a few civil society groups.9 Since the 
1996 World Food Summit, advocacy for recognizing the right to food has 
also brought the global human rights regime into the picture (Margulis 
2013, 58). The capacities of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the Human Rights Council to monitor and enforce 
the human right to food have been strengthened (Margulis 2013, 59). 
The FAO adopted voluntary “right to food” guidelines in 200410 and 
since then, has made efforts to mainstream a rights-based approach into its 
food agenda, albeit with varying success (Anthes and De Schutter 2017). 
Last, the space occupied by the WFP in the new millennium is unclear 
owing to the dual nature of its mandate, which has been found to be per-
ceived as somewhat confusing (MOPAN 2013). While its budget is several 
6 https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/hunger/. Accessed May 16, 2020.
7 http://www.fao.org/sustainable-development-goals/en/; https://www.wfp.org/zero-
hunger; https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/sdgs-2030-agenda, all accessed May 
16, 2020.
8 https://www.gafspfund.org/approach. Accessed May 16, 2020.
9 https://www.gafspfund.org/civil-society-organizations. Accessed May 16, 2020.
10 Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to adequate 
Food in the Context of National Food Security, adopted by the 127th Session of the FAO 
Council, 22–27 November 2004, see http://www.fao.org/3/j3893e/J3893e02.htm#ad. 
Accessed May 16, 2020.
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times higher than that of the FAO,11 its emergency logistics skills have at 
times made a larger impression than its developmental food policy visions 
(Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2018, 31; Maxwell 2008).
As international organizations have failed to resolve the problem of 
global hunger while continuously reconstructing a hopeful narrative 
(Hickel 2017), the emergence of powerful civil society actors has brought 
important dimensions of the global food question back to the table 
(Duncan 2016). A well-known one is La Via Campesina, an umbrella 
movement of peasants and smallholders from around the world, that was 
founded in 1993 to connect struggles for farmers’ sovereignty over land, 
seeds, agricultural practices, and food (Borras Jr 2008; Borras et  al. 
2015).12 La Via Campesina has engaged with the FAO, which is interested 
in collaborative policy development and knowledge sharing (Claeys and 
Edelman 2020, 1).13 One recent success of civil society has been the adop-
tion by the United Nations of the “Declaration on the Rights of Peasants 
and Other People Working in Rural Areas” in 2018 (Claeys and Edelman 
2020); another one was the institutionalization of civil society participa-
tion in the Committee on World Food Security, whose secretariat is hosted 
by the FAO, in 2009 (Duncan and Barling 2012; Duncan 2016, 150). 14
An important critic of the global trade system and its effects on food 
security was Olivier De Schutter, who served as UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food from 2008 until 2014 (McMichael 2014, 939; Orford 
2015, 7). He highlighted that foreign imports outcompeted local produc-
tion and destroyed agricultural capacities in the Global South, and criti-
cized the WTO for rendering domestic food reserves, the management of 
prices, and the cushioning of income volatility for the rural poor impossi-
ble (De Schutter 2011). He also advocated for better regulations of large- 
scale land acquisitions and for obliging investors to operate in the interest 
of local peasants (McMichael 2014, 939). Last, when the WTO proposed 
to regulate the types of permissible food aid, the WFP intervened and 
launched a public media campaign against the WTO (Margulis 2013, 61). 
11 WFP had raised 7.2 billion USD in 2018 (https://www.wfp.org/overview), while the 
total FAO budget planned for 2018–2019 was 2.6 billion USD (http://www.fao.org/
about/how-we-work/en/, both accessed May 16, 2020).
12 https://viacampesina.org/en/food-sovereignty/. Accessed May 16, 2020.
13 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/201824/icode/. Accessed May 16, 2020.
14 http://www.fao.org/cfs/home/about/en/. Accessed May 16, 2020.
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But while the UN organizations have much normative and moral author-
ity, the WTO ultimately makes the rules (Margulis 2013, 63).
Production
In the new millennium, food production is back on the agenda. As was 
described above, the focus had shifted since the early 1980s from ques-
tions of production to questions of distribution and access. For several 
reasons, the new millennium has seen a return to the concern of how to 
produce more food. Devereux calls this the “new productivist agenda” 
(Devereux 2018a). Given the accelerating effects of climate change, this 
agenda is inevitably linked to the question of how to make food produc-
tion not only more yielding but also more “sustainable”.
Especially in Africa, agricultural productivity has not substantially 
increased over the past 50 years so that the continent falls short of feeding 
itself (Devereux 2018a, 186–88). In light of global population growth, 
the imperative that results is commonly referred to as the “challenge of 
feeding 9 billion people” (Godfray et al. 2010). In 2009, the FAO wrote 
that food production needed to be doubled “[…] in order to feed a popu-
lation projected to reach 9.2 billion by 2050” (FAO 2009, vi), and the 
World Bank even estimates that a 70 percent increase in food will be 
required.15 While the need to increase the overall amount of available food 
worldwide is highly disputed (Fouilleux et al. 2017), as the current amount 
could be sufficient if only it were better distributed,16 the “productivist 
agenda” has brought the important question of supporting smallholder 
agriculture back into focus.
One of the first signals of this move was the World Bank’s 2008 World 
Development Report (WDR), entitled “Agriculture for Development” 
(World Bank 2007). The topic of that year’s WDR surprised the develop-
ment community, given that the World Bank had not paid much attention 
to agriculture since the 1980s, as indicated above. In fact, except for 
IFAD, all international financial institutions had reduced their relative 
share of lending to agriculture during the 1990s (Martha 2009, 458). In 
the report, the World Bank itself recognized that donor neglect had 
15 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climate-smart-agriculture. Accessed May 
16, 2020.
16 https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/world-food-day-there-enough-food-
grown-world-everyone-op-ed. Accessed May 16, 2020.
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contributed to an underinvestment in agriculture in the Global South 
(World Bank 2007, 44).
The report was seen as a welcome move back toward the unresolved 
issue of how to foster smallholder production, but criticisms mounted too. 
The main thrust of the WDR 2008 remained the focus on market-led 
agricultural development in which the “new role for the state” would con-
sist of “providing core public goods, improving the investment climate for 
the private sector—and in better natural resources management by intro-
ducing incentives and assigning property rights” (World Bank 2007, 24). 
Such interventions, however, did not promise to resolve the problems 
created by dismantling states’ ability to promote their own agricultural 
sectors in the Global South, and critics interpreted it as “an ongoing 
adherence to orthodoxy” (Akram-Lodhi 2008, 1155). Moreover, while 
paying lip service to peasants, the report failed to resolve the problems 
they faced in having to operate in a detrimental environment shaped by 
big agribusinesses and corporate power (Oya 2009, 595).
Raising agricultural productivity and production without further dam-
aging the environment and climate is a widely shared concern. As one 
solution, the FAO and World Bank encourage techniques of conservation 
agriculture (World Bank 2012).17 The FAO additionally supports agro-
ecology (FAO 2018) and organic farming (Morgera et al. 2012, v). For its 
part, the World Bank has promoted “climate-smart agriculture” since 
2009, which combines the aims of productivity increase, reduction of vul-
nerability to climate change, and reduction of emissions (i.e., productivity, 
adaptation, and mitigation).18 Critics, however, have argued that this con-
cept remains vague enough for the agricultural “business as usual” to con-
tinue (Taylor 2018). Research plays an important role in reaching the 
vision of a “food system simultaneously capable of delivering greater vol-
umes of more nutritious food with a lower environmental footprint”.19 
International agricultural think tanks have once again gained in impor-
tance, not least because state research agencies have suffered in the struc-
tural adjustment period (Chang 2009, 14).
While critics point to the conflict between free trade and peasant pro-
duction, a popular attempt at reconciling both is the reliance on global 
value chains. According to the World Bank, increasing private sector 
17 http://www.fao.org/conservation-agriculture/en/. Accessed May 16, 2020.
18 https://csa.guide/csa/what-is-climate-smart-agriculture. Accessed May 16, 2020.
19 https://www.cgiar.org/research/research-themes/. Accessed May 16, 2020.
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investment in agricultural value chains will contribute to ending poverty 
and hunger (World Bank 2018). Whether smallholders can benefit from 
being part of agricultural value chains, however, remains far from clear 
(Joala et al. 2016). From a very different vantage point, though also aimed 
at connecting smallholders to markets, farming cooperatives have been 
rediscovered. Historically, the cooperative movement has been a powerful 
way of enabling smallholders to benefit from economies of scale while 
simultaneously serving as a collective body for interest representation and 
risk pooling (Wanyama et  al. 2009). After having suffered considerably 
from the structural adjustment reforms (Wanyama et al. 2009), coopera-
tives are now being promoted again, most prominently by the ILO. In 
2002, the ILO adopted its Promotion of Cooperatives Recommendation 
(No. 193) as a guide to governments for revising their cooperative laws 
and putting supportive policies in place (ILO 2014, xv). The ILO sees 
cooperatives as having the potential to offer their members decent jobs, 
better access to global, regional, and national (agricultural) markets, access 
to finance, infrastructure, and irrigation, as well as social security (ILO 
2014; Pollet 2009).
Protection
A whole architecture of its own has been constructed from arguments 
about the (potential) linkages between social protection and food security. 
The new millennium has seen a wave of new social protection policies 
across the Global South. They are aimed at providing income security in 
times of risk during different stages of the life cycle and include social 
assistance programs (like cash transfers) and social insurance schemes (like 
unemployment benefits) (ILO 2017, xxix). Many international organiza-
tions are promoting the social protection agenda, though from very differ-
ent conceptual and political angles (for an overview, see UNICEF 2019, 
63–68). In 2012, the High-Level Panel of Experts of the Committee on 
World Food Security produced a report arguing that rights-based social 
protection could further the realization of the right to food (HLPE 2012, 
11). Social protection can play several key roles in relation to food, not 
only in terms of its consumption but also in terms of its production (HLPE 
2012; Devereux 2009).
An obvious way for social protection to contribute to food security 
is through social transfers, in kind or in cash. They can enable the poor to 
afford adequate food, and they can smoothen seasonal income 
13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND FOOD: NEARING THE END… 
314
fluctuations, especially for subsistence farmers. In many countries, small-
holders depend on rainfed agriculture and have—depending on the rain 
pattern in their region—only one harvest season per year. This leads to 
insufficient access to income or food throughout several months of the 
lean season (Devereux and Tavener-Smith 2019). Social transfers can pre-
vent harmful coping strategies such as reducing food intake or the sale of 
assets (Devereux and Tavener-Smith 2019).
By raising household incomes, social protection can improve nutri-
tion through making more diverse foods available. Besides the ILO,20 
UNICEF is one of the leading international organizations that promote 
rights-based universal social protection, and produced its first “Social 
Protection Strategic Framework” in 2012 (UNICEF 2019, 1). UNICEF 
recognizes the positive impact that social protection can have on the 
nutrition of children, as a “good consumption and diet diversification 
[are] a major focus of expenditure when families living in poverty receive 
cash transfers” (UNICEF 2019, 29). But they also point out that addi-
tional concerted interventions are needed to address undernutrition 
effectively (UNICEF 2019; see also Devereux 2018a, 194). UNICEF 
engages in programs aimed at improving the nutrition of mothers, preg-
nant women, children, and adolescents and includes, for instance, breast-
feeding campaigns or the supplementation of micronutrients.21 For its 
part, the WFP connects nutrition, agricultural development, and social 
protection by sourcing “home-grown” food for school meals, thereby 
improving educational outcomes while also offering an additional mar-
ket to local smallholders.22
Social protection can also have productive effects. Especially for small-
holders, overcoming financing constraints is a key step toward increasing 
production; yet, the private credit facilities that were supposed to replace 
the former state-led ones have failed to meet this need (Chang 2009, 
18–19). Cash transfers are thus a useful support for farmers to invest in 
agricultural inputs and assets, such as seed, fertilizer, implements, or the 
use of processing facilities. In 2003, social protection was stipulated as a 
20 https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/social-security/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. 
Accessed May 16, 2020. While the ILO’s Social Protection Floors, adopted in 2012, are a 
key step in building rights-based social protection systems, they do not dwell on issues of 
nutrition (Devereux 2018b).
21 https://www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_action.html. Accessed May 16, 2020.
22 https://www.wfp.org/home-grown-school-meals. Accessed May 16, 2020. This differs 
from USAID, for instance, which sources US food for its food aid.
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“corporate priority” by the FAO and is increasingly integrated into its 
assistance missions (FAO 2017, 1). It aims to expand social protection to 
rural people, to forge synergies between social protection and agriculture, 
to make agriculture nutrition-sensitive, and to use social protection for 
agricultural resilience (FAO 2017). Under its “From Protection to 
Production Project”, the FAO, in collaboration with UNICEF, evaluates 
the productive effects of cash transfer programs.23 Other social protection 
schemes include insurance mechanisms that protect smallholders against 
droughts or crop failure (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2018, 6), and 
supporting rural organizations that can collectivize risks (FAO 2017).
In sum, the current social protection momentum offers a much-needed 
opportunity to bring back those agricultural policies that were previously 
dismantled during the neoliberal era.
conclusIon
Ensuring that all people across the world have access to food remains an 
unresolved problem. Despite many decades of investments by interna-
tional organizations, the number of those living with hunger or under-
nourishment is on the rise, and the productive capacities of farmers in 
the Global South remain severely incapacitated. While the formal inter-
national architecture around food has failed to address the major under-
lying structural problems, a growing number of civil society and peasant 
movements pose vital questions about the current global capitalist order, 
thereby re- politicizing what has largely become a deceptively peaceful 
mishmash of micro debates. Not least thanks to the current attention to 
rights-based social protection, several public interventions that could 
potentially remedy some of the negative consequences of the neoliberal 
reforms have been rediscovered. The end of the lean season of global 
food policies might thus be in sight. But whether this momentum is 
utilized will also depend on the political power and effectiveness of orga-
nizations that could challenge the neoliberal paradigm, which has been 
successfully “embedded” (Duncan 2016) by the World Bank and 
the WTO.
As Orford has pointed out, the fact that making sure people have 
enough to eat has become a task for international organizations, who act 
23 http://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en/. Accessed May 16, 2020.
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“on behalf of humanity as a whole” is in itself remarkable (Orford 2015, 
9). After all, food production and consumption are fundamentally local 
activities. Solving the problem of their equitable distribution might need 
to start from there.
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migration, family and education, and health and environment. Each con-
tribution has provided specific accounts of actor constellations, ideational 
content, and resulting characterizations of global social policy architec-
tures. In this final chapter, we aim to bring together in a systematic man-
ner the insights from these various social policy fields in order to generalize 
about populations of IOs, ideas and discourses, and patterns of global 
governance in social policies.
Naturally, most of the chapters in the volume acknowledge that the fields 
being looked at are driven by many different global actors, with IOs being 
just one, albeit a central one. None of the chapters nor this conclusion sug-
gest that IOs are always the most important or most powerful actors. 
Nevertheless, they can be considered the most multi-faceted type of actor, in 
particular due to their multiple and varying roles, functions, and mechanisms 
of impact. By IOs we refer to intergovernmental organizations which have 
their own organizational bodies (e.g. secretariats) and have states as their 
prime members. Other types of organizations (e.g. bi- or multilateral associa-
tions of international exchange or international non- governmental organiza-
tions) are mentioned and discussed in relation to and within the context of 
IOs. In conceptualizing global social governance within social fields, we were 
interested in mapping each field according to the IOs active in it and analyz-
ing the discourses they promote. The analytical approaches of organizational 
ecology and of soft governance within the study of IR were loosely applied in 
this volume as heuristic frames and offered a theoretical lens for assessing the 
developments in the social policy fields. First, each chapter in this book shed 
light on IO involvement in a particular social policy field by describing the 
population of engaging IOs, namely how a field is constituted as well as which 
are the major or regional IOs. Second, each chapter examined the discourses 
within and between the IOs of a respective field, presenting the major leit-
motifs and policies found in a field. Overall, the chapters described and ana-
lyzed what we call the architecture of arguments in global social governance.
This concluding chapter resumes the arguments made in the introduc-
tion to this volume. We highlight prevailing cross-cutting issues and 
themes by summarizing findings pertinent to the different questions we 
raised in the introduction: How is the field of IOs in global social gover-
nance constituted? How can the discourses of IOs in social policy fields be 
described? How is the constellation of IOs interlinked with what they 
address? IOs have actively shaped the architecture of arguments in global 
social governance for a long time: They have populated diverse social fields 
and exercised soft governance, shaping how the global discourse on social 
policy topics is organized through the cognitive authority they hold over 
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their specific field. While the dynamics within populations tend to be char-
acterized by cooperation and coexistence, looking at the discourses and 
ideas promoted in social policy reveals contestation between IOs. This 
chapter closes by formulating avenues for further research.
IO POPulatIOns In GlObal sOcIal POlIcIes
The previous chapters mapped the population of IOs in a given social policy 
field by assessing the organizational fields in the realm of social policy. They 
showed which actors were pivotal and how the composition of IOs dealing 
with a certain policy evolved. Some IOs appear in almost all social policy 
fields. This group of almost omnipresent IOs includes the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank in particular, and increas-
ingly also the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) to a certain extent. Therefore, these three IOs can be considered 
as general global social policy actors, working across a significant variety and 
number of specific social policy areas. This is not fundamentally new or sur-
prising. Studies from as early as the 1990s onward have placed the ILO and 
the World Bank at the center of explaining global social policies and gover-
nance (Deacon 2007; Deacon et  al. 1997). Equally significant in more 
recent years has been the OECD, which made notable contributions to the 
field and is considered a key global social policy actor (see also Deeming and 
Smyth 2018; Deacon and Kaasch 2008; Kaasch 2010; Ervik 2009; Mahon 
2009). This observation holds true even for most of the policy fields that 
have barely been addressed by the global social policy literature before.
Also in line with earlier works (Deacon et al. 1997), all chapters have 
shown how the UN system is a structural determinant of global social 
policy fields. Particularly the overarching Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as global 
initiatives on the UN level, are mechanisms that bring IO actors together 
in their commitments to achieve common goals. That has been specifically 
mentioned in several chapters, for example, by Lakeman on climate change 
or by Wolkenhauer on food.
With regard to single IOs, the oldest one is also one of the most signifi-
cant and visible organizations in social policy: the ILO. Mandated with 
labor market and social protection issues and uniquely comprised in a tri-
partite manner of governments, employers, and workers, the ILO appears 
as a key player in any global social policy field. In many of the chapters, the 
story repeats itself: the World Bank appeared on the scene in the 1990s, 
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challenging the ILO (and other UN agencies) and taking on quite a pow-
erful role from that point on (apart from Deacon’s work; Koivusalo and 
Ollila 1997 made such an argument for the field of health; Mundy and 
Verger 2015 for education). Similarly, the OECD emerged as an influen-
tial actor in social policy. While this IO is significantly different due to it 
having a limited number of member states and therefore a rather indirect 
impact on most countries of the world, its ideational and discursive power 
has also challenged UN specialized agencies (see, e.g. some of the contri-
butions in Mahon and McBride 2008).
Several major and globally acting IOs, like the ILO, the World Bank, 
and the OECD, successively expanded their social policy portfolios and 
populated niches which were previously not occupied by IOs. This, among 
other things, resulted in what Deacon (2007) had called ‘overlapping’ and 
‘competing’ institutions in the shorter term. In the longer term, however, 
much of this has turned into collaborative relationships under joint goals 
or initiatives. In this way, as within the UN system particularly, the ILO 
and the World Bank were able to take leading positions in wider initiatives, 
keep powerful positions over extended time periods—even when faced 
with more IOs as actors in the field—and set the tone for as well as play a 
dominant role in shaping the global discourse. This can be seen, for exam-
ple, in the context of the Social Protection Floor initiative, as mentioned 
by Heneghan and Kaasch.
Such findings help us to specify the meaning of ‘populations’ as the 
dominant IOs active in specific social policy fields, but potentially also for 
global social policy and governance in general. We can identify several pat-
terns of how such fields are constituted and have developed over time. The 
fundamental distinction works along two dimensions: first, density and 
diversity focus on how many and what kind of IOs are active in a policy 
field. The concepts of density and diversity also address whether certain 
IOs have occupied particular niches within a policy field. Second, the 
interaction and relationship of the involved (IO) actors in a field can be 
characterized by either cooperation or contestation. Interaction and rela-
tionship also refer to the communication between IOs within a population 
as well as how IOs interact with the organizational environment of states, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other collective actors.
Prime examples of social policy fields which are densely populated by a 
diversity of IOs are education, as shown by Niemann and Martens, as well 
as the social policy dimensions of climate change, as elaborated by 
Lakeman. In both fields, we find a high number of IOs actively promoting 
 K. MARTENS ET AL.
329
their views and ideas. However, both fields also vary: while many of the 
IOs active in education are either distinct ‘education’ IOs or have been 
dealing with education as part of their mandate for a long time, climate 
change and its social dimension is a field which almost no IO seems to 
deny, and even IOs that have a distinctive thematic background and usually do 
not deal with matters of climate change have contributed to the discourse. 
In contrast, other fields are covered by a few specialized global IOs. Youth 
employment, as explored by Fergusson, is a policy field that is focused on a 
specific group and a specific labor market issue. With this example, we also 
see how global social policy studies are increasingly being organized into 
sub-fields. Their historical development is usually much shorter and the 
number of actors smaller—the ILO and World Bank commonly being the 
key players. According to Heneghan, both organizations have also largely 
shaped the global discourse on pension reform, although at different times 
and accompanied by a few UN organizations, the OECD, and the 
European Union (EU). In the case of children and their rights, Holzscheiter 
has argued that the centrality of the UN system and related organizations 
has become prevalent.
An important new finding for global social governance more generally 
that can be taken from the collection of chapters in this book is the signifi-
cance of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). Although its focus is on education, science, 
and culture, UNESCO has been identified as an influential IO in various 
chapters. Besides being active in its core competency areas, UNESCO has 
also covered care and migration policies, disability, and even water issues. 
In fact, UNESCO was the first agency to deal with international health 
worker migration as an issue of global concern, as highlighted by Yeates 
and Pillinger. In the case of disability, Schuster and Kolleck underlined that 
UNESCO became a strong and active supporter of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), adopting its own action plan 
for supporting persons with disabilities. Since its inception, UNESCO was 
involved in water politics, including the launch of UNESCO’s International 
Hydrological Decade, as Schmidt demonstrated. Similarly, Fergusson elab-
orated that UNESCO has always been concerned with questions of youth 
(un)employment and has shaped the discourse in favor of raising the 
school leaving age. In light of its name and mandate, UNESCO has obvi-
ously been an important IO in the realm of education since its inception, 
although it is neither the only IO within the UN system nor the only 
education IO, as demonstrated by Niemann and Martens.
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The relationship between IOs within a policy field also differs signifi-
cantly. On a continuum, this could range from cut-throat competition at 
the one pole to cordial cooperation on the other. However, in the case of 
social policy, we generally find that the typical contestations described for 
global social policies in the 1990s (Deacon et al. 1997) have not remained 
stable. Now, patterns of cooperation prevail over contestation in many 
global social policy fields. Even if IOs with very different worldviews and 
organizational backgrounds interact, like the OECD and the ILO for 
example, they still manage to agree on some common ground and do not 
escalate their diverging policy positions into permanent conflict. Two 
major causes for this development can be identified in the various case 
studies: global crisis and common (development) goals. For example, 
Mahon described in her chapter how after the global economic and finan-
cial crisis in 2008, the three major IOs in the realm of family policies—the 
ILO, the OECD, and the World Bank—embraced the concepts and lan-
guage of inclusive growth and recognized women’s unequal share of 
unpaid domestic work. As concerns the field of international health care 
workers, Yeates and Pillinger showed that the International Platform on 
Health Worker Mobility presents a recent example of cooperation between 
the ILO, the OECD, and WHO. This also mirrors the way in which the 
field of international health care workers is scattered across a variety of IOs 
which each look at it through a specific lens. According to Fergusson, the 
field of youth (un)employment is similarly characterized by recent IO 
partnerships, in which foremost the ILO and the World Bank collectively 
interpreted youth unemployment. It is too early to predict patterns of 
change or new structures in global social governance as a consequence of 
the COVID-19 crisis. However, the chapter by Kaasch identified some 
signs that at least global health governance might revert back to more 
individualized IO approaches. The role of the MDGs, SDGs, and other 
global initiatives, such as the Universal Health Coverage approach 
described in the chapter by Kaasch or the social protection floor initiative 
referred to in Heneghan’s chapter, provides incentives to collaborate rather 
than to compete. Being part of such initiatives, not to mention heading 
specific gatherings or joint institutions, provides important leverage in 
related discourses.
Most of the IOs which were identified as dominant in social policies are 
global IOs. This means that their activities are not restricted to a particular 
region or set of countries. Usually, these global IOs are the ‘big players’. 
However, in some social policy fields, regional IOs were also important 
and thus occupied their own particular niche. This has become particularly 
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evident in the field of education, in which many IOs have a regional scope, 
as Niemann and Martens have shown. Despite the dominance of the UN 
system in the field of disability, regional approaches are now also visible. 
For example, Schuster and Kolleck demonstrated that the EU has a disability 
strategy and a focus on collecting information and data on the implemen-
tation status of the CRPD in member states. On the African continent and 
in the Southeast Asian region, IOs promoted and adopted additional 
instruments to mainstream the rights of people with disabilities. In the 
case of labor standards, Römer, Henninger, and Dung argued that regional 
organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) or the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), are better at 
coming to agreements and overcoming deadlocks since they represent 
more homogeneous groups of countries.
In addition, the field an IO is active in is also populated by other actors. 
Although other actors were not the focus of attention in our volume, it 
was impossible in some fields to describe the population of IOs without 
reference to other players, since their interconnection is deeply inter-
twined. The field of disability, as shown by Schuster and Kolleck, is a prime 
example, whereby the nexus between civil society actors and IOs is par-
ticularly strong in promoting and implementing the CRPD. The field of 
youth (un)employment, as explored by Fergusson, is characterized by part-
nerships between IOs, national governments, and also through partnership- 
based entrepreneurial solutions. Similarly, in the field of labor standards, 
Römer, Henninger, and Dung showed that the implementation and 
enforcement of standards are deeply supported by a variety of actors, 
including multi-stakeholder initiatives, international unions, NGOs, and 
also grassroots movements. Furthermore, Holzscheiter argued that starting 
from the 1990s, the field of children’s rights became densely populated by 
non-governmental, hybrid, and public-private partnership organizations 
as well as networks which all interact with each other. For education, 
Niemann and Martens reminded us that despite there being 30 IOs active 
in the field, some NGOs and think tanks can be more influential through 
their financial means than many of the education IOs with little budgets.
DIscOurses IOs sPreaD abOut sOcIal POlIcy Issues
As has been shown, all analyzed social policy fields are populated by several 
IOs. These IOs do not necessarily hold the same preferences or convic-
tions regarding the best policy solutions or the most desirable policy aims. 
Hence, sometimes IOs discursively compete for who gets their ideas 
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accepted (Béland and Orenstein 2013). In analyzing the cognitive author-
ity of IOs within a given policy field, it is important to take into account 
who is able to shape problem perceptions, goal definitions, and appropri-
ate means. Since this generally reflects a soft governance approach, assess-
ing how IOs disseminate their ideas within a discourse is crucial. Discourse 
dynamics (how framing in a social policy field varied over time) and dis-
course coalitions (consensus or diverging ideas) are two concepts that 
have been addressed throughout this volume. While the first aspect is tied 
to the changing nature of a global discourse in a social policy field, the 
latter refers to cooperation among IOs when putting forward their ide-
ational framework. To recall, the concept of ‘discourse’ in this volume 
refers to the strategic way in which the collective actor IOs frame ideas. 
Analyzing the discourses which IOs promote allows for insights into their 
policies and leitmotifs, which shape particular social policy fields, and a 
better understanding of how views on social policies have evolved 
over time.
The discourses IOs promote are not static but changing: they have dif-
ferent facets and scopes in different times and contexts. As Heneghan 
showed for the case of pensions, the discourses IOs spread are shaped by 
paradigm shifts about global economics. Moreover, certain discourses can 
be highly connected with specific IOs. In the case of disability, as explored 
by Schuster and Kolleck, it is particularly striking that specific preferences 
are strongly interlocked with the involved IOs: while a medical approach 
to disability is promoted by WHO and involves enhancing welfare policies 
to support and ‘medically repair’ disabled individuals, a sociopolitical or 
rights-based approach to disability policymaking is favored by the UN 
system and implies an adjustment of the physical environments of disabled 
persons to suit their needs. The OECD and the ILO instead favor an eco-
nomic model of disability by focusing on building and ensuring inclusive 
structures in the labor market. In the realm of family issues, Mahon dem-
onstrated that discourses promoted by IOs were bifurcated until the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 between the North and the South, whereby the 
North connected with IOs such as the ILO and the OECD and followed 
the shift they promoted from the male breadwinner to adult earner care-
giver model, whereas the South employed the policies of UNICEF and 
the World Bank which primarily targeted the children of poor families. 
After 2008 and with the introduction of the SDGs, both world regions 
have come to be addressed in a common discourse of inclusive growth. In 
 K. MARTENS ET AL.
333
the case of water policies, we have learned from the chapter by Schmidt 
that IOs contributed to the discourse on water being changed from one 
where it was seen as a natural resource to one where it is framed as a 
social good.
In some cases, discourses have become harmonized and previous con-
testation has been replaced by collaboration and associated agreement 
over ideas. The chapter by Römer, Henninger, and Dung illustrated the 
tensions and disagreements that importantly characterize the discourse on 
a set of adequate global labor standards across institutions. In fact, between 
and even within IOs, there are different viewpoints based on conflicting 
ideological beliefs on labor standards. In addition, there are also strong 
regional differences. The field of pensions has typically been described as a 
field of contestation of economic paradigms (neoliberal views vs. social 
investment), where IOs accordingly promote one or the other, as can be 
seen by the ILO’s opposition to the neoliberal-leaning World Bank and 
OECD. The chapter by Heneghan told this same story too, but also pro-
vided evidence of global economic crises having an impact on economic 
thinking. Nowadays, the organizations collaborate under the roof of the 
Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B), and the 
discourse over appropriate pension reform happens with the aim of inter- 
agency agreement on key terms, ideas, and recommendations.
For the field of climate change and social policy, as dealt with in the 
chapter by Lakeman, the tensions between economic, environmental, and 
social goals are expected to lead to competing policy ideas and models. 
However, the field as such is currently only just beginning to emerge, and 
the engagement of IOs is still more focused on issues of climate change 
and its impact on social well-being than on establishing comprehensive 
eco-social policies. As Yeates and Pillinger have argued, some contestation 
also prevails in the area of health worker migration, where fracture lines 
within the cooperative Global Skills Partnerships have emerged and where 
the essential health needs and social protection approaches of the ILO and 
WHO have been challenged by proponents of mobility, financial incen-
tives, employability, and skills transfers by the OECD and the World Bank. 
For global health governance regarding health care systems, Kaasch 
showed that it is the level of abstraction that produces dynamics of con-
sensus or contestation, respectively.
It also became apparent that the discourse in one social field is often 
linked to the discourse in other fields of IO activity. For example, 
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discussing disability rights is associated with preventing poverty and granting 
access to education for people with disabilities, as Schuster and Kolleck 
have shown. Similarly, children’s rights also touch upon the topics of 
health, education, food security, and social benefits, according to 
Holzscheiter. In addition, social policy discourse can also be shaped by 
non-social policy issues: Schmidt pointed out that water policy discussed 
by IOs is also influenced by knowledge from engineering and technologi-
cal progress. Also, the discourse on development policies contributed to 
how water was framed as a social good. In sum, the interlinkage between 
discourses could lead to new evaluations, goal definitions, or problem 
recognitions.
In several social policy fields, the authors have identified a current dom-
inant double-edged discourse in the nexus between economic issues and 
social rights. In this context, the preferences and leitmotifs of IOs vary and 
the purpose of a given social policy is defined differently. This does not 
mean that IOs with different world views are necessarily irreconcilable 
with each other. It rather means that (groups of) IOs pursue different aims 
that in turn shape the whole discourse within a social policy field. In the 
case of care and migration, the dualism is reflected in the availability of 
health workers on the one hand and the quality of provisions on the other 
hand, as Yeates and Pillinger have argued. The discourse on education 
revolves around the following two education purposes: a means to gener-
ate human capital or a social right to promote citizenship values. While 
some IOs like the OECD or the World Bank primarily focus on the 
former, the ILO and UNESCO place education as a citizenship right at 
the center of their approach, according to Niemann and Martens. 
Fergusson highlighted in his study on youth (un)employment that the 
right to quality (vocational) training is sometimes plotted against consid-
erations of employability (options) in the job market. Finally, in the dis-
course on children’s rights, Holzscheiter claimed that a traditional approach 
to serving children’s special needs by providing (financial) assistance is 
contrasted with a more progressive approach of recognizing children’s 
rights as human rights.
In addition, the analyses in this volume also show that IOs may have 
divergent interpretations of a given concept depending on their specific 
angle. While food security in the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) has been associated with securing its produc-
tion and fighting hunger, the World Bank’s solution to food security has 
lain in providing financial access for consumption. From the perspective of 
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the World Trade Organization (WTO), food security has instead been 
seen as a function of open markets and trade, as demonstrated by 
Wolkenhauer. Yeates and Pillinger showed in the case of health worker 
migration that even though underpinning ideas were shared by relevant 
IOs, the ideas were taken up in quite different ways. While the ILO, 
WHO, and UNESCO all subscribe to the UN’s normative principles on 
human rights and equality, each IO blends in different perspectives which 
in turn reflect their specific fundamental discourses on improving working 
conditions and social justice (ILO), meeting essential health needs 
(WHO), or of emigration of highly skilled health workers (UNESCO). As 
elaborated by Holzscheiter, sometimes different views of global IOs and 
regional organizations become apparent in the discourse. Children’s 
rights, as formulated in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) and interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), are challenged on the grounds of Western bias by regional human 
rights treaties and institutions, like the ASEAN Commission on the Rights 
of Women and Children which pays additional attention to a stronger 
cultural embedding of core principles and ideas codified in the UNCRC.
lInkInG the cOnstellatIOn Of IOs tO the DIscOurses 
they PrOmOte
In sum, IOs have been shaping global social governance not only since 
recent times but for a century. Most exceptionally, the ILO is the most 
prominent IO in this regard and across all fields, but especially the World 
Bank and the OECD are among the dominant players too. Thus, IOs with 
universal membership, like the UN and UN agencies, have been shaping 
global discourses with great intensity. Hence, it is safe to say that IOs have 
held cognitive authority in the realm of social policy for a long time, and 
states not only tolerated but also encouraged the delegation of social pol-
icy authority to the international level long before it was considered neces-
sary due to globalization processes and growing international 
interdependencies. IOs often exercise soft governance as broadcasters of 
new ideas. What has become evident from the contributions in this vol-
ume is that the general approach of IOs does not differ in social fields: 
While an economistic view is applied by the World Bank, the OECD, and 
to some extent the ILO, the UN system and other IOs apply social or 
rights-based approaches.
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The fact that IOs deal with social policy on a global scale, however, is 
no recent phenomenon. Although social policy is widely considered as a 
classical domain of the nation state, the internationalization of it began 
well before globalization. It even dates back to before World War II, and 
before many currently operational IOs were founded. As Schmidt reminded 
us, one of the first multilateral international agreements, the founding 
treaty of the Danube Commission of 1856 on water issues, also addressed 
social policy issues in the broader sense. A very early form of protecting 
children’s rights was established back in 1904 with the International 
Agreement for the Suppression of ‘White Slave Traffic’, according to 
Holzscheiter. In the field of food policy, as we learned from the chapter by 
Wolkenhauer, the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) was founded 
in 1905 as a global mechanism for networking as well as for exchanging 
information and statistics. The ILO, recently celebrating its centenary 
anniversary, started its social policy program in 1919 with Convention 
003 on Maternity Protection, as explored by Mahon, and the Minimum 
Age Convention on youth employment, as explored by Fergusson. In the 
subsequent decades, the ILO continued to aim for the introduction of 
social protection mechanisms, for instance with the Conventions 35 and 
36, on old-age insurance in industry and agriculture.
However, intrinsic features of organizations may determine the kind of 
involvement an IO has as well as the nature of its discourse. Thus, in addi-
tion to the organizational environment, specific features of an IO have 
shaped the kind of discourses they promote and their ability to respond to 
a changing environment. As seen in the case of pensions, dealt with by 
Heneghan, the World Bank and the ILO have their own distinct depart-
ments on the issue and enjoy having the autonomy to promote specific 
pension models. Moreover, both organizations have the means to offer 
professional and technical assistance to reforming countries. Also, compe-
tition between sub-departments of single IOs influences how a discourse 
is shaped. For example, the discourse on family policy within the OECD 
was changed by the adoption of the initiative ‘New Approaches to 
Economic Challenges’, which posed direct challenges to the ideas of the 
Economic Department by enhancing the centrality of the Directorate for 
Employment, Labor and Social Affairs’ organizational discourse, as Mahon 
has shown.
Furthermore, intrinsic features of IOs may also influence cognitive 
authority. For the case of labor standards, Römer, Henninger, and Dung 
have shown that unlike other IOs, the regulations passed by ASEAN 
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remain non-binding with questionable impact due to the lack of regional 
harmonization. Since the OECD and the EU have a distinct membership, 
they are reluctant to promote one specific pension model and therefore 
prefer to use benchmarking as cognitive authority to promote general 
principles. According to Heneghan, reputation and cognitive authority 
also play a role in pension politics, as the tripartite structure of the ILO 
promotes the emergence of consensus. In the case of education policy, the 
cognitive authority of the OECD stems in particular from its data analysis 
department. The OECD’s emphasis on gathering and interpreting data on 
education performance through its Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) Study made the IO a central reference point for other 
IOs (and other stakeholders) in the discourse (Niemann and Martens 2018).
With this volume, our aim was to analyze global social governance as an 
architecture of arguments brought forward by the IOs active in various 
fields within the broader areas of labor and migration, family and educa-
tion, and health and environment. The varying constellations of IOs in 
different social policy fields and their patterns of discourse that character-
ize global social policies have been explored. The volume brought forward 
interesting and new insights about IOs and their involvement in global 
social policies as summarized in this chapter. However, there are also many 
issues that remain:
First, we need to better understand additional policy fields that overlap 
with social policies. For example, trade, energy, or security policies would 
almost certainly reveal a social policy component. Hence, it is not the 
policy field per se that makes it a social policy field, but it is more a deliber-
ate decision to perceive issues as a social policy.
Second, we could aim to find new ways to analyze patterns of collabora-
tion and contestation by performing a more systematic analysis of fields 
and sub-fields in social policies. More concretely, characterizations of 
global labor market policies could be compared with and related to analy-
ses of the sub-fields of labor market policies such as youth unemployment, 
migrant labor markets, and child labor; or analyses of different fields of 
global labor markets like the global food industry, the global carpets and 
rugs industry, and global care markets. There are already analyses of many 
such groups and fields, sometimes also addressing the role of IOs, but 
there is no systematic comparison between them as to what characterizes 
many or all sub-fields and what is specific to a particular aspect of global 
labor markets.
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Third, more theoretical questions would include considerations on 
whether different discourses are becoming more isomorphic. Delving 
deeper into such questions would result in a better conceptualization of 
the meaning of overlapping and merging policy fields, as opposed to cur-
rent concepts of discourses becoming more similar. From there, we could 
further investigate the implications for actor constellations and inter-actor 
relationships, or more generally for global social governance architecture(s).
Fourth, more research into the types of IOs in global social gover-
nance, the ways in which they are dependent on (not just aware of or 
linked to) other global social policy actors, and the extent of this depen-
dency is also important for understanding their roles, positions, and 
leeway for exerting influence. A prominent example is the strong involve-
ment of the Bill and Melinda Gates  Foundation with WHO activities, 
because it regularly causes criticism from outside observers. Comparatively, 
we know much less about other IOs and their involvement with and 
dependency on other actors.
Fifth, any further contribution to global social governance will certainly 
have to take into account the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
the roles, positions, abilities, and power of IOs. In the context of declining 
multilateralism, a process that was already in motion prior to the outbreak, 
the future of IOs like WHO and UNESCO is anything but certain. 
Particularly at risk is their ‘global’ significance, while financial institutions 
and knowledge actors like the OECD might be found to have a more 
stable position in the long term beyond the crisis.
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